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INTERROGATION OF CRIMINAL DEFENDANTSSOME VIEWS ON MIRANDA v. ARIZONA
The decision in Miranda v. Arizona is another of the United States
Supreme Court's major efforts directed at the protection of individual
liberties. The tremendous controversy engendered by the decision
prompted the Editorial Board to invite a number of scholars to express
their views on the case. These remarks follow a digest of the opinion of
the Court.
MIRANDA v. ARIZONA
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Arizona. No. 759.
Argued February 28-March 1, 1966.-Decided June 13, 1966.*
Mr. Chief Justice WARREN delivered the opinion of the Court.
The cases before us raise questions which go to the roots of our concepts of American
criminal jurisprudence: the restraints society must observe consistent with the Federal
Constitution in prosecuting individuals for crime. More specifically, we deal with the
admissibility of statements obtained from an individual who is subjected to custodial
police interrogation and the necessity for procedures which assure that the individual is
accorded his privilege under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution not to be compelled to incriminate himself.
We dealt with certain phases of this problem recently in Escobedo v. Illinois ....
This case has been the subject of judicial interpretation and spirited legal debate since
it was decided two years ago. Both state and federal courts, in assessing its implications,
have arrived at varying conclusions. A wealth of scholarly material has been written tracing its ramifications and underpinnings. Police and prosecutor have speculated on its range
and desirability. We granted certiorari in these cases . . .in order further to explore some
facets of the problems, thus exposed, of applying the privilege against self-incrimination
to in-custody interrogation, and to give concrete constitutional guidelines for law enforcement agencies and courts to follow.
We start here, as we did in Escobedo, with the premise that our holding is not an innovation in our jurisprudence, but is an application of principles long recognized and applied
in other settings. We have undertaken a thorough re-examination of the Escobedo decision
and the principles it announced, and we reaffirm it. That case was but an explication of
basic rights that are enshrined in our Constitution-that "INo person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself," and that "the accused shall
* Together with No. 760, Vignera v. New York, on certiorari to the Court of Appeals
of New York and No. 761, Westover v. United States, on certiorari to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuits, both argued February 28-March 1, 1966; and No.
584, California v. Stewart, on certiorari to the Supreme Court of California, argued February
28-March 2, 1966. [The remainder of the Court's footnotes have been omitted or renumbered.]
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•. .have the Assistance of Counsel"--rights which were put in jeopardy in that case
through official overbearing. . . It was necessary in Escobedo, as here, to insure that
what was proclaimed in the Constitution had not become but a "form of words" . . .In
the hands of government officials. And it is in this spirit, consistent with our role as judges,
that we adhere to the principles of Escobedo today.
Our holding will be spelled out with some specificity in the pages which follow but
briefly stated it is this: the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or Inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates
the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination.
By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after
a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action In
any significant way.1 As for the procedural safeguards to be employed, unless other fully
effective means are devised to inform accused persons of their right of silence and to assure
a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following measures are required. Prior to any
questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the
presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation
of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. If,
however, he indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to
consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no questioning. Likewise, If the
individual is alone and indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be interrogated,
the police may not question him. The mere fact that he may have answered some questions
or volunteered some statements on his own does not deprive him of the right to refrain
from answering any further inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney and thereafter consents to be questioned.
I.
The constitutional issue we decide in each of these cases is the admissibility of statements
obtained from a defendant questioned while in custody and deprived of his freedom of
action. In each, the defendant was questioned by police officers, detectives, or a prosecuting attorney in a room in which he was cut off from the outside world. In none of these
cases was the defendant given a full and effective warning of his rights at the outset of
the interrogation process. In all the cases, the questioning elicited oral admissions, and In
three of them, signed statements as well which were admitted at their trials. They all thus
share salient features--incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated
atmosphere, resulting in self-incriminating statements without full warnings of constitutional
rights.
An understanding of the nature and setting of this in-custody interrogation is essential
to our decisions today. The difficulty in depicting what transpires at such interrogations
stems from the fact that in this country they have largely taken place incommunicado.
From extensive factual studies undertaken in the early 1930's, including the famous Wickersham Report to Congress by a Presidential Commission, it is clear that police violence
and the "third degree" flourished at that time. . . . The use of physical brutality and
violence is not, unfortunately, relegated to the past or to any part of the country. ...
Unless a proper limitation upon custodial interrogation is achieved-such as these decisions
1. This is what we meant in Escobedo when we spoke of an investigation which had
focused on an accused.
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will advance-there can be no assurance that practices of this nature will be eradicated
in the foreseeable future.
[Tihe modern practice of in-custody interrogation is psychologically rather than physically
oriented .... Interrogation still takes place in privacy. Privacy results in secrecy and this
in turn results in a gap in our knowledge as to what in fact goes on in the interrogation
rooms. A valuable source of information about present police practices, however, may be
found in various police manuals and texts which document procedures employed with
success in the past, and which recommend various other effective tactics. These texts are
2
used by law enforcement agencies themselves as guides. It should be noted that these
texts professedly present the most enlightened and effective means presently used to obtain
statements through custodial interrogation. By considering these texts and other data, it
is possible to describe procedures observed and noted around the country.
From . . . representative samples of interrogation techniques, the setting prescribed by
the manuals and observed in practice becomes dear. In essence, it is this: To be alone
with the subject is essential to prevent distraction and to deprive him of any outside
support. The aura of confidence in his guilt undermines his will to resist. He merely confirms the preconceived story the police seek to have him describe. Patience and persistence,
at times relentless questioning, are employed. To obtain a confession, the interrogator
must "patiently maneuver himself or his quarry into a position from which the desired
objective may be attained." When normal procedures fail to produce the needed result,
the police may resort to deceptive stratagems such as giving false legal advice. It Is
important to keep the subject off balance, for example, by trading on his insecurity about
himself or his surroundings. The police then persuade, trick, or cajole him out of exercising his constitutional rights.
Even without employing brutality, the "third degree" or the specific stratagems described
above, the very fact of custodial interrogation exacts a heavy toll on individual liberty and
trades on the weakness of individuals ...
In the cases before us today, given this background, we concern ourselves primarily with
this interrogation atmosphere and the evils it can bring. In No. 759, AMiranda v. Arizona,
the police arrested the defendant and took him to a special interrogation room where they
secured a confession. In No. 760, Vignera v. New York, the defendant made oral admissions
to the police after interrogation in the afternoon, and then signed an inculpatory statement
upon being questioned by an assistant district attorney later the same evening. In No. 761,
Westover v. United States, the defendant was handed over to the Federal Bureau of Investi2. The methods described in Inbau & Reid, Criminal Interrogation and Confessions
(1962), are a revision and enlargement of material presented in three prior editions of a
predecessor text, Lie Detection and Criminal Interrogation (3d ed. 1953). The authors and
their associates are officers of the Chicago Police Scientific Crime Detection Laboratory and
have had extensive experience in writing, lecturing and speaking to law enforcement authorities over a 20-year period. They say that the techniques portrayed in their manuals reflect
their experiences and are the most effective psychological stratagems to employ during interrogations. Similarly, the techniques described in O'Hara, Fundamentals of Criminal Investigation (1956), were gleaned from long service as observer, lecturer in police science, and
work as a federal criminal investigator. All these texts have had rather extensive use among
law enforcement agencies and among students of police science, with total sales and circulation of over 44,000.
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gation by local authorities after they had detained and interrogated him for a lengthy period,
both at night and the following morning. After some two hours of questioning, the federal
officers had obtained signed statements from the defendant. Lastly, in No. 584, Calilornla
v. Stewart, the local police held the defendant five days in the station and interrogated
him on nine separate occasions before they secured his inculpatory statement.
In these cases, we might not find the defendants' statements to have been involuntary In
traditional terms. Our concern for adequate safeguards to protect precious Fifth Amendment
rights is, of course, not lessened in the slightest. In each of the cases, the defendant was
thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere and run through menacing police Interrogation procedures. The potentiality for compulsion is forcefully apparent, for example, In Miranda,
where the indigent Mexican defendant was a seriously disturbed individual with pronounced
sexual fantasies, and in Stewart, in which the defendant was an indigent Los Angeles Negro
who had dropped out of school in the sixth grade. To be sure, the records do not evince
overt physical coercion or patented psychological ploys. The fact remains that in none of
these cases did the officers undertake to afford appropiate safeguards at the outset of the
interrogation to insure that the statements were truly the product of free choice.
It is obvious that such an interrogation environment is created for no purpose other than
to subjugate the individual to the will of his examiner. This atmosphere carries its own badge
of intimidation. To be sure, this is not physical intimidation, but it is equally destructive
of human dignity. The current practice of incommunicado interrogation is at odds with
one of our Nation's most cherished principles-that the individual may not be compelled to
incriminate himself. Unless adequate protective devices are employed to dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings, no statement obtained from the defendant can
truly be the product of his free choice.
II.
We sometimes forget how long it has taken to establish the privilege against self-incrimination, the sources from which it came and the fervor with which it was defended. . . . [Tlhe
constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the respect a government-state or
federal-must accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens. To maintain a "fair stateindividual balance," to require the government "to shoulder the entire load" . . . to respect
the inviolability of the human personality, our accusatory system of criminal justice demands that the government seeking to punish an individual produce the evidence against
him by its own independent labors, rather than by the cruel, simple expedient of compelling
it from his own mouth .... In sum, the privilege is fulfilled only when the person is guaranteed the right "to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his
own will. .. "
The question in these cases is whether the privilege is fully applicable during a period
of custodial interrogation. In this Court, the privilege has consistently been accorded a liberal construction.... We are satisfied that all the principles embodied in the privilege apply
to informal compulsion exerted by law-enforcement officers during in-custody questioning.
An individual swept from familiar surroundings into police custody, surrounded by antagonistic forces, and subjected to the techniques of persuasion described above cannot be
otherwise than under compulsion to speak. As a practical matter, the compulsion to speak
in the isolated setting of the police station may well be greater than in courts or other official
investigations, where there are often impartial observers to guard against intimidation or
. In addition to the expansive historical development of the privilege and the
trickery....
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sound policies which have nurtured its evolution, judicial precedent thus dearly establishes
its application to incommunicado interrogation.
Because of the adoption by Congress of Rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and this Court's effectuation of [the McNabb-Mallory Rule] . . . we have had little

occasion in the past quarter century to reach the constitutional issues in dealing with federal
interrogations. These supervisory rules, requiring production of an arrested person before a

commissioner "without unnecessary delay" and excluding evidence obtained in default of
that statutory obligation, were nonetheless responsive to the same considerations of Fifth
Amendment policy that unavoidably face us now as to the States. In McNabb ... and in
Mallory ...

we recognized both the dangers of interrogation and the appropriateness of

prophylaxis stemming from the very fact of interrogation itself.3
Our decision in Malloy v. Hogan . . . necessitates an examination of the scope of the
privilege in state cases as well..
.. Aside from the holding itself, the reasoning in Malloy
made clear what had already become apparent-that the substantive and procedural safeguards surrounding admissibility of confessions in state cases had become exceedingly exacting, reflecting all the policies embedded in the privilege .. . . The voluntariness doctrine in
the state cases, as Malloy indicates, encompasses all interrogation practices which are likely
to exert such pressure upon an individual as to disable him from making a free and rational
choice. The implications of this proposition were elaborated in our decision in .scobcdo v.
Illinois ....
Our holding there stressed the fact that the police had not advised the defendant of
his constitutional privilege to remain silent at the outset of the interrogation, and we
drew attention to that fact at several points in the decision . . . . This wras no isolated
factor, but an essential ingredient in our decision. The entire thrust of police interrogation
there, as in all the cases today, was to put the defendant in such an emotional state as to
impair his capacity for rational judgment. The abdication of the constitutional privilegethe choice on his part to speak to the police-was not made knowingly or competently
because of the failure to apprise him of his rights; the compelling atmosphere of the incustody interrogation, and not an independent decision on his part, caused the defendant
to speak.
A different phase of the Escobedo decision was significant in its attention to the absence
of counsel during the questioning. There, as in the cases today, we sought a protective
device to dispel the compelling atmosphere of the interrogation ....
The presence of counsel,
in all the cases before us today, would be the adequate protective device necessary to make
the process of police interrogation conform to the dictates of the privilege. His presence
would insure that statements made in the government-established atmosphere are not the
product of compulsion.

mI.
Today, then, there can be no doubt that the Fifth Amendment privilege is available outside of criminal court proceedings and serves to protect persons in all settings in which their
freedom of action is curtailed from being compelled to incriminate themselves. We have
concluded that without proper safeguards the process of in-custody interrogation of persons
suspected or accused of crime contains inherently compelling pressures which work to under3. Our decision today does not indicate in any manner, of course, that these rules can
be disregarded. When federal officials arrest an individual, they must as always comply with
the dictates of the congressional legislation and cases thereunder. ....
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mine the individual's will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely. In order to combat these pressures and to permit a full opportunity to
exercise the privilege against self-incrimination, the accused must be adequately and effectively apprised of his rights and the exercise of those rights must be fully honored.
It is impossible for us to foresee the potential alternatives for protecting the privilege
which might be devised by Congress or the States in the exercise of their creative rulemaking capacities. Therefore we cannot say that the Constitution necessarily requires adherence to any particular solution for the inherent compulsions of the interrogation process
as it is presently conducted. Our decision in no way creates a constitutional straitjacket which
will handicap sound efforts at reform, nor is it intended to have this effect. We encourage
Congress and the States to continue their laudable search for increasingly effective ways of
protecting the rights of the individual while promoting efficient enforcement of our criminal
laws. However, unless we are shown other procedures which are at least as effective in
apprising accused persons of their right of silence and in assuring a continuous opportunity to
exercise it, the following safeguards must be observed.
At the outset, if a person in custody is to be subjected to interrogation, he must first
be informed in clear and unequivocal terms that he has the right to remain silent. For
those unaware of the privilege, the warning is needed simply to make them aware of Itthe threshold requirement for an intelligent decision as to its exercise. More Important, such
a warning is an absolute prerequisite in overcoming the inherent pressures of the interrogation
atmosphere ...
The Fifth Amendment privilege is so fundamental to our system of constitutional rule and
the expedient of giving an adequate warning as to the availability of the privilege so simple,
we will not pause to inquire in individual cases whether the defendant was aware of his
rights without a warning being given ...
The warning of the right to remain silent must be accompanied by the explanation that
anything said can and will be used against the individual in court. This warning is needed
in order to make him aware not only of the privilege, but also of the consequences of forgoing it. . . . Moreover, this warning may serve to make the individual more acutely aware
that he is faced with a phase of the adversary system-that he is not in the presence of
persons acting solely in his interest.
The circumstances surrounding in-custody interrogation can operate very quickly to overbear the will of one merely made aware of his privilege by his interrogators. Therefore, the
right to have counsel present at the interrogation is indispensable to the protection of the
Fifth Amendment privilege under the system we delineate today. Our aim is to assure that
the individual's right to choose between silence and speech remains unfettered throughout the
interrogation process. A once-stated warning, delivered by those who will conduct the Interrogation, cannot itself suffice to that end among those who most require knowledge of
their rights. . . . iT]he need for counsel to protect the Fifth Amendment privilege comprehends not merely a right to consult with counsel prior to questioning, but also to have
counsel present during any questioning if the defendant so desires.
An individual need not make a pre-interrogation request for a lawyer. While such request
affirmatively secures his right to have one, his failure to ask for a lawyer does not constitute a waiver. No effective waiver of the right to counsel during interrogation can be recognized unless specifically made after the warnings we here delineate have been given. The
accused who does not know his rights and therefore does not make a request may be the
person who most needs counsel. . ..

1966]

MIRANDA

Accordingly we hold that an individual held for interrogation must be clearly informed
that he has the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with him during
interrogation under the system for protecting the privilege we delineate today. As with the
warnings of the right to remain silent and that anything stated can be used in evidence
against him, this warning is an absolute prerequisite to interrogation. No amount of circumstantial evidence that the person may have been aware of this right will suffice to stand
in its stead. Only through such a warning is there ascertainable assurance that the accused
was aware of this right.
If an individual indicates that be wishes the assistance of counsel before any interrogation
occurs, the authorities cannot rationally ignore or deny his request on the basis that the
individual does not have or cannot afford a retained attorney. The financial ability of the
individual has no relationship to the scope of the rights involved here. The privilege
against self-incrimination secured by the Constitution applies to all individuals. The need
for counsel in order to protect the privilege esists for the indigent as well as the affluent.
In fact, were we to limit these constitutional rights to those who can retain an attorney,
our decisions today would be of little significance. The cases before us as well as the vast
majority of confession cases with which we have dealt in the past involve those unable
to retain counsel. While authorities are not required to relieve the accused of his poverty,
they have the obligation not to take advantage of indigence in the administration of justice.
In order fully to apprise a person interrogated of the extent of his rights under this system then, it is necessary to warn him not only that he has the right to consult with an
attorney, but also that if he is indigent a lawyer will be appointed to represent him. Without
this additional warning, the admonition of the right to consult with counsel would often
be understood as meaning only that he can consult with a lawyer if he has one or has the
funds to obtain one ....
Once warnings have been given, the subsequent procedure is clear. If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain
silent, the interrogation must cease. 4 At this point he has shown that he intends to exercise
his Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement taken after the person invokes his privilege
cannot be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise. Without the right to
cut off questioning, the setting of in-custody interrogation operates on the individual to overcome free choice in producing a statement after the privilege has been once invoked. If the
individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is
present. At that time, the individual must have an opportunity to confer with the attorney
and to have him present during any subsequent questioning. If the individual cannot obtain
an attorney and he indicates that he wants one before speaking to police, they must respect
his decision to remain silent.
This does not mean, as some have suggested, that each police station must have a "station
house lawyer" present at all times to advise prisoners. It does mean, however, that if police
propose to interrogate a person they must make known to him that he is entitled to a
lawyer and that if he cannot afford one, a lawyer will be provided for him prior to any
interrogation. If authorities conclude that they will not provide counsel during a reasonable
4. If an individual indicates his desire to remain silent, but has an attorney present, there
may be some circumstances in which further questioning would be permissible. In the absence of evidence of overbearing, statements then made in the presence of counsel might
be free of the compelling influence of the interrogation process and might fairly be construed
as a waiver of the privilege for purposes of these statements.
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period of time in which investigation in the field is carried out, they may do so without
violating the person's Fifth Amendment privilege so long as they do not question him during
that time.
If the interrogation continues without the presence of an attorney and a statement Is
taken, a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly
and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or
appointed counsel. . . This Court has always set high standards of proof for the waiver
of constitutional rights . . . and we reassert these standards as applied to in-custody Interrogation. Since the State is responsible for establishing the isolated circumstances under which
the interrogation takes place and has the only means of making available corroborated evidence of warnings given during incommunicado interrogation, the burden is rightly on Its
shoulders.
An express statement that the individual is willing to make a statement and does not
want an attorney followed closely by a statement could constitute a waiver. But a valid
waiver will not be presumed simply from the silence of the accused after warnings are given
or simply from the fact that a confession was in fact eventually obtained. . . . Moreover,
where in-custody interrogation is involved, there is no room for the contention that the
privilege is waived if the individual answers some questions or gives some information on
his own prior to invoking his right to remain silent when interrogated.
Whatever the testimony of the authorities as to waiver of rights by an accused, the fact
of lengthy interrogation or incommunicado incarceration before a statement is made is strong
evidence that the accused did not validly waive his rights. In these circumstances the fact
that the individual eventually made a statement is consistent with the conclusion that the
compelling influence of the interrogation finally forced him to do so. It is inconsistent with
any notion of a voluntary relinquishment of the privilege. Moreover, any evidence that the
accused was threatened, tricked, or cajoled into a waiver will, of course, show that the
defendant did not voluntarily waive his privilege. The requirement of warnings and waiver
of rights is a fundamental with respect to the Fifth Amendment privilege and not simply
a preliminary ritual to existing methods of interrogation.
The warnings required and the waiver necessary in accordance with our opinion today are,
in the absence of a fully effective equivalent, prerequisites to the admissibility of any statement made by a defendant. No distinction can be drawn between statements which are
direct confessions and statements which amount to "admissions" of part or all of an offense.
.. . Similarly .. . no distinction may be drawn between inculpatory statements and statements alleged to be merely "exculpatory." . . . These statements are incriminating In any
meaningful sense of the word and may not be used without the full warnings and effective
waiver required for any other statement. ...
The principles announced today deal with the protection which must be given to the
privilege against self-incrimination when the individual is first subjected to police Interrogation while in custody at the station or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action In any
way. It is at this point that our adversary system of criminal proceedings commences, distinguishing itself at the outset from the inquisitorial system recognized in some countries.
Under the system of warnings we delineate today or under any other system which may be
devised and found effective, the safeguards to be erected about the privilege must come Into
play at this point.
Our decision is not intended to hamper the traditional function of police officers In investigating crime... . When an individual is in custody on probable cause, the police may,
of course, seek out evidence in the field to be used at trial against him, Such investigation

1966]

MIRANDA

177

may include inquiry of persons not under restraint. General on-the-scene questioning as to
facts surrounding a crime or other general questioning of citizens in the fact-finding
process is not affected by our holding. It is an act of responsible citizenship for individuals
to give whatever information they may have to aid in law enforcement. In such situations
the compelling atmosphere inherent in the process of in-custody interrogation is not necessarily present.
In dealing with statements obtained through interrogation, we do not purport to find all
confessions inadmissible. Confessions remain a proper element in law enforcement. Any
statement given freely and voluntarily without any compelling influences is, of course,
admissable in evidence. ... There is no requirement that police stop a person who enters
a police station and states that he wishes to confess to a crime, or a person who calls the
police to offer a confession or any other statement he desires to make. Volunteered statements of any kind are not barred by the Fifth Amendment and their admissibility is not
affected by our holding today.
IV.
A recurrent argument made in these cases is that society's need for interrogation outweighs the privilege.... [But] if the individual desires to exercise his privilege, he has the
right to do so. This is not for the authorities to decide. An attorney may advise his client
not to talk to police until he has had an opportunity to investigate the case, or he may
wish to be present with his client during any police questioning. In doing so an attorney
is merely exercising the good professional judgment he has been taught. This is not cause
for considering the attorney a menace to law enforcement. He is merely carrying out what
he is sworn to do under his oath-to protect to the extent of his ability the rights of his
client. In fulfilling this responsibility the attorney plays a vital role in the administration of
criminal justice under our Constitution.
...
The limits we have placed on the interrogation process should not constitute an undue
interference with a proper system of law enforcement. . . . Although confessions may play
an important role in some convictions, the cases before us present graphic examples of the
overstatement of the "need?' for confessions. In each case authorities conducted interrogations ranging up to five days in duration despite the presence, through standard investigating
practices, of considerable evidence against each defendant. Further examples are chronicled
in our prior cases....
Over the years the Federal Bureau of Investigation has compiled an exemplary record of
effective law enforcement while advising any suspect or arrested person, at the outset of an
interview, that he is not required to make a statement, that any statement may be used
against him in court, that the individual may obtain the services of an attorney of his own

choice and, more recently, that he has a right to free counsel if he is unable to pay.... The
practice of the FBI can readily be emulated by state and local enforcement agencies. The

argument that the FBI deals with different crimes than are dealt with by state authorities
does not mitigate the significance of the FBI experience.
The experience in some other countries also suggests that the danger to law enforcement
in curbs on interrogation is overplayed....

It is also urged upon us that we withhold decision on this issue until state legislative
5. In accordance with our holdings today and in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U-s.
478, 492, Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958) and Cicenia v. La Gay, 357 US. 504
(1958) are not to be followed.
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bodies and advisory groups have had an opportunity to deal with these problems by rule
making. We have already pointed out that the Constitution does not require any specific code
of procedures for protecting the privilege against self-incrimination during custodial interrogation. Congress and the States are free to develop their own safeguards for the privilege,
so long as they are fully as effective as those described above in informing accused persons
of their right of silence and in affording a continuous opportunity to exercise It. In any
event, however, the issues presented are of constitutional dimensions and must be determined
by the courts. . . . Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no
rule making or legislation which would abrogate them.

V.
Because of the nature of the problem and because of its recurrent significance in numerous
cases, we have to this point discussed the relationship of the Fifth Amendment privilege to
police interrogation without specific concentration on the facts of the cases before us. We
turn now to these facts to consider the application to these cases of the constitutional principles discussed above. In each instance, we have concluded that statements were obtained
from the defendant under circumstances that did not meet constitutional standards for
protection of the privilege.
No. 759. Miranda v. Arizona.
On March 13, 1963, petitioner, Ernesto Miranda, was arrested at his home and taken In
custody to a Phoenix police station. He was there identified by the complaining witness ....
[i]e was questioned by two police officers. The officers admitted at trial that Miranda was
not advised that he had a right to have an attorney present. Two hours later, the officers
emerged from the interrogation room with a written confession signed by Miranda. At the
top of the statement was a typed paragraph stating that the confession was made voluntarly, without threats or promises of immunity and "with full knowledge of my legal rights,
understanding any statement I make may be used against me."
At his trial before a jury, the written confession was admitted into evidence over the objection of defense counsel, and the officers testified to the prior oral confession made by
Miranda during the interrogation. Miranda was found guilty of kidnapping and rape. He was
sentenced to 20 to 30 years' imprisonment on each count, the sentences to run concurrently.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arizona held that Miranda's constitutional rights were
not violated in obtaining the confession and affirmed the conviction. . . . In reaching Its
decision, the court emphasized heavily the fact that Miranda did not specifically request
counsel.

We reverse. From the testimony of the officers and by the admission of respondent, it Is
dear that Miranda was not in any way apprised of his right to consult with an attorney
and to have one present during the interrogation, nor was his right not to be compelled to
incriminate himself effectively protected in any other manner. . . . The mere fact that he
signed a statement which contained a typed-in clause stating that he had "full knowledge"
of his "legal rights" does not approach the knowing and intelligent waiver required to relinquish constitutional rights.....
No. 760. Vignera v. New York.
Vignera was found guilty of first degree robbery.... In argument to the Court of Appeals,
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the State contended that Vignera had no constitutional right to be advised of his right to
counsel or his privilege against self-incrimination. We reverse ....
Vignera nwas not warned
of any of his rights before the questioning by the detective and by the assistant district
attorney. No other steps were taken to protect these rights. Thus he was not effectively
apprised of his Fifth Amendment privilege or of his right to have counsel present and his
statements are inadmissible.
No. 761. Westover v. United States.
Westover was tried by a jury in federal court and convicted of the California robberies. . . . We reverse. On the facts of this case we cannot find that Westover knowingly
and intelligently waived his right to remain silent and his right to consult with counsel prior
to the time he made the statement. At the time the FBI agents began questioning Westover,
he had been in custody for over 14 hours and had been interrogated at length during that
period. The FBI interrogation began immediately upon the conclusion of the interrogation
by Kansas City police and was conducted in local police headquarters. Although the two law
enforcement authorities are legally distinct and the crimes for which they interrogated Westover were different, the impact on him was that of a continuous period of questioning. There
is no evidence of any warning given prior to the FBI interrogation nor is there any evidence
of an articulated waiver of rights after the FBI commenced their interrogation. The record
simply shows that the defendant did in fact confess a short time after being turned over to
the FBI following interrogation by local police. Despite the fact that the FBI agents gave
warnings at the outset of their interview, from Westover's point of view the warnings came
at the end of the interrogation process. In these circumstances an intelligent waiver of constitutional rights cannot be assumed. .. . [Iun obtaining a confession from Westover the
federal authorities were the beneficiaries of the pressure applied by the local in-custody
interrogation. In these circumstances the giving of warnings alone was not sufficient to protect the privilege.
No. 584. California v. Stewart.
Stewart was charged with kidnapping to commit robbery, rape, and murder. At his trial,
transcripts of the first interrogation and the confession at the last interrogation were introduced in evidence. The jury found Stewart guilty of robbery and first degree murder and
fixed the penalty as death. On appeal, the Supreme Court of California reversed... . It held
that under this Court's decision in Escobedo, Stewart should have been advised of his right
to remain silent and of his right to counsel and that it would not presume in the face of a
silent record that the police advised Stew%-art of his rights.
We affirm. In dealing with custodial interrogation, we will not presume that a defendant has been effectively apprised of his rights and that his privilege against self-incrimination
has been adequately safeguarded on a record that does not show that any warnings have
been given or that any effective alternative has been employed. Nor can a knowing and intelligent waiver of these rights be assumed on a silent record. Furthermore, Stewart's steadfast denial of the alleged offenses through eight of the nine interrogations over a period of
five days is subject to no other construction than that he was compelled by persistent interrogation to forego his Fifth Amendment privilege.
Therefore, in accordance with the foregoing, the judgments of the Supreme Court of
Arizona in No. 759, of the New York Court of Appeals in No. 760, and of the Court of
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Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in No. 761 are reversed. The judgment of the Supremo Court

of California in No. 584 is affirmed. It is so ordered.
[Mr. Justice Clark wrote a separate opinion, dissenting in Nos. 759, 760 and 761, and concurring in the result in No. 584. Mr. Justice Harlan dissented in an opinion in which Mr.
Justice Stewart and Mr. Justice White joined. Mr. Justice White dissented in an opinion In
which Mr. Justice Harlan and Mr. Justice Stewart joined.]

GEORGE EDWARDS*
N world history the significant contribution of the United States of
America has been its elevation of the rights of the individual as compared to the power of the state. In 1776, when Gibbons was writing The
Rise and Fall of the Roman Empire, he was able to point to only 43 years
in all prior recorded history where the purposes of any state had been primarily that of providing for the well-being of its citizens. And it was in
this historic context that our forefathers set forth in declaration of principle and constitution the ideal that this nation should exist to enhance
the privileges and opportunities of its citizens.
The concept of individual freedom is inextricably bound up with the
phrase "due process of law." The earliest version of this idea is found in
the words of the Magna Charta; the most recent in the words of Chief
Justice Warren in Mirandav. Arizona.'
"Due process of law" was first written into our Constitution by men
who had bitter experience with the arbitrary power of kings. But those
who had foreseen a possible tyranny exercised by Congress as a substitute
for the monarchy, and had sought to apply the restraint of due process to
its acts in the fifth amendment of the Constitution, had not adequately
foreseen that some restraint might likewise be required in relation to
arbitrary power exercised by an individual state. It was not until after
the end of the Civil War, in the wake of the most bitter internal conflict
in our history, that due process was made applicable to the states. And,
while it seems obvious that in this country we have chosen to bind ourselves to observation in both federal and state affairs of a national concept
of "due process of law," the problem nevertheless recurs. In the state
court trial of Billie Sol Estes not long ago, the trial judge said when denying a motion to exclude TV cameras from his courtroom:
This case is not being tried under the Federal Constitution. This Defendant has been
brought into this Court under the state laws, under the State Constitution....
I took an oath to uphold this Constitution; not the Federal Constitution but the
State Constitution; and I am going to do my best to do that as long as I preside on
this Court.... 2
* Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Judge Edwards received
his B.A. from Southern Methodist University, his MA. from Harvard University , J.D. from
Detroit College of Law and an Honorary Doctor of Laws degree from Southern Methodist
University. Formerly a Justice of the Supreme Court of Michigan and Commissioner of
Police for the city of Detroit, he is a member of the Advisory Council of Judges of the
National Council on Crime and Delinquency and is presently Chairman of the Committee
on the Administration of the Criminal Law of the United States Judicial Conference.
1. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2. Estes v. Texas, 381 US. 532, 566 (1965) (Warren, C.J., concurring).
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Between the Civil War and the 1920's due process offered little opportunity for relief to persons convicted of crime who were complaining
that the methods by which they were convicted violated their federal
constitutional rights. The cases from the early part of the twentieth century highlight how rarely due process was used successfully in criminal
cases prior to the 1930's. a The climate was, to put it mildly, adverse to
effective implementation of the fourteenth amendment by the courts.
The decade of the thirties, however, produced two cases which established far-reaching due process principles. In Powell v. Alabama4 the
Court dealt with the principle of right to counsel in a capital case in which
the "Scottsboro boys" had been condemned to death. Thirty-one years
later Mr. Justice Sutherland's opinion was read as the precursor of Gideon
v. Wainwright.5
In 1936, the members of the United States Supreme Court found themselves confronted by an appeal from a Negro citizen of the United States
based upon treatment which we would have thought more consistent
with King John's day than our own century. The supreme court of Mississippi had seen no reason to disturb the conviction which was based upon
a confession elicited by prolonged whipping with a leather strap with
buckles on it,' nor is there any record that any agency, state or local, ever
undertook any disciplinary action against the police officers concerned.
The United States Supreme Court, which had been loath to interfere in
any state criminal proceedings, found itself confronted by a situation
where obviously due process of law became meaningless to the ordinary
citizen, absent some federal intervention. This decision, Brown v. Mississippi7 was historic in foreshadowing the trend which has led to Miranda.
And it was greeted in 1936 by the same sort of cries of "federal interference in state's rights" and "handcuffing of the police" as have greeted
Supreme Court decisions of this decade.
One of the more important of the cases of the past decade was Spano v.
New York, 8 where the Supreme Court held that a confession coerced from
a prisoner without any physical brutality but by means of what the Court
0
termed "official pressure, fatigue and sympathy falsely aroused" was in3. E.g., Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) (judge's direct interest in the outcome violated due process) ; Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923) (mob domination of trial violated
due process) ; Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915) (Court stated that mob domination
would violate due process).
4. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
5. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
6. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 282 (1936).
7. 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
8. 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
9. Id. at 323.
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admissible by "due process" standards. In the light of the subsequent
cases, it is interesting to note that Spano was under indictment for first
degree murder at the time of his extended interrogation and that he repeatedly asked for and was denied counsel. Citing twenty-seven confession
cases decided to that date, Mr. Chief Justice Warren said:
The abhorrence of society to the use of involuntary confessions does not turn alone
on their inherent untrustworthiness. It also turns on the deep-rooted feeling that the
police must obey the law while enforcing the law; that in the end life and liberty can
be as much endangered from illegal methods used to convict those thought to be
criminals as from the actual criminals themselves.' 0
Still more recently, and against a background of prior reluctance," the
Supreme Court has told us that the fourth amendment prohibition of
"unreasonable searches and seizures" will be enforced-even against convictions based on procedures held consistent with state law.' And in
Gideon v. Wainwright 3 the Supreme Court held the sixth amendment and
the due process of law clause of the fourteenth amendment give indigent
defendants a right to counsel in at least all felony prosecutions-whether
state or federal.
The following year, the Court reversed long-standing precedent 14 and
held that the fifth amendment privilege of silence enjoyed by an accused is
a part of the due process right which the states must observe.' 5
And, in the final case I would cite as setting the stage of Miranda, the
Supreme Court required a new trial for Danny Escobedo because, although he had a lawyer present on the scene, he was not warned of his
rights to counsel and silence, and was repeatedly denied opportunity to see
his lawyer prior to confessing.' 6 We come then to the latest "due process"
contribution to American criminal law.
In Miranda the United States Supreme Court has made crystal clear
its intention to employ the fourteenth amendment to enforce all of the
essential principles of the Bill of Rights at the exact point where individual
freedom comes into conflict with state police power. Miranda greets objections to prior court decisions by going further in control of police
practices than friends of the Court generally had anticipated. The detailed rules laid down for securing admissible confessions in a criminal
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Id. at 320-21.
See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
372 U.S. 335 (1963).
Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78

(1908).
15. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
16. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
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trial make it appear that, when Miranda is added to prior decisions, there
emerges a set of "Judges' Rules" for police practices as explicit, and even
more concerned with individual liberty, than the Judges' Rules of England.
The fears which this case has engendered merit thoughtful consideration. They will not vanish merely by pointing to the obvious constitutional
authority of the majority of the Supreme Court to make the decision. Nor
does the fact that the Court subsequently held both Miranda and Escobedo to be prospective in application17 end the practical concerns. The
Court's set of rules for police practices, which has culminated for the
moment in Miranda,will historically have an impact on American society
comparable only to the impact of the school desegregation cases and the
equal apportionment cases.
Indeed, Mr. Justice Harlan closed his dissent with a dire prophecy. He
quoted Mr. Justice Jackson"s in these words: "This Court is forever adding new stories to the temples of constitutional law, and the temples have
a way of collapsing when one story too many is added." 1
Since I do not believe the temple will collapse, I choose in talking about
Miranda to describe its holdings in the astringent words of the same dissenting Justice:
[I]t is well to note exactly what is required by the Court's new constitutional code
of rules for confessions. The foremost requirement, upon which later admissibility of

a confession depends, is that a fourfold warning be given to a person in custody

before he is questioned: namely, that he has a right to remain silent, that anything he

says may be used against him, that he has a right to have present an attorney during
the questioning, and that if indigent he has a right to a lawyer without charge. To
forgo these rights, some affirmative statement of rejection is seemingly required, and
threats, tricks, or cajolings to obtain this waiver are forbidden. If before or during

questioning the suspect seeks to invoke his right to remain silent, interrogation must
be forgone or cease; a request for counsel brings about the same result until a lawyer

isprocured .... [T]he burden of proof of waiver is on the State[;] admissions and

exculpatory statements are treated just like confessions[;] withdrawal of a waiver is
always permitted ....20

The most significant feature of the Miranda decision is that it marks
the end of incommunicado interrogation of accused persons. Since the
founding of this country, police power to arrest and to question in private,
and without any legal representative or friend of the accused present, has
been undisputed. The past arguments have concerned whether or not this
power has been used so as physically, as in Brown, or psychologically as
in Spano, to deprive the prisoner of the exercise of free will in determin17. Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966).
18. Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 181 (1943) (concurring opinion).
19. 384 U.S. at 526.
20. Id. at 504-05 (dissenting opinion).
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ing whether or not he would confess. This case holds that incommunicado
interrogation is inherently coercive and that police who employ it to secure
a confession bear the burden of proof of proper warnings and waivers of
counsel and the right of silence. 1
No intelligent person will, I think, deny that Miranda makes the Bill
of Rights more meaningful to the individual citizen. But, of course, many
intelligent citizens will deny the appropriateness of the timing and the
immediacy of the need to solve the problem which the Court described.
And many will assert, as does Mr. Justice Harlan, that the opinion of
the Court is unsupported by past precedent. This last argument obviously
did not move Mr. Chief Justice Warren and the Court majority. The
majority opinion squarely overruled two cases -2 and relied upon modem
case precedent such as Escobedons Maoy,2 4 Gideon, 5 and others.
Further, it seems to me at least arguable that Miranda means a final
recognition, albeit not an express one, that the actual purposes of the
fourteenth amendment were badly served by early post-Civil War United
States Supreme Court interpretation and that at long last this Court has
determined to give the fourteenth amendment the meaning intended by its
authors. Congressman John A. Bingham, for example, stated that the
"great want of the citizen and stranger, protection by national law from
unconstitutional State enactments, is supplied by the first section of this
amendment. 02 6
Further, whatever the reaction may be to that argument, the Court's
opinion is consistent with long-standing precedent for interpretation of the
Constitution as a "living" document. Indeed the opinion cites and frankly
rests its overruling of past cases upon the most eloquent statement of this
constitutional philosophy:
...our contemplation cannot be only of what has been but of what may be. Under
any other rule a constitution would indeed be as easy of application as it would be
deficient in efficacy and power. Its general principles would have little value and be
converted by precedent into impotent and lifeless formulas. Rights declared in words
might be lost in reality. And this has been recognized. The meaning and vitality of the
Constitution have developed against narrow and restrictive construction.21

Further, the Constitution seems plainly to vest power over its interpretation in the United States Supreme Court.' The majority of that Court,
exercising the judicial power, has spoken. It has spoken clearly and in an
21. Id. at 479.
22. Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U.S. 504 (1958); Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958).
23. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 US. 478 (1964).
24. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 US. 1 (1964).
25. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
26. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2543 (1866).
27. 384 U.S. at 443-44, quoting from Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910).
28. U.S. Const. art. III, § 1; Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
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area where it has the power of decision. But, crime and police problems
do not vanish with a court decision. And practical questions of great
moment remain to be faced.
First, was there, predating Miranda, a serious threat to individual
liberty in existing police interrogation practices in the various states?
My own observation and knowledge compels an affirmative answer. I
neither advocated nor predicted the Court's holding that there is a constitutional right to have a lawyer present at all police interrogation. Further, contrary to the situation relating to many other cases, I believe this
case will have a real effect on law enforcement.
In some cases it will make identification and conviction more difficult.
Further, the police in their daily confrontation with violent crime both
need and deserve the support of the public and the legal profession. And,
finally, I am certain that in recent years police practices in interrogation
of criminal suspects have markedly improved, as the police authorities in
this country universally proclaim.
But, all of that being said does not lead me to join the public dissent
to Miranda. I profoundly doubt that all physical abuse has been removed
from all police interrogation rooms in the 50 states. I am sure that all
psychological compulsion to confess has not ended. And I find it impossible to dispute the majority opinion in Miranda when it points to the
inherently coercive nature of incommunicado interrogation.
I may be the only federal judge who has ever seen the third degree. Of
course, to paraphrase T. S. Eliot, it was a long time ago, and in another
state, and besides, the people involved are probably dead. But the memory
lingers.
As a boy I worked in the summers in my father's law office. I accompanied him to court, to the records building, and on this occasion to see a
client in jail. We were admitted through a steel-barred door to a large
room off the jail office where my father began interviewing his client
through the bars. Shortly, my interest in that interview was abruptly
ended by blows and screams and groans coming from a small room partitioned off in a corner of the lockup room where we were. A few moments
earlier I had seen several men lead a redheaded prisoner, whose arms were
handcuffed behind his back, into that room.
Several times in the next few moments someone went into or came out
of the small room. And when the door was open, the scene in the room
was unforgettable. The redheaded prisoner was spread-eagled over the
end of a heavy table. His ankles were shackled to the table legs so that
his legs were spread apart. One man stood behind him with a length of
rubber hose in his hand. A man on each side of the table had each of his
arms twisted so that the prisoner was bent forward over the table. The
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prisoner was stripped to the waist and red welts criss-crossed the white
skin of his back. Then the door would close and the blows and moans
would start again.
The most macabre memory of all was seeing jail personnel and other
prisoners going about their routine jobs without ever looking in the direction of this human anguish.
There is more-but perhaps nothing more which bears polite description. What remains with me is a distinct and terrible doubt. Stubborn, as
in franker moments I acknowledge that I am, I doubt that I could stand
the torture I saw routinely administered to that redheaded prisoner without my "confessing," if that's the right word, anything the interrogator
desired.
My father was stubborn too. He, and I with him, went promptly to the
grand jury. I told the grand jury just what I have told you. I was asked
whether I knew the names of the men in the little room. I said I did not.
The foreman of the grand jury patted me on the head, said I was a fine
boy, and gave me an apple. Then the grand jury voted a "No Bill."
If this bit of testimony from a now 40-year-old memory seems too old
to be relevant, perhaps I should relate what I believe to be the facts about
a case which I heard in trial board proceedings as Police Commissioner of
Detroit not so long ago.
Several Detroit officers were informed by a complainant that a man
named Daniels had threatened her with a gun. She said he had run off
when she called the police. At the Daniels' house, his wife denied he was
there and invited the officers in to establish that fact. In sworn testimony
she subsequently acknowledged the invitation. Several of the officers proceeded to accept the invitation and found Daniels hiding in a coal cellar.
They arrested and handcuffed him. So far, so good!
What happened next, however, was not far different from the story I
have just related. Five officers surrounded Daniels in his own basement
and proceeded to seek to extract from him information as to what he had
done with the gun. Daniels denied stubbornly that he had ever had one.
The testimony I heard convinced me that Daniels was punched in the
stomach somewhere between six and a dozen times, with questioning
about the gun interspersed between the blows. At one point one officer
picked up a baseball bat and put it on Daniels' head, saying, "Now, Willie,
where's the gun?"
No such episode was ever again reported during my tenure as Police
Commissioner. But I had good reason to know that there were many of
the older officers iii my department who felt that I was most unsympathetic with what they believed to be "practical" law enforcement.
All in all, my experiences as Police Commissioner in my own depart-

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 35

ment and elsewhere did not convince me that the third degree was completely dead. The episode just related was in the relatively enlightened
city of Detroit, in the relatively civilized state of Michigan in the spring
of 1962.
But it is also clear that the Supreme Court in Miranda was concerned
with more than the problem of physical torture. If Miranda is a monument to anyone, perhaps it is to Fred Inbau. For years police have listened
to this Northwestern University law professor in his national police institutes and gone away with what they thought was legal sanction for some
fascinating interrogation practices.
The Mutt and Jeff technique which his text" advocated was widely
adopted. Jeff, the quiet, friendly officer, who is interrogating is interrupted by Mutt, his giant-sized partner who demands in a lion's-sized
voice: "When are you going to turn that little punk over to me?" Several
such interruptions, with variations on the theme of Mutt's impatience, I
have been assured produce results if they do not correspond with exactness to the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution and our
expanded concept of due process. Thus, I cannot share the dissenting opinion's objection 3 to the reliance upon the quotations from Inbau and Reid
found in the majority opinion in Miranda."'
One other justification for the basic rules in Miranda deserves mention.
There is no doubt that the full rights granted the poor and the ignorant
by Miranda have been exercised to the fullest by our most affluent and
arrogant criminals. The classic expectation in police circles concerning
the arrest of a figure in organized crime is that the lawyer will beat his
client to the police station. The Mafia trains its young that silence is not
just a right but a duty to the mob. For them the fifth amendment warnings of Mirandaare a duty enforceable by death.
Miranda also adds nothing of practical moment to the constitutional
practices of the affluent and the educated. Those who fell into the toils of
the law possessed of money, position in the community, and knowledge
of their rights generally had little difficulty in securing them.
The equal protection argument advanced by Judge Bazelon in his exchange with the Attorney General is a realistic one.82 Its persuasiveness
to the majority of the Supreme Court is mirrored in Miranda.
Thus, it seems to me that, at some appropriate time, measures calculated
to render the fifth, sixth and fourteenth amendments effective in police
29. Inbau & Reid, Criminal Interrogation and Confessions 58-60 (1962).

30. 384 U.S. at 532-33 (White, J., dissenting).
31. 384 U.S. at 449-55.
32. Bazelon & Katzenbach, Equal Treatment in the Enforcement of the Criminal Law:
The Bazelon-Katzenbach Letters, 56 J. Crim. L., C. & P.S. 498 (1965).
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interrogation were due to be taken. And they have been taken in Miranda.
This, then, leads to the next pertinent question. Some of the more intelligent critics of the Court's due process intervention phrase it thus: Is
excluding a confession the only way by which constitutional police
practices can be mandated? Can this not be achieved by disciplinary
measures directed against the police or by administrative controls?
Much of our history stands in the way of quick solutions of this sort.
One part of this country's numerous grievances against King George was
the use of military force nationally directed in purely local affairs. From
a powerful colonial reaction against any form of national police sprang
our current frequently chaotic local police administration.
It should be remembered that in at least one sense the insistence of
local rather than national police control has served us well. It has guaranteed that no national police agency ever became a vital factor in
political control in this country. In other countries from time to time the
opposite has proved to be true.
But along with this great virtue, local police control has also produced
some great disadvantages. It has been estimated that we now have in the
United States 40,000 separate and completely autonomous police jurisdictions. If these in actual practice are responsible to anyone, they are
responsible almost exclusively to locally elected councils or mayors.
There is no national guidance of these multitudinous and frequently
conflicting departments. There is not even very much contact between
them.
The English have long had a~strong tradition of local law enforcement
also. They are as aware as we of the problems which would be created by
a national police force. They have nonetheless striven with much more
vigor than we for some solutions to the problems of lack of coordination,
lack of training, and lack of adherence to national standards of due
process which are inherent in any system of purely local police control.
Basically, they have employed two measures. The first is the enactment
of what has been called "The Judges' Rules."33 These are direct orders
governing police practices which are laid down by the judges of the
Queen's Bench and made administratively effective as to the police forces
of England through their enactment by the Home Secretary and their
transmittal by him to every chief constable in England.
The second mechanism which the English have used is the coordination
,of local police policies and practices through the office of the Home Secretary. Since 1888 Parliament has appropriated 50 per cent of the total
33. See the discussion of these rules in the opinion of Chief Justice Warren. 384 U.
486-87 & n-57.
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budget of all local police forces. And since that date there has, of course,
been some participation on the part of the national government through
the Home Secretary in establishing standards for police service.
It is obvious that the administrative counterparts of the English effort
are to date completely lacking in the United States.
As I have suggested, the judicial controls set forth in Miranda, and preceding cases of recent years, may well indicate an inclination on the part
of the Supreme Court to emulate the example set by the Judges' Rules.
The first rule to be found in Miranda is that the defendant be warned
of his rights. 4 But, when must the warning be given? I think the answer
is "at the earliest practical moment." Certainly the warning should be
given at the point of arrest.
Early in the opinion we find this meaningful sentence and footnote:
By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement
officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant way 4

[Footnote 4] This is what we meant in Escobedo when we spoke of an investigation which had focused on an accused. 36
I read this sentence as suggesting that the warning may be required in
situations other than station house interrogation. In street detention
episodes-certainly if any sustained questioning is undertaken-the warning should be given.
I do not seek to minimize the impact of such a warning. It will shut
some mouths. There will, however, continue to be many voluntary statements after full warning with full waiver, of counsel. For the most part,
these will come from the obviously guilty who can be proved to be such
anyhow. But, if the statement made after warning and waiver is thought
likely to have any value, evidence as to how the warning was given and the
waiver was accomplished should be preserved. There may be many better
devices developed for this purpose, but at this point these occur to me.
In smaller police jurisdictions, the warning and the waiver could be
recorded on a dictaphone sleeve and properly marked and placed in the
case file. In larger jurisdictions, I would think that television recordation
of the whole process would be practical and valuable.
While the decision was "not intended to hamper the traditional function
of police officers in investigating crime, ' 3' and considerable out-of-custody
questioning is still allowed,37 the police must, in my opinion, face the fact
that Miranda means fewer confessions. Hence, the police must rely more
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id. at 479.
Id. at 444. (Emphasis added.)
Id. at 477.
Id. at 477-78.
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on other sorts of evidence. In-custody interrogation has at least in some
instances made for lazy police work. Detective staffing of crime investigations, particularly of murders and holdups, will need to be considerably
increased.
Interestingly enough, since Escobedo there is good evidence in many
jurisdictions that prosecutions without confessions have considerably increased and that the number of cases where a confession was thought to
be essential has markedly decreased.
I certainly believe that higher quality of law enforcement-such as that
mandated by the ideals of our Constitution as set forth in Miranda-does
demand new practical measures of support for law enforcement.
Our city police officers are the front line of defense of law enforcement.
Generally we have lampooned them, paid them badly, assigned them a
relatively low social status, and appreciated them only when faced with an
individual emergency. With this kind of attitude and the new demands for
higher standards of police performance, our police may not be able to do
an acceptable job. Something else must be added.
Sidney Zion of the New York Times entitled an article on Miranda,
"Requiem for the Squealroom." 3 s I suggest that Miranda and its precursors sound a death knell for the old-time "cop."
For the next decades acceptable standards of law enforcement will require: (1) higher status for police officers; (2) more police officers; (3)
higher pay for police officers; (4) better training for police officers; (5)
more public support for law enforcement; (6) greater coordination between the agencies of our government concerned with law enforcement.
The great majority of police officers want no part of any abusive
practices. They want and will support higher standards of training, of
pay, and of performance in their profession. We should look forward to
the day when our streets are policed by men recruited, trained and paid
at the professional levels now maintained by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
If it is said that law enforcement cannot be handled within constitutional
limits, this is nonsense! In the two and a half years that I have been a
federal appellate judge, I cannot remember one single case which came
before us where the FBI agents were even charged with any physical
abuse of the defendant who had been convicted in that case.
That is quite a record, because I certainly can't say that in relation to
state court appellate review in past years. I do not need to be reminded
that these FBI results are in large part a product of a very much lower
case load than we currently require our metropolitan police to carry. But
my point is that the standards of professionalization and manpower which
38. The New Leader, July 18, 1966, p. 3.
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the Federal Bureau of Investigation brings to its work are standards which
we should seek to apply at local law enforcement levels.
I believe that the integrity of our system of local law enforcement must
be maintained, but I see no reason why federal assistance should not be
sought for some of its needs. Particularly appropriate are federal contributions to local police training programs, and particularly appropriate in
my view also would be the creation of a National Police College. This
four-year, degree-granting college should be organized, staffed and
financed at a level comparable in police work to a West Point. Qualified
young men should be appointed to this college who are prepared after
graduation to commit themselves to law enforcement careers. Such candidates might be drawn from local law enforcement ranks or from the ranks
of high school graduates. Such a National Police College could supply a
cadre of professional police officers highly qualified for local police leadership posts for future decades.
In addition to better trained police officers for the next few decades,
we will also need more of them-probably in substantial percentage terms.
This is demanded by higher standards of performance in cases like Mapp
v. Ohio 9 and Miranda. The "third degree" and the "tipover raid" are
repugnant to our ideals of American justice, but they are certainly economical of police man-hours.
Finally, I would like to see more public concern about police work-not
less. I would like to see citizens feel that they have a tremendous stake in
how their police department operates and feel a duty to support it in the
proper discharge of its duties. I would like to see them willing to "get involved." The effort to involve citizen support for law enforcement is basic
in a democratic society. Without it the police effort can degenerate into
an occupation army attitude. With citizen support the police are the
community's right arm in fighting the evils which make city living difficult.
Now, a word on Miranda'splace in history. Justice Frankfurter called
the right to due process of law "the most majestic concept in our whole
constitutional system."4
Time has enshrined the great due process decisions of the past as monuments to the progress of mankind. But we should never forget that each of
them was born of bitter controversy and was reviled by its detractors in
its own day.
I suggest to you that the Miranda decision will prove to be one of the
great due process documents of our time. And that the Court which delivered it will be honored for it in our nation's history.
39.

367 U.S. 643 (1961).

40. Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 174 (1991)
concurring).

(Frankfurter, J.,

B. J. GEORGE, JR.*
T HE decision in Miranda v. Arizona' creates problems at a number of
levels. It raises the fundamental question of whether police interrogation has any lawful basis. This is no trivial matter, for the Supreme
Court, in other cases, has largely foreclosed legislative efforts to move
toward a system of investigating magistrates. This has been the result of
making the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination binding on
the states under the fourteenth amendment. If derivative evidence is also
barred, a matter that I doubt has been determined by Miranda,3 the
impact on law enforcement will be disastrous.
A second problem stems from the Court's expectation that lawyers will
participate in station house investigation. This new function will subject
members of the legal profession to stresses they have never before ex* Professor of Law, University of Michigan. Professor George received his BA. and J.D.
from the University of Michigan and is a member of the Michigan and Missouri bars.
Co-reporter to the Committee to Revise the Criminal Code of the State Bar of Michigan,
and a member of the Michigan Crime Commision, he is also president of the American section
of the International Penal Law Association and editor-in-chief of the American Journal of
Comparative Law. In 1956-1957 Professor George was Fulbright Research Professor at Kyoto
University, and in 1962-1963 Fulbright Lecturer at Tokyo University, Chuoto University and
the Legal Training and Research Institute of the Supreme Court of Japan. He has edited
and translated several books and he is the author of numerous articles.
Portions of this article are adapted from George, Constitutional Limitations on Evidence
in Criminal Cases (1966), by permission of the copyright owner, The Institute of Continuing
Legal Education, Ann Arbor, Michigan.
1. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2. Griffin v. California, 380 US. 609 (1965); Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n 378
U.S. 52 (1964) ; Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
3. Though the question of derivative evidence was discussed in briefs and argument,
none of the six cases before the Court directly involved use of derivative evidence. Out of
the whole 61-page majority opinion only one sentence supports the construction that a
derivative evidence rule is included in the Miranda code: "But unless and until such
warnings and waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as
a result of interrogation can be used against him." 384 US. at 479. (Footnote omitted.)
This is slim support for asserting that an important question like this has been adjudicated,
however logically the derivative evidence rule reinforces the objective stated by the majority
of disciplining police. In short, although the Court will probably utilize an exclusionary rule
applicable to derivative evidence, as it has in the search and seizure context, Silverthorne
Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920), and in support of its wiretapping prohibition, Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939), it has not done so yet. And failure
to invoke that rule offers an escape route for the Court if its constitutional code proves
substantially unworkable.
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perienced. The attorney has one simple way out of this dilemma-he may
simply fail to appear, and thus halt lawful interrogation.4 If he appears,
he will be subjected to pressures, future and present, with which he is
unaccustomed to cope. An assigned defense counsel is presently subject to
attack if his client is convicted and is assigned other counsel on appeal or
in a post-conviction remedial proceeding. Participation in questioning
extends the number of professional acts for which he may later be called
to account. He will also sense an immediate conflict between his traditional duty to advise his client to remain silent and his personal feelings
about what society's or his client's best interests dictate. At trial, such
conflicts can be rationalized as simply forcing the state to discharge the
burden, which it has assumed, of persuading the trier of the facts that
the defendant has committed the offense charged by adducing adequate
proof in fair proceedings. But, at the police station, his advice to his client
to remaifi silent may prevent solution of the crime, a result which may
well conflict with the attorney's belief that by an admission of guilt the
client will be better off, in terms of the client's own psychological needs
or his eligibility for probation, or in terms of the attorney's feeling as a
citizen that the client is a dangerous criminal who must be restrained.
The canons of professional ethics provide no adequate guidelines for him
in this situation and the process of developing new concepts of the
lawyer's professional role will not be easy for the individual attorney or
for the organized legal profession.
But my chief point of concern is the blow which the Miranda decision
and other recent decisions embodying the same philosophy' have struck
at the traditional balance of federal and state powers in the creation of
criminal law norms and their enforcement. Until five or so years ago,
revision of criminal procedure was viewed as activity appropriate to
the legislature. If procedural institutions inherited from the common law
proved inadequate, they could be modified or abrogated altogether. If
they were enshrined in the state constitution, that constitution could be
amended to authorize legislative change. The history of American penal
legislation from 1789 to 1960 has been one of replacement of common law
4. The Court held that interrogation must cease until the attorney actually appears and
has consulted with his client. 384 U.S. at 474-75.
5. There are many cases which are similarly based, notably the privilege against selfincrimination cases, note 2 supra, and the search and seizure decisions, e.g., Aguilar v.
Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964); Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964); Ker v. California,
374 U.S. 23 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). The racial segregation and re-

apportionment cases present the same basic problems of constitutional theory.
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procedure by statute, and replacement of one generation of statutes by
another.
The law of arrest is an example. It came into being when there were
no professional police forces and when each community was responsible
for policing itself. The first statutes largely restated the common law
tradition. But each successive generation saw new experiments with arrest
and warrant practice, all of which were viewed by appellate courts as
reasonable and legitimate exercises of the primary power of the legislature
to determine the directions that law reform should take.
If this process were permitted to continue, it would be within the realm
of reasonable legislative judgment, and would be viewed by a large number of citizens as eminently desirable, if the legislature should determine
(a) that an officer should be able to stop and question a citizen on the
street, and to detain him for a brief period of time to investigate a
suspicious set of circumstances,' (b) that a police officer may frisk
a suspect whom the officer has reason to believe is armed,' (c)
that an officer could arrest on reasonable grounds for belief that the
arrested person has committed a misdemeanor,8 or (d) that under special
circumstances officers may ask a judge to dispense with the usual and
traditional requirements that they announce their presence and identify
themselves as officers before they execute an arrest or search warrant.'
If a factual need were established for one or more of these enactments,
they would be signed into law. And if it were said that some innocent
citizen might be adversely affected, the usual reply would be that this is
the sort of inconvenience one must be prepared to accept if he is to live
as a member of an organized society.
Two contemporary efforts at model legislation, the Uniform Arrest
Law and the American Law Institute Model Code of Pre-Arraignment
Procedure," embody this tradition of legislative action at its best. Yet
the result of Miranda is to render nugatory efforts by groups, like
ALI, which are interested in law reform, and efforts by state legislatures
to upgrade and modernize the law of criminal procedure. Experimentation
with arrest, warrant and detention practices is now forbidden to the states.
6. See, e.g., Uniform Arrest Law § 2. It is in force in three states. Del. Code Ann. tit.
11, § 1902 (1953); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 594:2 (1955); R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 12-7-1
(1956).
7. See, e.g., N.Y. Code Grim. Proc. § 180-a (2).
8. See, e.g., ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, § 107-2(c) (Smith-Hurd 1964).
9. See, e.g., N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 799; People v. Maddox, 46 Cal. 2d 301, 294 P2d
6, cert. denied, 352 U.S. 858 (1956).
10. Tentative Draft No. 1 (1966).
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The standard is clearly a federal one. Notwithstanding Aristotle's
dictum that nothing produces greater inequality than to treat unequal
things equally, the majority of the Court has been unable to contemplate
that one rule might be required for Michigan and another for Nevada,
or that one procedural device should be in force in a large city and another
utilized in rural areas. By its insistence on a single pervasive federal standard, which renders state statutes, judicial rules and appellate decisions
constitutionally irrelevant, the Court has effectively blocked the best path
toward procedural reform.
This is strongly pointed up in the Miranda opinions. The dissenting
justices urged that the Court go slowly, and not promulgate a detailed
code of practices until investigations into actual conditions affecting
interrogation and efforts at drafting model legislation had been carried
through to completion."' But the majority knew its own mind:
In any event, however, the issues presented are of constitutional dimensions and must
be determined by the courts.... Judicial solutions to problems of constitutional dimension have evolved decade by decade. As courts have been presented with the need
to enforce constitutional rights, they have found means of doing so .... Where rights
secured by the Constitution12 are involved, there can be no rule making or legislation
which would abrogate them.

The Court's "constitutional code of rules for confessions"'1 thus effectively forecloses the states from action.' 4
Moreover, because these doctrines rest on a federal constitutionalbasis,
Congress is not free to enact legislation that either establishes a single
nationwide code of criminal procedure (in itself a radical departure from
our traditions concerning where primary responsibility for criminal law
administration rests), or that purports to grant freedom to the states to
accomplish their own reforms independently. The federal legislative
branch is by judicial fiat reduced to the same level of impotence as state
law-making organs.
With matters left in this posture, changes in doctrine can come about
in only two ways. One is by the slow accretion of a constitutional common
11. See 384 U.S. at 501 (Clark, J., dissenting) ; Id. at 523-24 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
12. Id. at 490-91.
13. The phrase is Justice Harlan's. 384 U.S. at 504 (dissenting opinion).
14. The majority indicated that it encourages "Congress and the States to continue their
laudable search for increasingly effective ways of protecting the rights of the individual
while promoting efficient enforcement of our criminal laws." Id. at 467. In the next sentence,
however, the Court required that its detailed regulations be followed "unless we are shown
other procedures which are at least as effective in apprising accused persons of their right of
silence and in assuring a continuous opportunity to exercise it ...." Ibid.
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law that lays down the details of procedure case by case. It is ironical
that the Supreme Court, which manifests interest in law reform in many
areas, 15 makes inevitable the return of a common law process which our
system has been dedicated to eliminating through the past century. But
this is the inescapable result of using the guise of broad constitutional
provisions to promulgate detailed codes of procedure in the form of judicial opinions.
The other method is to amend the federal constitution. One possible
form of amendment is a piecemeal, detailed provision that specifically
repudiates undesirable or unworkable aspects of judicial constitutional
doctrines. In the nature of things, these detailed changes in turn soon
become equally undesirable or unworkable, so that new amendments are
necessary. This is the process which time and time again has necessitated
the drafting of new state constitutions within twenty to fifty years after
the predecessors became effective. When this process of amendment and
re-amendment has been carried through a few times, the constitution becomes nothing more than a "senior citizen" code. Our Constitution has
lasted as long as it has because its general provisions have been construed
in a relaxed enough fashion that there is room for legislative adaptation to
changed economic and social conditions. If the reforming zeal of the
majority of the Court has led it to foreclose its exercise of this functional
relativism, we may see the death of the Constitution as the unintended
result of efforts to save it.
The other form of amendment is a repudiation of the basic provision
itself, in this instance the fifth amendment. This course of action would
weaken our traditions of constitutional government, but it is a development which is entirely possible. It has been suggested that if the Bill of
Rights were placed before the voters of the country for approval through
popular referendum, there is considerable doubt that approval would be
forthcoming. Until now there has been no great pressure generated in
support of constitutional amendments to counteract Supreme Court decisions. But it should also be noted that there is a cumulative effect from
the many recent decisions that deny to the states the exercise of powers
held by them for 175 years. In particular, the Miranda code was laid
down in the face of requests from thirty states, and the Department of
Justice itself, to make haste slowly. Citizens are deeply concerned about
mounting crime statistics. If, as a result of Miranda,the rate of successful
investigations, and thus the rate of convictions and pleas of guilty,
15. See, for example, the recent forward-looking changes in the Federal Rules of Civil
and of Criminal Procedure. 384 US. 1039-1116 (1966).
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markedly drops, the pressures toward amendment of the federal constitution will increase dramatically. And amendment, like revolution, is
difficult to contain.
Thus the key issue remains that of federalism and of the power of the
Supreme Court to regulate the workings of the federal system by judicial
decree. The issue of Marbury v. Madison"0 is never settled; each generation has to resolve it anew. The Miranda decision makes it more likely
than ever before that the resolution will be a cataclysm in our generation.
16.

5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).

A. KENNETH PYE*
VER the years the confession of guilt by a suspect became the symbol
of an efficient and successful police investigation in American life.
Few expressed concern that many, if not most, confessions were extracted
from persons who were either ignorant of their rights or too weak to assert
them under the pressure of an incommunicado police interrogation. The
courts were content to rely upon the rubric of "voluntariness" to limit
the nature and extent of police stratagems designed to elicit incriminating
statements from uncooperative suspects, but voiced no objection to proving the guilt of defendants through the use of confessions which had been
clearly induced, at least in part, by persuasion, cajolery, or deception.'
Judges continued to mouth the platitude that "ours is the accusatorial
as opposed to the inquisitorial system" - while asserting that the courtroom, not the police station, was the proper setting in which a citizen
might invoke his privilege against self-incrimination or his right to the
effective assistance of counsel. The inescapable fact that the approved
techniques of police interrogation primarily affected the poor and members of minority groups was either ignored or deemed "particularly irrelevant."' Some recognized the wide gap between notions concerning
the accusatorial system, the privilege against self-incrimination, the right
to counsel, equality in the administration of the law, and the realities of
everyday life in the police stations of the country. Nevertheless, many
0

* Professor of Law, Duke University; Visiting Professor of Law, Banaras Hindu University; Program Specialist in Legal Education, The Ford Foundation (India). The views
expressed by the author are his own and not necessarily those of any of the institutions with
which he is associated.
1. Indeed, on occasion a little physical violence was permitted, as Air. Justice Harlan notes
in his footnote reference to Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181 (1952), in which the suspect
was assaulted, intimidated, interrogated for two hours and kept apart from a lawyer who
was attempting to see him. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 509 n.5 (1966) (dissenting
opinion).
2. The oft repeated phrase had its origin in Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 54 (1949).
3. See, e.g., Letter From Nicholas deB. Katzenbach to Chief Judge David L. Bazelon,
June 24, 1965, in Equal Treatment in the Enforcement of the Criminal Law: The BazelonKatzenbach Letters, 56 J. Crim. L., C. & P.. 498 (1965): "Your suggestion that police
questioning will primarily affect the poor and, in particular, the poor Negro, strikes me as
particularly irrelevant. The simple fact is that poverty is often a breeding ground for
criminal conduct and that inevitably any code of procedure is likely to affect more poor
people than rich people. For reasons beyond their control, in Washington many poor people
are Negroes; in Texas, Mexicans; in New York City, Puerto Ricans. A system designed to
subject criminal offenders to sanctions is not aimed against Negroes, Mexicans, or Puerto
Ricans in those jurisdictions simply because it may affect them more than other members of
the community." Id. at 501.
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of these perceptive observers deemed conformity with the theoretical ideal
less important than the maintenance of efficiency in confession-seeking,

which was considered vital in order to maintain a high percentage of convictions and guilty pleas.

The opinion in Miranda v. Arizona* reflects a deliberate judgment by
the majority of the Supreme Court that our civilization has reached the
level where such a state of affairs in the administration of criminal
justice can no longer be tolerated.
It is not possible to state the holding or holdings of the Miranda
quartet concisely. The Court chose to use the four cases to set forth the
fundamental principles which must govern police interrogations of suspects, court rulings on the admissibility of statements obtained from defendants, and the range of constitutionally permissible choices available
to legislatures which contemplate alterations in the traditional structure
of pre-trial criminal procedure.5 In doing so, it clearly went further than
was necessary to decide the cases before it.
The principal objective of the opinion was to preclude police tactics
likely to impair a suspect's capacity to remain silent during a custodial
interrogation and to implement the suspect's privilege against self-incrimination by requiring warnings and providing him with a continuing
opportunity to exercise his rights. The Court determined that "without
proper safeguards the process of in-custody interrogation of persons sus4. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). References to "the Miranda" opinion, "the opinion" or "the
decisions" in this article refer to the opinions and decisions in Miranda v. Arizona, Id. at 439,
491, Vignera v. New York, id. at 493, Westover v. United States, id. at 494, and California v.
Stewart, id. at 497. The opinion of the Court was delivered by Mr. Chief Justice Warren.
Justices Harlan, White, and Stewart dissented. Mr. Justice Clark wrote a separate opinion.
This article does not attempt to discuss the decisions of the lower courts during the two years
which intervened between the Supreme Court's decision in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S.

478 (1964), and Miranda or the briefs and oral arguments of the parties or amid curiae, in
view of the excellent study by Richard J. Medalie, Deputy Director of the Georgetown
University Law Center Institute of Criminal Law and Procedure, in From Escobedo to
Miranda: The Anatomy of a Supreme Court Decision (1966).
This article does not purport to consider the problems raised by the Court's decision In
Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966), to apply Miranda only to cases tried after
its rendition. Professor Dash has commented that "the total effect of Johnson is a discriminatory array of remedies, of very differing degrees of effectiveness, for persons tried or
convicted at different points of time. Those tried after Miranda may use the Miranda ruling.
Those tried between Escobedo and Miranda may use the Escobedo ruling but not Miranda.
Those tried before Escobedo may only use the earlier Supreme Court doctrine on voluntary
confessions which requires no warning of rights by police, but treats the absence of a
warning as one of the factors in the determination of whether the confession was voluntarily
made." Dash, Foreword to Medalie, op. cit. supra at xix. (Italics omitted.)
5. Fifty-three of the sixty-one pages of the majority opinion in Miranda dealt generally
with the relationship of the fifth amendment privilege to police interrogations with only random references to the facts of the four cases. 384 U.S. at 439-91.
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pected or accused of crime contains inherently compelling pressures which
work to undermine the individual's will to resist and to compel him to
speak where he would not otherwise do so freely."' It then proceeded to
delineate the safeguards which it thought to be necessary:' The suspect
must be informed clearly that he has a right to remain silent8 and that
anything said "can and will" be used against him in court.' The fact
that he remains mute or claims his privilege in the face of an accusation
may not be used against him at trial." The suspect may answer some
questions without waiving his privilege to refuse to answer others."
The suspect must also be informed that he has the right to consult with
a lawyer and to have him present during an interrogation.' The warnings
of the right to remain silent, the consequences of talking, and the right
to counsel are absolute prerequisites to an interrogation."3 No inquiry
will be made concerning whether a suspect was aware of his rights in
the absence of these warnings.1' The suspect must also be informed that
a lawyer will be appointed for him if he is indigent, except in cases where
it is clearly apparent that he has an attorney or has sufficient funds to
retain one. 15
6. Id. at 467.
7. The procedures required for interrogations, referred to as "safeguards" throughout this
article, were twice summarized by the Court. Id. at 444-45, 478-79.
8. Id. at 467-68.
9. Id. at 469.
10. Id. at 468 n.37. The Court, thus, overrules a substantial number of state and federal
cases which have admitted such evidence upon the theory that a defendant's voluntary failure
to deny an accusatory statement, under circumstances where he would have naturally contradicted it if he did not assent to its truth, constituted an admission of a party opponent
and thus satisfied an exception to the hearsay rule. See, eg, Dickerson v. United States, 65
F.2d 824 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 290 US. 665 (1933). The fifth amendment problem in
implied admissions was thought by some courts to have been answered by the Supreme
Court in Sparf & Hansen v. United States, 156 US. 51 (1895). Other courts have long
recognized that the doctrine of implied admission by silence would compel a defendant to
speak when he had a right to remain silent if applied to police interrogations. Sandez v.
United States, 239 F.2d 239 (9th Cir. 1956) ; United States v. Lo Biondo, 135 F.2d 130 (2d
Cir. 1943) ; Yep v. United States, 83 F.2d 41 (10th Cir. 1936) ; McCarthy v. United States,
25 F.2d 298 (6th Cir. 1928).
11. 384 U.S. at 475-76. The Court thus limits Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367
(1951), to grand jury testimony and to the legislative and judicial fact-finding authority.
384 U.S. at 476 n.45.
12. Id. at 471.
13. Id. at 467-69.
14. Id- at 468.
15. Id. at 473 & n.43. It is interesting to note that the Court devoted only one paragraph to the equal protection issue: "Denial of counsel to the indigent at the time of interrogation while allowing an attorney to those who can afford one would be no more supportable
by reason or logic than the simrla situation at trial and on appeal struck down in Gideon
v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), and Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963)." Id.
at 472-73. (Italics omitted.)
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A suspect must be permitted to exercise his rights after he is informed
of their existence. Normally, interrogation must cease whenever the
suspect indicates that he desires to remain silent.1" However, an exception is recognized when he is accompanied by counsel, in which case
questioning may be permitted after an initial assertion of the privilege. 7
The interrogation must also cease if the suspect requests an attorney.'5
It may be resumed only if a lawyer appears to represent the suspect-and
then only after there has been adequate time for consultation and only
in the presence of the lawyer. 19
The requirements for a valid interrogation set forth in the opinion
apply to admissions and statements claimed to be exculpatory, as well as
confessions.2 °
The Court recognized that a suspect may voluntarily waive his rights
and make a statement, 2' but made clear that the doctrine of waiver could
not be used as a subterfuge to obscure the impairment of the privilege.
The government must assume a "heavy burden... to demonstrate that
the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against
self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel."2
It is noteworthy that the Court did not rule out other alternative procedures which may be devised by the Congress or the states. 2 However,
any statute or rule dealing with interrogation of suspects must be "at
least as effective" as the procedures outlined in the opinion in informing
a suspect of his rights of silence and insuring him an opportunity to
exercise it throughout an interrogation.2 4
The conclusions of the Court (i.e., that these procedures should be
observed in all custodial interrogations and that the judgments of conviction against the defendants in the cases before it should be reversed
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id. at 473-74.
Id. at 474 n.44.
Id. at 474.
Ibid.
Id. at 476-77.
"An express statement that the individual is willing to make a statement and does

not want an attorney followed closely by a statement could constitute a waiver." Id. at 475.
22. Ibid.
23. Id. at 467, 490.
24. Id. at 467. More serious consideration may now be given to proposals to require the
prompt production of a suspect before a magistrate who would determine the legality of
the arrest, inform the defendant of his rights, appoint counsel for the defendant If he
wished, determine whether the suspect wished to waive his rights and, if so, remand him
to the custody of the police for a limited period of interrogation. Suggestions for a prompt
presentment-remand system have been made by Chief Justice Walter V. Schaefer of the
Illinois Supreme Court and others. However, the reporters of the ALI Model Code thought
that the price was too high for a remand system in which the magistrate determined only
the legality of the arrest before remand. Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure, art. 4,
comment at 148-49 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1966).
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because of the failure of the police to comply with them) rest upon two
basic propositions, one factual and one legal.
After a careful consideration of the literature dealing with police interrogation procedures,2 5 the Court found that custodial interrogation
operates to apply pressure upon the suspect to waive his privilege and
speak although he would not have chosen to do so in the absence of the
coercion which resulted from the questioning.2" Furthermore, the Court
was persuaded that the police routinely utilize an arsenal of tactics
designed to weaken the capacity of a suspect to remain silent if he does
not initially express his willingness to admit guilt. 7 On the basis of these
findings, it was concluded that a statement obtained from a suspect during
a custodial interrogation is not "truly ...

the product of his free choice"

in the absence of safeguards such as those set forth in the opinion.'
The Court conceded that statements obtained during custodial police
interrogations might not be "involuntary in traditional terms."" 0 The
legal basis for its conclusion that such statements should not be admitted
into evidence rests upon the conclusion that the fifth amendment applies
in the police station and that unsafeguarded custodial police interrogation
involves the type of compulsion to speak which is prohibited by the
amendment.3" The Court was "satisfied that all the principles embodied
in the privilege apply to informal compulsion exerted by law-enforcement officers during in-custody questioning."' It read Brant v. United
States' and Ziang Sung Wan v. United States3" to justify the proposition
that "judicial precedent thus clearly establishes its [the privilege's] appli' 34
cation to incommunicado interrogation.

25. 384 U.S. at 445-58. Professor Yale Kamisar has made reference to the "frequent resort
to police interrogation manuals on the premise that they evidence the best current standards
of professional police work." Equal Justice in the Gatehouses and Mansions of American Criminal Procedure, in Criminal Justice in Our Time 1, 15 n-35 (Howard ed. 1965). (Emphasis
omitted.) Professors Anthony G. Amsterdam and Paul J. Mishkin utilized many of the same
authorities in the excellent Brief for the ACLU as Amicus Curiae, Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966).
26. 384 U.S. at 455.
27. Ibid.
28. Id. at 458.
29. Id. at 457.
30. Id. at 460-61.
31. Id. at 461.
32. 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
33. 266 U.S. 1 (1924).
34. 384 U.S. at 463. In view of the Court's reliance on Brain and Wan, it is interesting to
note that seventeen years ago Judge Charles Fahy saw Wan as the legitimate descendant of
Brain and the progenitor of Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949). He wrote: "Some years
ago Justice Brandeis told me that he had been disappointed that the Wan decision had not
had a more lasting effect upon police methods. The fact that the opinion in that and comparable cases did not have a deeper impact upon police methods is no doubt accountable fur
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Reassurance for the Court in its conclusions was found in the fact that
procedures somewhat similar have been followed by the FBI, the military,
and in Scotland, India and the United Kingdom without any marked
detrimental effect on criminal law enforcement.", It rejected the strained
argument that "an unfettered right to detention for interrogation should
be allowed because it will often redound to the benefit of the person
questioned." 36 The Court declined to withhold decision while various
bodies were studying the problem, pointing out that the issue was one of
constitutional dimensions in which the ultimate determination of competing social values must be made by the Court. 7
However, these are clearly explanations directed at the arguments
raised by the dissenters rather than the rationale of the decisions. The
crux of the decision is the Court's conclusion that the fifth amendment
applies in the station house and that the custodial interrogation routinely
used by police authorities will impair its exercise unless certain safeguards are observed. If these premises are correct, the result reached was
required, and other arguments pro and con must be regarded as makeweights. Consequently, it is not surprising that the principal thrust of the
dissenters was directed at these premises.
Mr. Justice Clark challenged the accuracy of the Court's characterization of usual police interrogation practices.3 8 Mr. Justice White argued
that the factual basis for the Court's premises concerning police practices
was manifestly insufficient if "judged by any of the standards for empirical investigation utilized in the social sciences ...."31The dissenters
are undoubtedly correct in their assertions that the authorities upon which
the majority relied to determine the methodology of police interrogations
were not "shown by the record.., to be the official manual of any police
department, much less in universal use in crime detection.1 40 They are
also accurate in their assumption that tactics designed to persuade a recalcitrant suspect to confess are not the hallmarks of all investigations
which precede confessions. 41 But can it be doubted that the police do
the larger number of cases decided more recently in the effort to bring the administration of
the criminal law in both federal and state courts within the Court's views of due process and

the proper rules governing the administration of criminal law." Fahy, Notes on Developments
in Constitutional Law, 1936-1949, 38 Geo. L.J. 1, 19 (1949). (Footnote omitted.) (Italics

omitted.)
35.
36.

384 U.S. at 483-90.
Id. at 482.

37. Id. at 490-91.
38. Id. at 499-500 (dissenting opinion).
39. Id. at 533 (dissenting opinion). The same observation could certainly be made concerning Mr. Justice White's own conclusions with reference to the effects of the decision. Id.
at 540-45.
40. Id. at 499 (Clark, J., dissenting).
41. Id. at 533.
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seek routinely to persuade, cajole, deceive or apply pressure to suspects
thought to be guilty during incommunicado interrogations in an effort
to obtain confessions? Apologists for modern police interrogation practices
do not deny the use of deception or other subtle forms of psychological
pressure, but admit their use and defend them on the ground that they are
not calculated to produce false confessions.4 Official endorsement of interrogation manuals or a full blown study utilizing approved social science
techniques are certainly not necessary to substantiate the Court's conclusion that these practices are standard operating procedures in the
police stations of the nation. Mr. Justice Harlan candidly stated the fact:
"Without at all subscribing to the generally black picture of police conduct painted by the Court, I think it must be frankly recognized at the
outset that police questioning allowable under due process precedents may
inherently entail some pressure on the suspect and may seek advantage
in his ignorance or weaknesses."4
The stronger point involves the issues of whether the fifth amendment
applies in the statonhouse and whether custodial interrogation constitutes the kind of compulsion prohibited by it. Justices White and
Harlan were able to develop reasoned arguments for the proposition that
neither the history of the privilege nor the language of the amendment
provides strong support for the conclusion reached by the Court." But
both the majority and the dissenters recognized that the doctrine enunciated in Miranda constituted a departure from precedent 4 3 The issue
before the Court was not how the fifth amendment had been interpreted
in the past, but whether it should be so interpreted for the future0 Before
the Court was an issue of fundamental policy affected, but not controlled,
by either history or the literal meaning of the language of the amendment. The Court was required once again to rule in the controversial
42. See Inbau, Law Enforcement, the Courts, and Individual Civil Liberties, in Criminal
justice in Our Time 97 (Howard ed. 1965); see generally authorities cited by the Miranda
Court, 384 U.S. at 448 n.8.

43. Id. at 515 (dissenting opinion).
44. Id. at 526-31 (White, J, dissenting); id. at 510-13 (Harlan, J, dissenting). Mr.
Jutice Harlan recognized that the argument was not quite so strong as Mr. Justice White
suggested. See id. at 511 & n.7 (dissenting opinion).
45. The Court expressly declined to follow Crooker v. California, 357 US. 433 (1958),
and Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U.S. 504 (1958), which it had attempted to distinguish in Escobedo
v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 491-92 (1964). 384 U.S. at 479 n.48.
46. Mr. justice Harlan noted that "legal history has been stretched before to satisfy deep
needs of society," but he denied that the Court could demonstrate the desirability of its new
rules. Id. at 515 (dissenting opinion). Mr. justice White pointed out that what the Court
had done was "to make new law and new public policy in much the same way that it has in
the course of interpreting other great clauses of the Constitution." Id. at 531 (dissenting
opinion). (Footnote omitted.) The latter agreed with Mr. justice Harlan that the Court's
action was inadvisable, but within its powers. Ibid.
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twilight zone where the appropriate limits of a citizen's right must be
decided in the context of other societal interests.
Traditionally, the admissibility of confessions had been determined by
the standard of "voluntariness.14 7 In applying this mixed question of
law, fact, and terminology,4 8 the Court attempted to regulate the conduct
of law enforcement officials by a case by case consideration of the capacity of individual suspects to withstand the pressures to which they had
been subjected during the confession-seeking process. The dissenters
agreed that "voluntariness" or the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment, in its constitutional form, was a better judicial instrument
than the fifth amendment for striking the balance between the rights of
the individual and the needs of society.4" They found nothing abhorrent
in the application of some pressure to a suspect in order to obtain a confession or the use of his statements to prove his guilt at trial." The suspect should be heard to complain only if undue pressure, as determined
on the facts of each case, should be exerted against him.51 Society should
permit subtle though effective forms of coercion because of its interest in
obtaining confessions as an important device of law enforcement 2 The
dissenters would not expand the protection of the rights of the individual
by extending the privilege at the expense of the societal interest of using
confessions to solve crime and prove guilt.
The basic difference between the majority and the dissenters arose
from different value judgments concerning the basic fairness of the police
obtaining and using admissions of guilt from a suspect who was too weak
or ignorant to remain silent0 3 and different notions of the costs to society
which would result from the recognition, application and implementation
of the privilege in stationhouse interrogations. 4 Conclusions concerning
these issues were much more important than history or language in de47. See id. at 506-10 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
48. See id. at 515 n.11 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
49. Id. at 503 (Clark, J., dissenting) ; id. at 505 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
50. Mr. Justice White maintained that there was "nothing wrong or immoral, and certainly nothing unconstitutional, in the police's asking a suspect whom they have reasonable
cause to arrest whether or not he killed his wife or in confronting him with the evidence on
which the arrest was based, at least where he has been plainly advised that he may remain
completely silent . .. ." Id. at 538 (dissenting opinion). (Citation omitted.) However, the Court
stated that "to maintain a 'fair state-individual balance,' to require the government 'to
shoulder the entire load,' . . . to respect the inviolability of the human personality, our accusatory system of criminal justice demands that the government seeking to punish an individual produce the evidence against him by its own independent labors, rather than by the
cruel, simple expedient of compelling it from his own mouth." Id. at 460.
51. Id. at 515 (Harlan J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 517 (Harlan J., dissenting).
53. See note 50 supra.
54. See text accompanying notes 58-61 infra.
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ciding the cases before the Court. The wisdom of the Court's decisions
hinges upon the question of whether its views concerning these issues are
more sound than those of the dissenters.
There can be little doubt that freedom of choice unimpaired by fraud
or duress is a value with deep roots in American society. Countless examples could be gleaned from the law of contracts, wills, marriage or
other fields.5" In the abstract there should be little quarrel with the concept that it is better to sanction only those acts changing legal relationships
which are truly voluntary, whether the act in question is a confession or
a will. A persuasive argument for tolerating involuntary confessions not
"crepellent to civilized standards of decency" ' can be made only if it can
be established that confessions are an essential instrument for the enforcement of the criminal law which can not be obtained except by countenancing the less flagrant and more sophisticated forms of psychological
pressure.
Some would insist that even in such a siuation the values of "freedom
of choice" and "the right of privacy" sought to be protected by the fifth
amendment are absolutes which must be respected regardless of public
necessity. To a very real extent, the police interrogations of the twentieth
century are the legal equivalent of the judicial interrogations claimed to
have been essential under the Stuarts."' The reason for the privilege
is to protect the citizen when public authorities conclude that his right
is less important than the societal interest. There is little need to afford
him constitutional protection in other cases.
However, many would be inclined to conclude that a demonstrable
public necessity for custodial interrogation in order to maintain effective
law enforcement would constitute sufficient justification for permitting
some tactics designed to impair the "freedom of choice" of the citizen.
Can such a showing be made? The majority stated that "the limits we
have placed on the interrogation process should not constitute an undue
interference with a proper system of law enforcement.""8 However, Mr.
Justice White opined that "there is, in my view, every reason to believe
that a good many criminal defendants . . .will now, under this new

version of the Fifth Amendment, either not be tried at all or acquitted
if the State's evidence, minus the confession, is put to the test of litiga55. See 384 U.S. at 547 n.26, quoting from Sutherland, Crime and Confession, 79 Harv.
L. Rev. 21, 37 (1965).
56. 384 U.S. at 507 nA (Harlan, J., dissenting), quoting from Bator & Vorenberg, Arrest,
Detention, Interrogation and the Right to Counsel: Basic Problems and Possible Legislative
Solutions, 66 Colum. L. Rev. 62, 73 (1966).
57. The historical approach to the fifth amendment tends to ignore that organized police
forces did not come into existence until the nineteenth century.
58. 384 U.S. at 481.
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tion."5 9 Mr. Justice Clark expressed concern that "such a strict constitutional specific inserted at the nerve center of crime detection may
well kill the patient."6 Mr. Justice Harlan noted that "evidence on the
role of confessions is notoriously incomplete . . ." but warned that confessions have importance in crime control." In his opinion, the Court was
taking a real risk when the effect of its decision could not be fairly predicted with accuracy."
The fact of the matter is that we do not know what, if any, effect
the decisions will have on law enforcement. There have been loud protestations of impending doom from some police officials, 6 3 but similar
assertions have been made in the past concerning Mapp v. Ohio. 4 Limitations on interrogations may affect the clearance rate "because it is well
known that when a suspect is apprehended by the police and if he could
be questioned about other offenses committed by him, multiple crimes
are solved which would not otherwise be cleared."15 There is clearly a
social value in solving such crimes but it is a social value much different
and less significant than solving an offense committed by a criminal who
will be able to avoid prosecution or conviction of any offense unless he can
be interrogated.
There are some cases of this nature. Limitations on interrogations may
affect proof of guilt in causes cdl~bres such as those involving a solitary
killer or a rapist. These cases are important but they constitute a minute
percentage of the crimes committed. They are not so numerous that they
have a major impact upon the administration of criminal justice. Other
methods of solving them may develop with improved selection, better
training and greater technological assistance to police forces.
In the routine cases which constitute the bulk of the criminal business
there are many other factors which intervene in the criminal process between the close of the police investigation and the final disposition of
the case which may be much more significant in determining how many
persons will be prosecuted, convicted or imprisoned, than the efficiency
of the police in procuring confessions. It does not follow that the ability
of the police to produce more confessions will have any significant effect
on the degree to which society exerts its sanctions against criminal offenders.66 It is possible that a high percentage of suspects will voluntarily
waive their rights and confess.
59. Id. at 542 (dissenting opinion).
60. Id. at 500 (dissenting opinion). (Footnote omitted.)
61. Id. at 517 (dissenting opinion).
62. Ibid.
63. See N.Y. Times, June 15, 1966, p. 1, col. 6.
64. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
65. Bress, Who Speaks for Effective Law Enforcement?, 1 Forum 5 (1966).
66. For a discussion of the experience in the District of Columbia, see generally Pye, The
Administration of Criminal Justice, 66 Colum. L. Rev. 286 (1966).
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We may find that the legal protections afforded to the poor and to
members of minority groups by Miranda will in the long run result in a
change of attitude and a willingness to cooperate with the police which
is unfortunately absent today in our urban ghettos. It is at least possible
that such a change in community attitudes could improve police effectiveness to the point that it would more than compensate for the loss of
efficiency in confession-seeking.
These are only speculations. Clearly there is some risk that the reduction in the number of confessions will cause a general disintegration of
law enforcement. However, the risk does not appear to be great. The
Court has acted before to strike down traditional police practices when
the results could not be calculated with precision and society has survived. What would be the level of the administration of criminal justice
today if the Court had delayed action until it could neatly ascertain the
exact effects of its judgments in Ziang Sung Wan v. United States,"7
Brown v. Mississippi," McNabb v. United States, 9 Escobedo v. Illinois,"°
Weeks v. United States,71 Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States,7 2 Nardone v. United States,73 Henry v. United States, 74 Wong Sun v. United
States,75 or Mapp, to name but a few cases?
It is argued by the dissenters that the Court should have at least delayed its decision until prestigious bodies now considering the issue had
completed their research. Such an argument seems to be directed more
appropriately at the decision of whether certiorari should have been
granted rather than the action which the Court should have taken after
agreeing to review the cases.
It is indeed unfortunate that the Court did not have the value of a
careful analysis of the relevant facts before making its decision. However,
there is no reason to believe that the type of information required will
be available for some time. The Special Committee of the American Bar
Association is not engaging in any independent factual study. The reporters of the American Law Institute's Proposed Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure engaged in no new factual studies before presenting a
first draft to the Institute which recommended proposals clearly contrary
to the conclusions reached by the Court. 76 One of the reporters is also
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

266
297
318
378
232
251
302
361

US. 1 (1924).
U.S. 278 (1936).
U.S. 332 (1943).
U.S. 478 (1964).
U.S. 383 (1914).
US.385 (1920).
US. 379 (1937).
U.S.98 (1959).

75. 371U.S. 471 (1963).
76. See Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1966). The draft
went so far as to permit a police officer to use drugs or hypnosis in connection with the ques-
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Executive Director of the President's Commission on Law Enforcement
and the Administration of Justice, which is headed by former Attorney
General Katzenbach, who has also clearly voiced his views on custodial
interrogation of indigents without counsel. 7 The Commission has collected some factual data within the District of Columbia, but plans no
national project for the development and analysis of the underlying facts
relating to the problem.
Neither will the District of Columbia Crime Commission engage in a
study in depth. One of the reasons is that answers to many of the most
important questions depend upon knowledge concerning the effect of
warnings, the incidence of waiver among suspects who know their rights,
and the impact of the advice and presence of counsel upon the interrogation .process. Procedures such as those required by the Court must be
placed in practice before their effects can be known. A year ago, the
Neighborhood Legal Service Project of the District of Columbia proposed
to the then United States Attorney for the District of Columbia that
arrested persons be informed of their right to remain silent, the possible
consequences of speaking, their right to counsel, and that a lawyer would
be provided for them if they were indigent. It offered to coordinate
efforts to provide counsel for indigents who requested the advice of a
lawyer. The proposal met with initial opposition and delay, and ultimate
approval was given only a few weeks before the Miranda decision. If the
proposal had been accepted at the time it was made, much information
would have been available when it was most needed.
It is fair to say that delay would have given the Court the benefit
of the opinions of the ABA, the ALI, the Crime Commission and others.
However, all shades of reasoned opinions were already available to it in
lower court opinions and the reviews.' 8 What it needed was empirical
knowledge, and delay would not have provided it.
Furthermore, the prompt decision will be of great assistance to those
studying the problem. The private and public bodies may now frame
their recommendations with knowledge of the interrogation techniques
which are permitted and prohibited by the Constitution. Much would
have been lost if the ABA, ALI, and the Crime Commission had adopted
complex proposals upon the assumption that it was permissible to question
tioning of an arrested person if he first informed the person that he was not obliged to submit
thereto and obtained his written consent. Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure § 5.05
(Tent. Draft No. 1, 1966). The Reporters for this Model Code are Professors James Vorenberg and Paul M. Bator of the Harvard Law School upon whose leading law review article,
Bator & Vorenberg, supra note 56, the dissenters relied.
77. See note 3 supra. See generally Kamisar, Has the Court Left the Attorney General
Behind?-The Bazelon-Katzenbach Letters on Poverty, Equality and the Administration of

Criminal justice, 54 Ky. L.J. 464 (1966).
78. The opinions demonstrate that the majority and the dissenters had carefully surveyed
the literature in the field.
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suspects for a period up to twenty-four hours without providing them
counsel or bringing them before a committing magistrate, only to have
the Court render a decision invalidating their proposals at the end of
their labors.
The Miranda opinion raises a number of significant issues. The Court's
requirement of warnings applies to "custodial" interrogations. This is
described as the time "when the individual is first subjected to police
interrogation while in custody at the station or otherwise deprived of his
freedom of action in any way." 9 Clearly the principles do not apply to a
person who enters a police station and indicates that he wishes to confess.8 0 It is equally obvious that the procedures required by the opinion do
apply to a person who is brought to a police station or placed in a squad
car under formal arrest. Presumably, it does not apply when a police
officer approaches a crowd of people after the commission of an offense
and inquires concerning who committed it."'
More difficult problems are raised when a police officer observes a
defendant on the open streets or in an automobile under suspicious circumstances. May he order or request the citizen to stop walking or get
out of the car and answer questions without giving him the litany of
warnings? Rarely will the suspect be placed under formal arrest at this
stage. Usually his "freedom of action" will be substantially impaired by
the officer's action.
Must the safeguards outlined in the opinion be observed when a suspect
"cooperates" in response to a police request to go outside a building, s2
enter a squad car"- or accompany the officers to a police station?" Must
the warnings be given and an opportunity to exercise the rights be accorded
to the suspect who is interviewed in his own home after entry has been
gained by acquiescence to a police request made under color of law?'
Courts have had little experience with such issues except in determining
whether there has been an arrest for the purpose of determining the legality
of a subsequent search8 6 or the application of the Mallory rule 7 or for
79. 384 U.S. at 477.
80. Id. at 478.
81. But cf. United States v. Wilson, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 248 (1953).
82. Cf. Kelley v. United States, 298 F.2d 310 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
83. See, e.g., Seals v. United States, 325 F.2d 1006 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S.
964 (1964).
84. See, eg., ibid.; Scarbeck v. United States, 317 F.2d 546 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
374 U.S. 856 (1963); United States v. Vita, 294 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369
U.S. 823 (1962).
85. Cf. Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921); Judd v. United States, 190 F2d 649
(D.C. Cir. 1951).
86. E.g., Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959); Kelley v. United States, 298 F.2d
310 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
87. E.g., cases cited note 84 supra.
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deciding whether there has been the valid consent to an entry which
negates the necessity for a search warrant.8 8 In the arrest cases, they
have on occasion looked at the intent of the police officer,8" but more often
at the reality of the apparent manifestations of consent by the suspect 0
The latter approach is more closely akin to the Court's treatment of
questions of claimed consent in the search and seizure cases."
However, the Court was careful not to refer to "arrested persons"
in its opinion. In the future it may use the concept of "limitation of
freedom of action" enunciated in Miranda to define arrests, thereby dealing a death blow to the "stop and frisk" statutes. But it is also possible
that it may find limitations of "freedom of action" which require the invocation of the interrogation safeguards in circumstances such as on-thestreet questioning where it might not find that an arrest, with its other
legal consequences, has taken place. There may still be room for less
stringent requirements of warnings in interrogations conducted in the
home in the presence of members of the family than in those conducted
incommunicado in a police station. It does not necessarily follow that a
few general questions directed towards a suspect in his home or in a
public place will constitute a "custodial interrogation," although the same
questions directed at a person forcefully removed from the streets may
require the warnings." It does seem clear that police authorities will not
be able to evade the warning requirements simply because a suspect
complied with an official request without reference to the circumstances
in which the suspect acted.94
Obviously, the operation of the requirements concerning warnings and
the waiver doctrine depend upon the integrity of police officers and
sympathetic enforcement by the lower courts if they are to be effective.
There is little reason to suspect that officers will assert that a defendant
confessed when he did not make any statement. There is more reason
for concern over the candor of some officers when there is a dispute as to
88. E.g., cases cited note 85 supra.
89. See Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960).
90. See Seals v. United States, 325 F.2d 1006 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 964
(1964) ; Kelley v. United States, 298 F.2d 310 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
91. See Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921).
92. See, e.g., Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 41, § 98 (1966); N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 180-a; cf.
Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959).
93. The Court noted that "inquiry of persons not under restraint" did not necessarily
involve "the compelling atmosphere inherent in the process of in-custody interrogation." 384
U.S. at 477-78.
94. See Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure § 2.01 (1), comment at 88-89 (Tent.
Draft No. 1, 1966). The draft takes the view that inquiry should not be made into the
motivations of a suspect who apparently consents to a police request to appear at a police
station or to answer questions. Instead, the issue should be viewed in terms of whether the
officer requested cooperation or expressly or impliedly ordered the suspect to cooperate.
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whether the warnings were given in clear and unequivocal language or a
controversy concerning the circumstances under which a suspect has
made a statement after warnings. Unfortunately, one possible effect of
the cases could be to affect police testimony rather than police actions.
Richard H. Kuh has suggested that the initial reaction of the police in
New York to Mapp may have resulted in an increase, significant in its
proportions, in accommodations by police officers of their stories, not
always their actions, to law. 5 Students of the criminal process must be
concerned with the number of cases in which long-time narcotics offenders
throw vials containing heroin into gutters in front of approaching persons
known to be police officers; situations where professional gamblers leave
numbers tickets in full view on the front seats of automobiles which by
chance have been stopped for violations of minor traffic regulations; cases
in which an officer remembers having given a loud and clear statement
of his identity and purpose before entering an apartment although onlookers do not remember anything being said; cases where defendants
in lineups "apologize" to victims who have identified them;"0 and cases
in which defendant, who denied guilt in the presence of witnesses when
arrested, nevertheless "spontaneously" admitted guilt to an officer in a
squad car or immediately after arrival at the stationhouse. This is not to
say that such cases do not occur or that defendants demonstrate unusual
veracity in recounting the facts involving their arrests or confessions.
They do raise questions concerning the candor of some officers and the
gullibility of some judges. They also raise the possibility of the lack of
trustworthiness in forthcoming confession cases.
The problem is that it is difficult to avoid disputes between the police
and defendants concerning what happened during a period of secret interrogation if any extended period of delay is permitted between arrest
of the suspect and his presentment before a magistrate. The involuntary
confession cases provide vivid illustrations of the difference in testimony
between police and defendants concerning what happened during interrogations. These cases also demonstrate the disadvantage which confronts a defendant whose testimony must stand alone against self-corroborating stories of various law enforcement officials.
The Court sought to deal with the problem by making it clear that the
government must assume a "heavy burden"17 to sustain a contention of
waiver which will be measured by the stringent standard of Johnson v.
ZerbstY8
95. Kuh, Reflections on New York's "Stop-and-Frisk" Law and Its Claimed Unconstitutionality, 56 J. Crim. L., C. & PS. 32,37 n.8 (1965).
96. See Veney v. United States, 344 F.2d 542 (D.C. Cir.) (separate opinion) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 865 (1965).
97. 384 U.S. at 475.
98. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
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Claims of waiver will be carefully examined:
Whatever the testimony of the authorities as to waiver of rights by an accused,
the fact of lengthy interrogation or incommunicado incarceration before a statement
is made is strong evidence that the accused did not validly waive his rights. In these
circumstances the fact that the individual eventually made a statement is consistent
with the conclusion that the compelling influence of the interrogation finally forced him
to do so. It is inconsistent with any notion of a voluntary relinquishment of the
privilege. Morover, any evidence that the accused was threatened, tricked, or cajoled
into a waiver will, of course, show that the defendant did not voluntarily waive his
privilege. The requirement of warnings and waiver of rights is a fundamental with
respect to the Fifth Amendment privilege and not simply a preliminary ritual to
existing methods of interrogation. 99

The Court's intentions are clear. It remains to be seen whether they
will be given effect in the lower courts. There will be few cases where
police officers admit that they failed to give the required warnings or
ignored requests for a lawyer or assertions of the privilege. Prosecutors
will presumably not offer confessions in such cases.
There will be cases, however, in which police officers testify that:
(1) they informed the defendant of all of his rights whereupon he
stated that he did not want a lawyer and spontaneously confessed within
a few minutes after his arrival at the police station;
(2) there followed a six-hour delay before the defendant was taken
before a magistrate, during which time the defendant's oral statement
was reduced to writing; the accuracy of the statement was verified by
independent investigation followed by a lineup in which the accused was
identified; and a magistrate was located.
In the same cases, indigent defendants will testify that:
(1) they were warned of some of their rights but did not understand
that they could obtain the advice of a lawyer without paying;
(2) they initially refused to make any statement;
(3) after more than an hour of questioning, they were told that their
fingerprints were found at the scene of the crime;
(4) when they continued to remain silent, they were placed in a lineup
and informed that they had been identified by the victim;
(5) after several additional hours of interrogation, they gave a state-

ment which was promptly reduced to writing;
(6) they were then promptly taken before a magistrate.
In many such cases it will be difficult to determine who is lying. The
most that can be expected is that the lower courts will actually place the
burden of persuasion on the government and then seek to ascertain
whether that burden has been met. Too often suppression motions have
been viewed as proceedings in which the government has the obligation
of meeting only a burden of going forward which it fulfills when it
99. 384 U.S. at 476.
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produces sufficient evidence which, if believed, would meet a burden of
persuasion. At that point, the burden shifts to the defendant to show
cause why the government's evidence should not be believed, a task which
he cannot accomplish when his only weapons are his own uncorroborated
testimony and his cross-examination of experienced testifiers conducted
without the benefit of adequate discovery.
Experience may show that many lower courts routinely will find
"waiver," where in past times they have found "abandonment" in search
and seizure cases and "voluntariness" in confession cases. In such an
event, the Court may feel compelled to expand its remedial doctrine to
provide that primary protection to suspects which it has now decided that
they deserve.
A device to accomplish this end exists in the McNabb-Mallory rule"'0
in the federal courts. The requirement of prompt presentment of an
arrested defendant before a magistrate, enforced by the suppression of
statements obtained during a period of unnecessary delay, has proved to
be an effective judicial technique to make the fifth amendment a meaningful right to the arrested citizen, to avoid disputes concerning what
happened during incommunicado interrogations, and to deter unlawful
arrests. The doctrine imposes considerably greater limitations upon law
enforcement agencies than does the Mirandaopinion.
Authorities are permitted under Miranda to detain a suspect arrested
upon probable cause for a "reasonable period of time in which investigation in the field" "o'may be conducted without violating the constitutional
imperative, so long as they refrain from questioning him. The federal
courts at present permit the police to violate their state prompt presentment statutes and conduct investigations to check the identity of the
suspect, obtain statements from victims and witnesses, make laboratory
analysis of physical evidence, search for fruits or instrumentalities of
crime, and perhaps to conduct a lineup for victims and witnesses."0 ' The
opportunity to engage in such investigations while holding a suspect in
detention is obviously of great assistance to the police.
If the Court finds that its present safeguards are inadequate to protect
the fifth amendment rights of suspects, expressions of the McNabbMallory technique in constitutional language may result. While the effectiveness of the Miranda doctrine is being determined, the Court can continue to use the District of Columbia as a Holmesian laboratory in which
100. Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S.
332 (1943). The development of the rule is traced in Hogan & Snee, The McNabb-Mallory
Rule: Its Rise, Rationale and Rescue, 47 Geo. L.J. 1 (1958).
101. 384 U.S. at 474.
102. See Hearings on H.R. 7525 & S. 486 Before the Senate Committee on the District of
Columbia, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., ser.-, pt. 1, at 310-11 (1963).

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35

the effect of the McNabb-Mallory doctrine upon individual rights and
efficiency in law enforcement can be studied.
In the future, the Court will also be required to determine the extent
to which the "fruits of the poison tree" 103 doctrine shall be applied to
evidence obtained as a result of interrogations which violate the safeguards required by its opinion. Mr. Justice Clark read Miranda itself to
hold that "failure to follow the new procedures requires inexorably the
exclusion of any statement by the accused, as well as the fruits
thereof ."'O This may constitute an exaggeration of the holding, but nonetheless an accurate prophecy.
Some light on the approaches which the Court may follow can be inferred from its language in the Westover case. 10 In that case, the defendant had been in the custody of state officials for over fourteen hours
and had been interrogated at length without warnings prior to his transfer
to federal custody. The federal agents warned him that he did not have
to make a statement, that any statement he made could be used against
him, and that he had a right to consult with a lawyer. Westover confessed
after more than two hours of interrogation. There was no evidence that
he had affirmatively waived his rights. The Court held that his statements
were not admissible despite the warnings. However, the holding was based
on the fact that the FBI interrogation took place immediately after the
state interrogation and in the same detention facility. 00 The Court made
it clear that "a different case would be presented if an accused were taken
into custody by the second authority, removed both in time and place
from his original surroundings, and then adequately advised of his rights
and given an opportunity to exercise them." 107
It would appear that a violation of a suspect's rights by state authorities will not necessarily preclude federal authorities from obtaining a valid
confession at a point in time after the initial compulsion has been dissipated. Presumably, state authorities can isolate an initial illegality and
prevent it from contaminating any subsequent admission of guilt if the
first proceeding is clearly brought to an end and interrogation is not resumed until a later time when the constitutional safeguards are present.
However, additional steps may be required to assure the Court that none
of the original coercion has lingered on into the second period of questioning. Westover did not confess during the first unlawful interrogation.
More difficult problems will be presented by a case in which a confes103.

The doctrine has its origin in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S.

385 (1920).
104. 384 U.S. at 500 (separate opinion).

105. The facts in the Westover case are set forth by the Supreme Court. 384 U.S. at 494-95.
106.
107.

Id. at 496.
Ibid.
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sion is obtained during an illegal interrogation and the defendant subsequently reiterates his statement during a later period of questioning where
the constitutional formalities have been observed. Here, the "cat is out
of the bag." The second confession, though voluntary and given with
knowledge of the right to remain silent, may be the clear product of the
first, unless the defendant realized that the first statement could not be
used against him. In United States v. Bayer,'0" the Supreme Court refused
to apply the "fruits of the poison tree" doctrine to such a situation and
inquired only as to whether the second confession was voluntary. The
vitality of the Bayer case is doubtful, to say the least, in light of Miranda.
In Killough v. United States.,' the court of appeals for the District of
Columbia refused to apply the Bayer approach in an analogous problem
arising under the McNabb-Mallory rule. The basic issue in Killough was
whether a confession, obtained from a defendant while in jail, should be
excluded because an earlier confession of the defendant was obtained
during a period of unlawful delay, where, however, the defendant was
informed of his right to remain silent by a United States commissioner
during the interval between the two statements. Prior to the Killough
case, the court of appeals had dealt with the problem of reaffirmed confessions in Goldsmith v. United States"" and in Jackson v. United
States."' Each of these cases had approved the admission of a second
confession obtained from the defendant while in jail, although the defendant's initial confession had been obtained during a period of unlawful
delay. Counsel had been appointed for each defendant at the preliminary
hearing.
In Killough, a majority of the court sitting en banc rejected the admission of the second confession. The court distinguished Jackson and
Goldsmith on the ground that those defendants had received the advice
of counsel, whereas in Killough no counsel had been appointed. However,
both the majority and the dissenters recognized the broader significance
of the decision. Essentially, it rested upon the theory that the second confession was the fruit of the first and not independent of it and that one of
the objects of the exclusionary rule in such cases would be frustrated if
a derivative statement were to be admitted.
It seems reasonable to predict that the Supreme Court will apply the
Killough approach to fifth amendment cases and bar second confessions,
or at least those which are not preceded by the advice of counsel. The
police will not be permitted to elicit a first statement as a result of violating the safeguards and obtain its reiteration in a second interrogation in
108.

331 U.S. 532 (1947).

109. 315 F.2d 241 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
110. 277 F.2d 335 (D.C. Cir.), cerL denied, 364 US. 863 (1960).
111.

285 F.2d 675 (D.C. Cir. 1960), cerL denied, 366 U.S. 941 (1961).
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which the defendant is warned of his rights in a perfunctory manner and
waives counsel because he believes he has nothing more to lose.
Mr. Justice White noted in his dissenting opinion that, in the future,
the Court will have to decide whether nontestimonial evidence offered at
trial should be denied admission because it is the fruit of statements made
during a prohibited interrogation." Such nontestimonial evidence may be
a murder weapon, loot, or fingerprints found at the scene of the crime.
The Court will also be required to deal with testimonial evidence in the
identity or existence has been ascertained as a
form of witnesses whose
3
result of interrogation.1

No one wishes to immunize the criminal from a just conviction because
"the constable has blundered." "" At the same time, judicious extension
of the "fruits of the poison tree" doctrine may be the only effective way of
insuring police observance of the procedures required by Miranda.
The Court has already indicated its awareness of the problem by prohibiting the use of statements alleged to be exculpatory if obtained in
violation of the Mirandasafeguards." 5 Its action was dictated by a realization that "statements merely intended to be exculpatory by the defendant are often used to impeach his testimony at trial or to demonstrate
untruths in the statement given under interrogation and thus to prove
guilt by implication.""" In order to inspire observance of its required
procedures, the Court apparently is prepared to preclude application of
the doctrine of Walder v. United States" 7 in fifth amendment cases.
The importance of such an approach is also apparent from the cases
which have arisen under the McNabb-Mallory rule. In Tate v. United
States, 58 the court of appeals for the District of Columbia held that a
defendant, who does more than simply deny the commission of a crime
in his testimony at trial, may be impeached by the use of statements obtained during a period of unlawful delay, if the statements are not "per
112.

384 U.S. at 545.

113. Cf. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); Smith v. United States, 344
F.2d 545 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Smith v. United States, 324 F.2d 879 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 954 (1964).
It is interesting to note that the Solicitor General apparently gives a broad meaning to
Wong Sun, reading it to hold that any statement made after an illegal arrest is inadmissible,
See Medalie, From Escobedo to Miranda: The Anatomy of a Supreme Court Decision 138
(1966).
114.
(1926).

People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585, 587, cert. denied, 270 U.S. 657

115.
116.

384 U.S. at 476-77.
Id. at 477.

117.

347 U.S. 62 (1954). In this case, the Supreme Court permitted the government to

impeach a defendant who had testified on direct examination that he had never sold or possessed narcotics by the use of evidence of a different incident, although the evidence had

been unlawfully seized.
118.

283 F.2d 377 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
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se inculpatory." Subsequent cases have caused confusion concerning when
a statement is "collateral" or "exculpatory." 119 A defendant who has
given a statement during a period of unlawful detention may be placed
in the situation where he must either refrain from taking the stand or
submit to a damaging impeachment if he tells a story at trial which differs
from his pretrial version. In a very real sense the police have been permitted to profit from their wrongdoing. An incentive has been provided
for ignoring the law governing interrogations by providing a tactical advantage at trial to those who violate a defendant's rights. The approach
suggested in Miranda may require a re-examination of Tate and perhaps
Walder as well.
In a few years we will be in a better position to assess the real significance of Miranda. If the fears of the dissenters prove justified, it may
be necessary to reconsider whether society can afford the luxury of the
values protected and implemented in the decisions. Some have already
suggested that the fifth amendment should be modified in order to prevent
it from interfering with the interrogation of suspects." Even this drastic
step might be preferable to a judicial declaration that the fifth amendment should be limited to precluding the use of star chamber devices, long
since discarded as a tool of law enforcement, but should not be interpreted
in a manner which would give real protection to citizens subjected to
twentieth century techniques designed to produce self-incrimination. It
may become necessary to re-examine other phases of criminal procedure,
119. See United States v. Poe, 352 F.2d 639 (D.C. Cir. 1965) ; Johnson v.United States,
344 F.2d 163 (D.C. Cir. 1964); The United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit: 1964-1965 Term, 54 Geo. L.J. 185, 265-67 (1965).
120. See Comments of Richard H. Kuh, Panelist, in Kamisar, supra note 77, at 507. Mr.
Kuh has stated: "The second way, one that I would like to see used, but I doubt that I'll see
in the next five years, (though I expect I may see it in ten or fifteen) would be by constitutional amendment to come right to grips with the need for interrogation, and by a constitutional amendment to modify the fifth and sixth amendments to permit reasonable noncoercive
interrogation of defendants, either in the absence of counsel but with other safeguards, or even
in the presence of counsel but with some obligation on the part of defendants to answer
questions put to them, or to risk that their silences may be used against them." Ibid.
The American Law Institute has stated that "finally, if it turns out that the effect of providing legal advice to all persons immediately on arrest is to put a stop to all questioning,
and that this entails law enforcement losses which society is unwilling to bear, even more
fundamental questions will have to be faced. Thus it has been suggested that the only longrange solution lies in amending the Fifth Amendment to permit, under fair safeguards, the
obtaining of information from all arrested persons--rich, poor, professional and inexperienced
alike. One form of such an amendment would allow the police to question arrested persons only
in the presence of counsel, but would permit comment at trial on an arrested person's refusal
to cooperate, thus exerting pressure for cooperation in the interrogation. A more far-reaching
change would be to permit the questioning of an accused under process before a magistrate or
judge." Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure § 5.07, comment at 192 (Tent. Draft No.
1, 1966).
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such as the prosecution's burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt if we find that the balance of advantage has really shifted to defendants to the extent that law enforcement is impaired substantially.
However, experience may show that our system for the administration of
criminal justice will be able to adjust to Miranda as it has to the other
departures from precedent-from the abolition of torture to Escobedo.
As Mr. Justice Goldberg noted in Escobedo, it may even profit from the
change:
We have also learned the companion lesson of history that no system of criminal

justice can, or should, survive if it comes to depend for its continued effectiveness on
the citizens' abdication through unawareness of their constitutional rights. No system
worth preserving should have to fear that if an accused is permitted to consult with a
lawyer, he will become aware of, and exercise, these rights. If the exercise of constitutional rights will thwart the effectiveness 2of a system of law enforcement, then there
is something very wrong with that system.' '

Perhaps one may be permitted to sympathize with Chief Justice Traynor's search for a compromise'2 2 and agree with Judge Friendly's argument that rules and statutes are better instruments to fashion a system of
criminal procedure than judicial decisions, 2 and still conclude that the
Court decided a hard case in the only way it could, if it was to keep faith
with the spirit of the fifth amendment. Any 24other result would have
permitted "precedent [to] embalm a principle.'
121.
122.
Record
123.

378 U.S. 478, 490 (1964). (Footnotes omitted.)
Traynor, The Devils of Due Process in Criminal Detection, Detention, and Trial, 21
of N.Y.C.B.A. 357 (1966).
Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 Calif. L. Rev. 929

(1965).

124. The language is that of Benjamin Disraeli in his Address on the Expenditures of the
Country Before the House of Commons, Feb. 22, 1848, in Bartlett, Familiar Quotations 512b
(13th & Centennial rev. ed. 1955).

THOMAS C. LYNCH*

S INCE the

decision in Miranda v. Arizona,' there has been much dis-

cussion, and many meetings have been held,2 with the apparent purpose of arriving at some agreement as to the meaning of that case. There
has been progress toward a consensus which will provide basic guidelines
to aid both law enforcement officials and the courts. However, the colloquies which have taken place have very often evoked as much confusion

as unanimity.
I. IMPACT ON POLICE PRACTICES
While it is interesting to entertain ourselves with interpretations of
Miranda, this does not furnish the assistance necessary for the police
officer on the street who does not have time to debate abstractions, but
must make constant and instantaneous decisions upon which the lives
and security of the public may depend.
The Mirandadecision will have a tremendous impact on police practices
in most states. The immediate impact is somewhat less in California as a
result of the state court's decision in People v. Dorado,' the curious offspring of Escobedo v. Illinois,4 but the forerunner of Miranda.
This is not the first instance in which California has found it necessary
to make a radical legal adjustment prior to most of the other states. In
1955 the California supreme court, in People v. Cahan,l adopted a state
* Attorney General of the State of California. Mr. Lynch received his BA. from the

University of Santa Clara and his LL.B. from the University of San Francisco School of
Law. He served as Assistant United States Attorney for the Northern District of California
from 1933 to 1943. Prior to his election to the office of District Attorney of San Francisco
in 1951, Mr. Lynch was Chief Assistant District Attorney in that city. He served as District
Attorney for thirteen years until he was elected Attorney General in 1964. Mr. Lynch was
recently elected to a four-year term as Attorney General.
The Attorney General has been voted a Fellow of the American College of Trial Lawyers
and is a member of President Johnson's Crime Commission. He has been a principal advisor
to the California Crime Commission and has served on the Law and Legislative Committee

of the District Attorneys Association.
This article is adapted from remarks delivered at symposia presented by the Institute of
Continuing Legal Education at the University of Colorado on August 20 and in New York
City on October 1.
1. .384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2. The Institute of Continuing Legal Education has presented a series of programs
entitled "Escobedo--The Second Round" in cooperation with the Practicing Law Institute
and the Universities of Michigan and Colorado. The first program was presented at Ann
Arbor, Michigan, on July 23. The other two (from which the present article is drawn)
took place on August 20 in Boulder, Colorado, and on October 1 in New York City.
3. 62 Cal. 2d 338, 398 P.2d 361, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169, cert. denied, 381 US. 937, 946 (1965).
4. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
5. 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955).
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rule to exclude illegally seized evidence. The United States Supreme Court
had reaffirmed its position in the previous year that the federal exclusionary rule did not apply to the states.' Not until 1961 did the Supreme
Court set forth the exclusionary rule as part of the fourteenth amendment
and applicable to the states in Mapp v. Ohio.J By the time of the Mapp
decision, California had long since adapted its search and seizure procedures to the rule formerly applicable only to federal cases.
Thus, in interrogation, California is in some ways repeating its
experience in the area of exclusion of illegally seized evidence. However,
it should be pointed out that there is a much greater difference in the applicable rule here. For example, the Dorado rule did not require that the
indigent suspect be warned that he had a right to appointed counsel
and that, if he wished, counsel would be appointed during questioning.
Miranda does require this8 and, in addition, requires that, if counsel is
not appointed, questioning must stop.
While Miranda established requirements additional to those in Dorado,
California police officers have been giving warnings concerning the right
to remain silent and to obtain a lawyer for over a year and a half.
Although the change in police practices as a result of Miranda will be
less in California than in other jurisdictions, that state shares with all
states the problem of determining what its requirements are, the full
extent of their application, and the best method by which to insure their
promulgation to the working officer.
Since California has had a period of time in which to adjust to about
two-thirds of the Miranda requirements, its interpretation and procedure
may be useful to others as an illustration.
Setting aside the determination of the practical meaning of Miranda,
the immediate problem faced by law enforcement officials is this: How
can the police be made aware of-and familiar with-the requirements
of Miranda so that they can follow them?
Police normally would learn the law by referring to the codes. Police
training in California includes the codes. The office of the attorney
general supplies an abbreviated California Penal Code to peace officers
for their handy reference. Here, however, there is no statute to examine.
The opinion of the Court in Miranda covers sixty-three pages. It would
be impossible for all law enforcement officers to read and digest this form
and volume of material. Thus, it is apparent that the police need ready
information and advice not only as to Miranda, but also concerning the
6.
7.
8.

Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954).
367 U.S. 643 (1961).
384 U.S. at 473.

9.

Id. at 474.
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federal and state cases which are daily following it in interpretation and
application. What, then, is the most desirable way to provide this assistance?
In California, the Attorney General and the district attorneys keep
law enforcement officers informed of significant developments which will
be of interest to them through a system of regular "zone meetings."
Information concerning the Miranda requisites already has been given
by means of this long-established procedure.
The district attorneys of the state are grouped in three sections for
these zone meetings. In July, there were meetings to discuss Miranda in
Sacramento, San Francisco, and San Diego. As a result of the discussions at these meetings, my office then prepared instructions which were
sent to all district attorneys for distribution to local law enforcement
officers. Subsequently, a series of meetings was held with state investigators and the state highway patrol and with chiefs of police and sheriffs
to discuss the new requirements.
The President's Crime Commission is currently preparing a Police
Task Force Report as part of its massive examination of crime and
criminal justice in the United States. One portion of this report deals
with recommendations for a police legal advisor within the police agency.
Such an advisor would have the responsibility for developing greater
interaction with the system of criminal justice and with the task of
enhancing police understanding of legal problems. The report will also
consider the alternatives of using a public prosecutor, a civilian lawyer,
or a sworn officer in this capacity.
An alternative to this proposal would be the California system. The
district attorney and the city attorney are responsible for advising the
police of legal problems involved in their procedures. Even before the
promulgation of instructions from the state attorney general, most local
police agencies had been informed by district attorneys of the Miranda
requirements. The attorney general has the over-all responsibility for
providing information to local enforcement agencies and does so through
the "zone meeting" system.
Thus, the responsibility for insuring that the procedures will both
protect the rights of defendants and produce solutions and admissible
evidence rests with those who must use the evidence and defend the
procedures in the trial court and on appeal. This seems to be a desirable
relationship of function and responsibility, and it works well in California.
Over-all supervision and direction is necessary in the rendering of
legal interpretations and advice. After all, what we are seeking is a
uniformly high standard in the administration of criminal justice. This
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can best be achived through the constant attention of the state attorney
general, and implemented on the working level by interaction between
the district attorney and the local police.
This pervasive problem of interpreting and distributing information
on legal rules was not so critical until the recent departures from stare
decisis. Now, however, it would be chaotic if each police station had
its own legal advisor to make individual interpretations. For example,
Texas has over 200 counties, each with at least one law enforcement
agency; California has fifty-eight counties with a total of nearly 400
separate police agencies. Moreover, officers or civilian lawyers assigned
to police stations for this purpose would lack the constant exposure to the
"cause-and-effect" relationship experienced by the district attorneys.
This could create a distortion in their advice on matters affecting the
process of the subsequent trial.
In light of these systemic problems, peace officers in California have
been advised of specific rules developed after analysis of Miranda.
California police officers have been admonished generally that they
must give a warning and secure a waiver in order for any statement made
by a suspect in custody to be admissible in court. Instructions have been
given as to the persons entitled to the warning, the warning which
must be given, and what is required for a valid waiver. A series of admonitions concerning these warnings and subsequent questioning have been
issued. These requirements are so complex that it had been suggested
that each officer carry a card containing the necessary information. In
order for this information to be useful to the officer, our office has found
it necessary to make specific determinations-despite the doubtful areas
and the many unresolved problems.
We have, therefore, formulated guidelines for determining who is
entitled to the warning:
It is recommended that law enforcement officers give the warning set out below
to all potential defendants in police custody or who are "otherwise deprived of their
freedom of action in any significant way."
(1) The warning must be given when the suspect is arrested.
(2) When the officer has decided to arrest the suspect, the warning should be
given. For example, when a person is stopped in a car or on the street under
suspicious circumstances, no warning need be given until the officer decides
to place the person under arrest; the ordinary traffic citation would not require a
warning.
(3) No warning need be given in the following circumstances: (a) when a person
walks into the police station and states that he wishes to confess to a crime; (b) when
a person calls the police to offer a confession or any other statement that he desires
to make; or (c) when the officer is engaged in "general on-the-scene" questioning as
to facts surrounding a crime or other general questioning of citizens in the factfinding process. It is an act of responsible citizenship for individuals to give whatever
information they may have to aid in law enforcement.
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In all of the fact-situations dealt with by the Court in the Miranda
decisions, the persons were under arrest and in the police station.
The Court, however, stated that a warning is required where the suspect
is in police custody or "otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in
any significant way.""
Although it is not at all clear what this means, it would appear to be
inapplicable where the officer stops and questions a person under
suspicious circumstances."
Such a situation also lacks the qualities stressed by the court: isolation and unfamiliar surroundings. We indicate that the warning must
be given as soon as the officer decides to make an arrest. It seems relatively clear that the court will not consider the formalism of the actual
arrest to be the determining factor. In California, the officer must give
a citation in some vehicle misdemeanor cases and can arrest only if there
is a refusal to sign the citation. Therefore, there is no significant restraint
in such cases and no warning is required.
The Miranda Court also stated that "there is no requirement that
police stop a person who enters a police station and states that he wishes
to confess to a crime ....
Volunteered statements ... are not barred
....
1,12 Although this makes an exception, which we have indicated in

our instructions, there are problems. For instance, is there a point in the
process of confession where by asking clarifying questions the police
become sufficiently involved to require that a warning be given?
What if, at some point in the process, the information indicates that an
arrest should be made: may the suspect continue without being given the
warning?
The problem is how to analyze this in terms of the officer's action.
He may say and do nothing, but nobody could possibly believe that in
these circumstances he would not restrain the individual's freedom of
action if necessary. Would the answer to this question be different if,
instead of the station, the individual approached the officer on the
street, or if he volunteered a confession after being stopped in suspicious
circumstances? Miranda leaves these questions unanswered.
The Court indicated also that "general on-the-scene questioning as to
facts surrounding a crime or other general questioning of citizens in the
fact-finding process is not affected by our holding. It is an act of responsible citizenship for individuals to give whatever information they may
3
have to aid in law enforcement.'
10. Id. at 444. (Footnote omitted.)
11. In California, such a stop is not an arrest. See, e.g., People v. Mickelson, 59 Cal. 2d
448, 380 P.2d 658, 30 Cal. Rptr. 18 (1963).
12. 384 U.S. at 478. (Footnote omitted.)
13. Id. at 477-78.
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The critical question is whether those who might be suspected of the
crime, as well as those who are witnesses, may be questioned "on-thescene." If likely suspects could not be questioned under these circumstances, there would be an enormous impact on police practices. Although
the opinion does not make this clear, there is an indication that such
questioning of suspects may be carried on. The court observed: "In
such situations the compelling atmosphere inherent in the process of
in-custody interrogation is not necessarily present."' 4 In a footnote
appended to this statement, the court quotes a Scottish court which
made a distinction between questioning a suspect at home and questioning him at the police station.' 5 Is the court pointing the way to a basic
change in practice, leading to greater use of on-the-scene or at-home
investigation and interrogation?
A problem may be raised by the method employed by the policeman to
hold suspects and witnesses at the scene. Suppose, for instance, that a
police officer responds to a call reporting an assault in a crowded bar.
When he arrives and goes in, the door closes automatically. He then says:
"Nobody leave until I find out what happened." Does Miranda apply?
Suppose he only says, "What happened?" Should this make a difference?
Even in the first example, the detention may not be considered significant
restraint, if only temporary, since the surroundings and the presence
of others could keep the atmosphere from being inherently compelling.
Also, there would be many witnesses to police behavior, and the possibilities of abuse which may be present in incommunicado questioning
would be absent.
The complexity of the problems raised, and the possibility of wide
variations in interpretation are pointed up, however, in a recent New
York case, People v. Allen." The court warned that the police must
give the Miranda warnings whether at the scene of a crime upon arrest,7
on in a police car, "before engaging in any 'first' custody questioning."
The court found that compulsion was the new standard and that "compulsion is simply any questioning in any setting

. . .

where a criminal fact

may be elicited."" If this is what Miranda means, then any police attempt
to question individuals to obtain information which should be given as
an "act of responsible citizenship" runs the risk that the citizen may turn
out to be a suspect and the information unusable.
This points out the further difficulty in applying the "fruits of the
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Id.
Id.
50
Id.
Id.

at 478. (Footnote omitted.)
at 478 n.46.
Misc. 2d 897, 272 N.Y.S.2d 249 (Sup. Ct. 1966) (Sobel, J.).
at 905, 272 N.Y.S.2d at 257.
at 903, 272 N.Y.S.2d at 255.
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poison tree" doctrine to the Miranda requirements. The court states:
"But unless and until such warnings and waiver are demonstrated by the
prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as a residt of interrogation
can be used against him."' 9 The consequences could be devastating if
this rule were literally applied, especially under the New York interpretation of Miranda.
We have admonished our police only that evidence obtained through
inadmissible statements inight be inadmissible. We have thus concluded
that there will be some flexibility in the application of the phrase "as a
result," and that the degree to which independent police work contributes
will be a significant factor. The extent of the ultimate exclusion is,
however, unknown.
We have told our law enforcement officers to phrase the warning as
follows: "(1.) You have the right to remain silent; (2.) Anything you
say can and will be used against you in a court of law; (3.) You have
the right to talk to a lawyer and have him present with you while you
are being questioned; (4.) If you cannot afford to hire a lawyer, one
will be appointed to represent you before any questioning, if you wish
one."
The court presents, or refers to, the formulation of the required warning
in several different places in the opinion. Even in this, the court left
questions.
II.

PRESUMPTION OF EVIDENTIARY ILLEGITIMACY-THE HEAVY
NEW BURDENS OF PRESENTATION AND PERSUASION

This area overlaps to a considerable extent the discussion concerning
the impact on police practices and the new role and obligations of the
police. The "burden of persuasion" in court, of course, can only be met
when the practices of the police conform to the decision's requirements.
The particular emphasis of this topic, as I see it, involves the standard
of the waiver: how the police and the prosecutor can convince the court
that the constitutional rights of the accused were protected. It should be
unnecessary at this time to reiterate the warnings which must be given
or to explore again the grey areas existing in determining who must be
given the warning and at what time it must be given. Assuming, then,
that the warnings have been properly given, the problem is to secure a
voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver.
The first problem is to connect the rights which have been explained
with the required waiver. California police have been instructed first to
ask: "Do you understand each of these rights I have explained to you?"
If this answer is in the affirmative, the next question is, "Having these
19.

384 U.S. at 479. (Emphasis added.) (Footnote omitted.)
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rights in mind, do you wish to talk to us now?" Here, we caution that the
waiver must appear affirmatively; a silent record will not suffice even
if the circumstances are such that there can be no doubt that the rights
are being waived. The question is: what kind of statement or affirmative
conduct will show such a waiver?
The Court in Miranda phrased the requirement in this way: "This
court has always set high standards of proof for the waiver of constitutional rights, Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1930), and we re-assert
these standards as applied to in-custody interrogation. 2 0 In Johnson, it
was stated "that 'courts indulge every reasonable presumption against
waiver' of fundamental constitutional rights and 'do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights.' ," Itdefined waiver as "an
intentional relinquishment... of a known right or privilege." 2
The Johnson Court then went on to say that "the determination of
whether there has been an intelligent waiver of the right to counsel must
depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct
of the accused." 23 The trial judge has the "serious and weighty responsibility" of determining whether there is an intelligent and competent
waiver, and "it would be fitting and appropriate for that determination to
appear upon the record." 4 (The Johnson case involved a collateral
attack, however. The court stated that, in that case, the burden of proof
is on the defendant to establish that he did not competently and intelligently waive his right to counsel.25 )
Applying this to Miranda,the right must be explained by the policeman,
functioning as a judge, but his determination that there is a waiver is
insufficient; it must be made again by the trial court and reviewed on
appeal. The presumption is that no rights are waived. The Court stated:
"Since the State is responsible for establishing the isolated circumstances
under which the interrogation takes place and has the only means of
making available corroborated evidence of warnings given during incom20
municado interrogation, the burden is rightly on its shoulders.1
What is this burden? First, the warning must actually be givenwhether the suspect knows his rights is irrelevant. Miranda, thus,
requires something more than Johnson v. Zerbst. As the Miranda Court
20.

Id. at 475.

21.
22.

304 U.S. at 464. (Footnotes omitted.)
Ibid.

23.

Ibid.

24.

Id. at 465.

25.

Id. at 468-69.
384 U.S. at 475.

26.
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phrased it, "no amount of circumstantial evidence that the person may
have been aware of this right will suffice to stand in its stead." These circumstances are, of course, still relevant to the determination
that the rights were knowingly waived. Therefore, California police have
also been advised to keep records not only of the waiver, but also
concerning the officer's evaluation of the suspect's education, mental
and physical condition, age, background, experience and any other
factors which would tend to show that the suspect knew his own mind.
Secondly, the waiver must be express. Answering questions, no matter
how readily, after being informed, is in itself insufficient. Even testimony
of officers that the accused assented may be insufficient in some circumstances. A tape recording of the actual assent or a verbatim report of an
entire conversation by a shorthand reporter would be helpful corroboration. The Court stated that "an express statement that the individual is
willing to make a statement and does not want an attorney followed
closely by a statement could constitute a waiver."'
However, whatever the testimony as to waiver, the fact of lengthy
interrogation or even incommunicado detention is evidence that no
waiver took place.2 9 The fact of the statement thus becomes proof that
it was compelled by the interrogation. Using this reasoning, the Court
has in effect imposed a variant of the rule in McNabb v. Uidted States 0
on the states. The rule, however, is expressed in terms of distrust of the
police. Whatever his testimony and whatever the determination of the
trial court, the fact of a statement is used to presume improper police
behavior. This, it seems to me, is a shocking rule.
Some indication of the extent of the burden in showing waiver is
indicated in Westover v. United States,3 one of the cases disposed of in
the Miranda decision. 2 In Westover, the defendant was held for about
fourteen hours by local police and interrogated at the time of his arrest
later in the evening and again during the next morning. At noon, he was
turned over to FBI officers who gave him full warning of both his right
to remain silent and his right to an attorney. At the end of two or two
and one-half hours, Westover had signed two confessions which had
been prepared during the interrogation." The Supreme Court reversed
27. Id. at 471-72. (Emphasis added.)
28. Id. at 475. (Emphasis added.)
29. Id. at 476.
30. 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
31. Id. at 494-97.
32. The Miranda decision involved a quartet of cases: Miranda v. Arizona, id. at 491;
Vignera v. New York, id. at 493; Westover v. United States, id. at 494; and California v.
Stewart, id. at 497.
33. Id. at 495.
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a conviction where these statements had been introduced in evidence.
The reasons? There was no evidence of an "articulated waiver" after
commencement of the FBI interrogation; and, from Westover's viewpoint,
"the warning came at the end of the interrogation process," despite
warning at the beginning of the FBI interview. 4 The Court stated that,
"in obtaining a confession from Westover the federal authorities were
the beneficiaries of the pressure applied by the local in-custody interrogation. In these circumstances, the giving of the warnings alone was
not sufficient to protect the privilege."3 5 The Court, however, indicated
that a different situation would be presented if the accused had been
"removed both in time and place from his original surroundings, and
then adequately'36 advised of his rights and given an opportunity to
exercise them.

Thus, in spite of the fact that the FBI agents behaved properly and
gave fully and accurately the warnings required by the Court, and that
there was not the slightest indication of any coercion, the statements
were inadmissible. (It should be noted that the FBI agents were questioning the defendant about different offenses than were the local officers
and that, apparently, he had not made any statements to the local
officers.)
In accordance with the clear mandate of the Court, we have also
advised California police not to question a suspect, once he indicates
that he does not wish to continue. If he wants counsel, he is not to be
questioned until after counsel is present. We have indicated, however,
that questioning may continue if the suspect changes his mind, if the
warnings are given and a waiver obtained, and if no threats or tricks are
used to persuade him to change his mind.
It is by no means clear, however, that this is a proper interpretation.
The Court may be unwilling to accept any waiver in this situation no
matter how explicitly it is given. The Court stated that "any statement
taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the
product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise. 31 7 There may also be no
possibility of questioning a suspect who indicates he is willing to answer
some but not all questions. In the latter case, however, his refusal to
answer some questions at intervals could be evidence that he understood
and was exercising his rights and that, therefore, his rights were intelligently waived when he answered.
The Court did comment that when a person "indicates his desire to
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

496.
496-97.
496.
474.
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remain silent, but has an attorney present, there may be some circumstances in which further questioning would be permissible." 3" The Court
did not indicate what such circumstances might be, except to say that,
in the absence of evidence of overbearing, statements in the presence of
counsel might be fairly construed as a waiver of the privilege for the
purpose of these statements.
The extent of admissibility even of statements with counsel present
is thus left in doubt. However, the basic rationale of the decision leaves
little doubt that the Court considered confessions highly unlikely without
coercion, and, therefore, coercion is to be implied. The next step may well
be the exclusion of any statement, whatever the circumstances.
Unless future decisions of the courts determine that no standard of
proof can satisfy the requirements for waiver and thus eliminate all
interrogation, apparently a good percentage of suspects are still willing
to talk to the police even when full warnings are given.
A problem yet to be resolved is the extent to which reversal is required
if statements are erroneously admitted at trial. The application of the
Miranda requirements in determining waiver may be resolved in favor
of waiver by the policeman who then continues interrogation, and by the
trial judge who determines admissibility. Yet, months later on appeal, a
court may rule that there was no waiver. Will the courts also require
reversal in all cases because Miranda applies to any statement, whether
a full confession, an admission or a statement intended to be exculpatory?
In California, the Dorado decision also applied to admissions and
exculpatory statements, but only full confessions were considered prejudicial per se.39 The extent to which admissions or exculpatory statements might have prejudiced the defendant, in view of the other evidence,
determined whether or not reversal was required. In view of the stringent
standards of Miranda and the areas of uncertainty involved, automatic
reversal in all cases would impose an intolerable burden on law enforcement without any significant increase in the protection of the suspect.
III.

CONCLUSION

Police, prosecutors, and courts will be faced now with countless
decisions on practices and procedures. Whether the right decision is
made in any case will only be known after months of litigation. Some
will take years to resolve. The only certainty is that the area of criminal
justice and procedure will, for the foreseeable future, be one of development and change.
38. Id. at 474 n.44.
39. People v. Dorado, 62 Cal. 2d 338, 356, 398 P.2d 361, 372-73, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169,
180-81 (1965).
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This development and change has already created a new and healthy
mutual awareness among the various segments of the criminal justice
process. This is part of our legal renewal. Escobedo, Dorado, and
Miranda have been essential judicial efforts at maintaining the primacy
of the individual in an increasingly mass culture.
While I have disagreed with many of the specifics of these casesand even more with their application-I believe they have gone far in
establishing an important new recognition of mutual concern among the
courts, the prosecution, and the enforcement agencies.
When the defense is brought into this discourse on an equitable basis,
I feel that it will be among the most fruitful legal advances that we have
seen in years.

RICHARD H. KUH*

I Fthere
we are to be logical and intellectually honest, we must recognize that
is rarely such a thing as Miranda v. Arizonal contemplates-an
intelligent, voluntary waiver of the fifth amendment privileges. I say
"Crarely" as there are possible exceptions to this generality. For example, a
valid waiver of the fifth amendment may exist when a defendant has
spoken to his lawyer and when the defendant's lawyer is satisfied that the
defendant will serve himself well by talking-that is, when the defendant
either can exculpate himself or can put such a portion of the blame on
someone else that he can rely upon the prosecution's relieving him of some
of the onus of a case that is already fairly strong against him. Also, there
may be a waiver in a situation in which a defendant-to-be invites his own
arrest by calling the police or by walking into the station house and announcing that he has killed his wife. One may, however, question the intelligence of such waivers, particularly in light of the precariously balanced
and often emotion-laden situations in which they are likely to arise.
Putting these relatively rare situations out of the way and turning to
the far more common situation of someone taken into custody involuntarily, and not shrewdly advised by his lawyer, I would like to explore my
reasons for stating that there is rarely such a thing as an intelligent, voluntary waiver.
The first line of reasoning deals with the factual concept of "voluntariness." It is essential that we recognize that the problem of "coercion,"
with which the courts have been dealing for many years,2 is a much more
extreme concept than is "voluntariness." With this latter concept, far
more sensitive ground is broken.
The typical factual situation which creates doubts in my mind is one
in which a defendant has been sought out and has not marched in voluntarily. Not only has he not come in voluntarily, but, ordinarily, his actions
would strongly negative any possibility of his action being deemed
truly voluntary-possibly he has fled the scene of the crime, committed
the crime under cover of night or wearing a mask, or told his victim not
to cry out or he will be killed. He has thus taken affirmative measures to
conceal his wrongdoing.
Add to these measures the circumstances of that which traditionally
* Member of the New York Bar. Mr. Kuh received his B.A. from Columbia University
and his LL.B. from Harvard Law School. He was formerly Administrative Assistant to the
District Attorney of New York County and Assistant-in-Charge of the Criminal Court Bureau
in the New York County District Attorney's Office.
This article is adapted from remarks delivered before the Conference of Chief justices at
its meeting held in Montreal on August 5, 1966.
1. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2. E.g., Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 US. 568 (1961); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315
(1959); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
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has been deemed "non-coercive" interrogation. At the station house, the
defendant is usually in the presence of more than one police officer; thus,
immediately, he is outnumbered. In many jurisdictions, as in New York,
there are minimal physical requirements-height and weight-for police,
and, therefore, there will frequently be a wispy little defendant and five or
six stocky police officers. These officers have badges, are in uniform, and
are wearing guns on their hips or in shoulder holsters. The sum total of
these circumstances is a show of power on the one side. Add to this the
fact that all who have been actually involved in law enforcement have
observed-namely, that the typical defendant is stupid, immature, and
usually young; but young or not, he is ordinarily uneducated. Under
these conditions alone (and, in the overwhelming number of cases, this
will be the minimal disproportion that will exist), there will be a situation
in which we must recognize that, if the defendant does talk, his statement
will not be made on a truly voluntary basis. And the Supreme Court has
stated that, under Miranda, the burden of proving the voluntariness of a
waiver is on the prosecution. 3 How, then, is a trial-or appellate-court
ever to decide whether the prosecution has successfully proved that there
was a voluntary waiver?
Examining the same problem from a slightly different perspective, it
seems that there is a basic inconsistency between the word "intelligent"
and the phrase "waiver of the fifth amendment." It would appear that
there can be no truly "intelligent" waiver of the fifth amendment.
Under Chief Justice Warren's opinion in Miranda, the proper warning
would be along these lines: "If you fail to talk with us, your silence can
never, under any circumstances, be used against you in any way. It cannot
hurt you. On the other hand, if you do talk to us, what you say can hurt
you. You can have a lawyer. If you cannot afford a lawyer, one will be
appointed at no charge, and that act of requesting a lawyer cannot hurt
you in any way."4
With all that warning, the defendant will either waive or he will not.
He may say: "No. If that is so, let me wait and talk to a lawyer." If that
is his tack and he does not waive, there is no problem under Miranda.
There simply is no confession. (There may be no provable case, but that
is another problem.) If, on the other hand, the defendant does waive and
says that he wants to talk, then he talks for either of two reasons: (1) he
did not understand the whole "formula," and, if he did not understand it,
there is a "waiver" that was made without an understanding of the warning; such an alleged waiver is a nullity; or (2) although he understood the
warning, he still wanted to waive. However, let us analyze this. If I may
return to college days and use a term then used, a syllogism demonstrates
the invalidity of this waiver. The major premise is: To hurt oneself inten3. 384 U.S.at 475.
4. See id. at 479.
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tionally is not intelligent, but is stupid. The minor premise is: a defendant,
who, with knowledge that he can only hurt himself by talking, talks, intentionally hurts himself. The conclusion is: His act in talking intentionally
is a stupid, non-intelligent act. Placing this syllogism in the context of the
case law that, in the area of confessions, affords special protection to the
stupid (that is, the non-intelligent), we reach the conclusion that such a
waiver, stupidly and non-intelligently made, is therefore a nullity; and
any statement that follows from it cannot be used.'
Thus, we are left with the end result, it seems to me, that the prosecution is damned if the defendant does and damned if he does not-there
is just no sound way of ordinarily finding an intelligent waiver by a defendant of his fifth amendment rights. It is logically impossible to draw a
sound line with which the courts can guide prosecutors and police as to
what constitutes an "intelligent" waiver; there is no formula for announcing when a defendant has been given adequate information under such
circumstances that his waiver will be held binding on him. Mirandawould
have us believe that there is such a thing. I say that judges are going to
have a great deal of trouble in drawing lines-that is, in determining what
an "intelligent" waiver is. Had the United States Supreme Court recognized what I think is clear-at least the improbability, if not the impossibility, of an intelligent waiver of the fifth amendment privilege-the justices might have squarely wrestled with the issue and said: "Confessions
are no longer usable in our adversary system." I think that this would
have resulted in a much more adverse public reaction, but I also believe
that, had the Supreme Court done this, it would have been intellectually
honest, and we would have had clarity.
Those scholars who have dedicated many hours to feeling the pulse of
the decisions in Escobedo v. Illinois' and Miranda cannot define the
limits of the principles which those cases demand be applied. How is a
policeman conducting an interrogation taking place swiftly after the commission of a crime to be expected to make a decision as to what he can
and cannot do if the most able academicians and appellate judges do not
know the confines of the law since those cases?
Before I consider that which all who are prosecution-oriented are supposed to abhor-namely, that law enforcement cannot function without
confessions-there are at least a half dozen other absurdities which
Miranda has proliferated and which should be considered.
First, it is a complete absurdity to expect that a policeman, who wants
to collect evidence fairly, will serve as some sort of a surrogate-defense
counsel, giving helpful advice to defendants. Judge Nathan Sobel has
pointed out that "advice from the police to the kind of illiterate half-wits
we see in the Criminal Courts can hardly take the place of advice from
5. Ibid.
6. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35

one's own lawyer," and he has further said that "it is absurd to believe
that any court could find waiver from the 'warnings' or 'advice' given by
police. 'Warnings' of constitutional rights by an adversary is a poor
substitute for advice from one's own counsel." 8 The first and most marked
absurdity of Mirandais to expect police to give advice that will strip them
of their ability to collect evidence.
A second absurdity is the uncertain state of the law generated by
Miranda-uncertainty as to when a waiver will have been found to have
been voluntarily made. This must be resolved in the appellate courts of
fifty separate states, ultimately finding its way to Washington. Thus, we
have a few more years of confusion ahead of us. Perhaps our experience
under Escobedo should have prepared us for continued confusion. However, I cannot view confusion as a desirable handmaiden to law enforcement.
The third absurdity is the heavy reliance that Miranda places upon
the resolution of a nearly impossible factual question. Chief Justice
Warren stated that the people must bear a "heavy burden" of showing
that the protections of the fifth amendment were voluntarily waived.0 I
do not remember ever learning at law school what a "heavy burden" was,
although I did learn about a "preponderance of the evidence" and "proof
beyond a reasonable doubt." Putting aside, for now, the quantum of proof
which a "heavy burden" may involve, it must be pointed out that, whenever we deal with the question of waiver of the fifth amendment, we
will have contested factual issues in which the witnesses on both sides
will engage in a frustrating "swearing contest." And the question to be
resolved will be twice removed from the issue of guilt. The issue will not
be one of guilt; nor will it be of voluntariness of a confession; but it will
center on the tertiary question of whether the defendant voluntarily
waived his privileges of having counsel at his side and of saying nothing at all. The only testimony will be the testimony of the defendant
and of the police. The defendant, knowing (by hypothesis) that he has
confessed and that his confession is extremely damaging, has nothing to
lose and will claim that the police did not explain his rights adequately or
that they cursorily rattled off their explanation. That sometimes-possibly
often-will, in fact, have happened, but I suggest that the defendant has
every motive to lie in this regard if it did not.
But now, let us look at the other side. I have long been pro-police. I
am also a realist, and I bemoan the fact that, on occasion, police officers
-just as do taxpayers-will lie. It cannot be denied that this occurs, and
7. Sobel, The Exclusionary Rules in the Law of Confessions, A Legal Perspective--A
Practical Perspective, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 17, 1965, p. 1, col. 5.
8. Sobel, The Exclusionary Rules in the Law of Confessions, A Legal Perspective-A
Practical Perspective, N.Y.L.., Nov. 18, 1965, p. 1, col. 4, at 4, col. 6.
9. 384 U.S. at 475.
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this happens particularly when the officers feel that they are telling
"little white lies." And when there is a defendant who, without coercion,
has made a confession to the police and, on the basis of that and other
evidence, the police are satisfied that they have a guilty man-if ever
there was a situation that tempted the police to paint the picture of having informed the defendant of his rights, that is it. There are police
officers who, on occasion, will say that the end justifies the means. We
lament this, but lamenting it and proving a lie in a particularcase are two
quite different things. We know that there will be much testimony claiming that a full explanation was given to the defendant. Some of that
testimony will be true and some false, and trial judges will have the absurd duty of resolving factual questions concerning which there is likely to
be no truly objective testimony at all.
There is a fourth absurdity. There has been discussion of an experiment in New York and in the District of Columbia, in which lawyers
(or law students) will be placed in station houses in order to advise defendants of their rights. "Advise" is a euphemism; what is meant is
someone in the police station who will tell a defendant: "Keep your
mouth shut." This is the "advice" that, inevitably, will be given. I find
it absurd that lawyers who are trained for the forum of the world of
commerce, or for the courts, should find themselves spending their time
in station houses, not really giving advice, but shouting instructions. Is
this the end that the Supreme Court desires-no more confessions, but a
Pied Piper's march of lawyers to every precinct house in the country
simply to holler at defendants that they are not to say a word?
The fifth absurdity is that Miranda does not, and cannot, do one of
the things which it was most designed to accomplish. If it was designed
to treat rich and poor alike, and the intelligent and the stupid alike, it
will not do it. If any waivers are to be preserved-and Chief Justice
Warren suggested that some will be-who is it who is going to waive? It
is not the wealthy defendant with his own private lawyer, nor is it the
intelligent defendant who receives and follows advice from the police.
It is the poor nobody for whom the police send out for coffee and who
thinks that they are nice guys and so is convinced when they say "let's
talk and get it all over with." So, although there may be possibly a bit less
of the inequality that existed before Miranda,the only defendant who will
waive his rights will be the ignorant or poor one. The American Law Institute has suggested that waiver be permited and that the defendant who
wishes to cooperate be permitted to make that choice. It speaks of the
defendant's "making a choice that he will cooperate."' I deeply respect
the Institute, but I think that in this area, it is suggestive of the comment
by Anatole France: "The law in its majestic equality forbids the rich as
10. Reporters' Introductory Memorandum to Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure
at xxili (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1966).
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well as the poor to sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal
bread.""1
A sixth absurdity arising under Miranda is the preposterous position
in which it places police and prosecutors. Namely, they have the duty to
act fairly, but to collect evidence against persons who may be guilty and,
when they are themselves satisfied of guilt, to bring the case to trial and
leave it to the jury, as the trier of fact, to review and weigh the evidence.
The prosecutor's duty is to present all the legally admissible evidence that
can be fairly collected and presented and that he believes to be necessary
and helpful in sustaining his considerable burden. Prosecutors may then
be put in an impossible position when they have a confession in an otherwise weak case. If the confession has survived a pre-trial motion to suppress (for example, one premised on an allegedly void waiver) and a
prosecutor offers the statement at the trial, if it is struck down by the
appellate court, all the time and expense of the trial have been wasted.
In addition, trying a case for the third time very often can be much less
effective than for the first time. It is all very well to suggest that, despite
the rulings of a trial court sustaining the use of a defendant's statements,
the prosecutor should play it safe and not use the confession. However,
when, so doing, he finds himself with an acquittal that might have been
avoided had he used the admissions, has he done his job? To those who
believe that, in many cases, prosecutors probably could obtain convictions without confessions and are "overtrying" their cases, I would suggest reading trial records in cases in which there have been acquittals or
"hung juries." It is a revelation to observe the apparently overwhelming
evidence and yet the seemingly "wrong" result at which the jury will
sometimes arrive. It is much easier to fall into the habit of saying that
certain evidence was not necessary if, as do the appellate courts, one
reads only records of convictions.
Confronted with these six manifest absurdities, must we sit back and
tolerate the situation? I think not. We might rather take our lead from
Marshall Ferdinand Foch of France, who, in 1918, said at the Second
Battle of the Marne: "My center is giving way, my right is pushed back,
situation excellent, I am attacking."' 2
There are lines of attack which those who are bothered by the uncertainties of Miranda may pursue.
It seems to me that the first line of attack is to decide whether interrogation is important. If we decide that it is not, we should all strive
for a clear rule that under no circumstances is a defendant's statement
to be used. If, on the other hand, interrogation is important, a way must
be found by which statements from all defendants-rich and poor alike,
11. Quoted by Arthur T. Vanderbilt, Law and Government in the Development of the
American Way of Life 16 (1952).
12. Bartlett, Familiar Quotations 754b & n.2 (13th & Centennial rev. ed. 1955).
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intelligent and ignorant-may be used. Thus, the prime question is as to
the importance of interrogation.
First, in this age when surveys are used as a matter of course by captains of industry and by politicians, why can we not get an objective
survey-that is, one not designed to fool anyone? I am not a professional
pollster, but I am going to outline a survey that could be taken in a
few months and probably at a reasonable cost. The survey should be conducted in about a half dozen of our larger cities or in three large and
three small cities. Then a half dozen serious crimes should be selectedpossibly intentional homicide, forcible rape, nighttime burglary of a
dwelling, arson, armed robbery and assault with a dangerous weapon. (Or
possibly three such crimes and several misdemeanors.) A pre-Miranda
date should be selected-possibly June 1, 1966. Then the police and
prosecutors in the selected cities would be approached and asked to open
their files and to make available everything they had on every case in the
selected crime areas pending as of the chosen date. In this fashion, the
number of cases to be studied would be small, in terms of our national
crime picture. Yet, there would be every reason to believe that they
would truly represent a microcosm of crime in America. A team or teams
of surveyors would be chosen by a committee drawn from all viewpoints
and including defense lawyers, prosecutors, trial judges, police officials,
libertarians, and appellate judges. The survey teams thus chosen would
examine the files presented. They would have the authority to interview
witnesses, and they would seek answers to such questions as: What was
the evidence against the defendant? Did it include his own statement?
Under what conditions was the statement made? Was it supported by
corroborative evidence? How adequate and complete was the evidence
without the defendant's statement? What further evidence might diligent
police work have turned up?
Conducting such a survey would neither be difficult nor prohibitively
expensive. It could be quickly initiated, and it would provide an objective
answer to the question: "Is interrogation really important?"
There are other reasons why I reach my own conclusion-absent a
survey-that confessions are important. A reading of Truman Capote's
book, In Cold Blood, demonstrates the importance of confessions. That
case dealt with the brutal murder of a family of four persons. The police
turned up very little despite intelligent and around-the-clock work. The
investigation led nowhere until an informer's lead led to the defendants
and they made full statements-statements which probably would not
have been made had all the warnings required by Miranda been given.
We must recognize the realities of police work. In a busy city like New
York, with several hundred thousand crimes reported annually, the police
simply cannot turn out in large numbers for everything that takes place.
Some shortcuts are necessary. The ability to talk to a defendant who has
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some obligation to respond can prove to be an extremely helpful shortcut.
It is almost a truism that, when crimes are committed by stealth and at
night, eyewitnesses are frequently of little value. Applying every-day
experience which would be more persuasive in a trial court-the testimony of a person (possibly elderly, nervous and with broken eyeglasses)
who has been mugged and has had only a few seconds under poor light
in which to see his assailant, or that of the police officer and police
stenographer who testify to a confession?
I suggest, moreover, that it is human nature-and even our highest
Court is not about to change that-to want to know if a defendant has
"owned up to his crime." After the trial of cases in which there were no
confessions, I have seen jurors cluster around the judge or counsel and
ask whether the defendant ever admitted his guilt. There is always that
seed of doubt that remains until the defendant, in effect, rises and admits
his guilt. This is well demonstrated by the continuing flow of books dealing with the assassination of President Kennedy and the Warren Commission's findings as to the guilt of Lee Harvey Oswald.' a These books
are, in part, based upon the fact that there was no confession; and, in
the absence of a confession, seeds of doubt are likely to remain in the
minds of the public and of jurors despite overwhelming evidence.
Thus, I conclude-in the absence of an objective survey-that reasonable interrogation is necessary. Although the validity of such reasonable
interrogation is extremely doubtful today, I perceive no reason for perpetuating that dubious status.
The time has come to engage in a "Great Dialogue" centering on the
fifth amendment. It would be constructive to consider whether the fifth
amendment should be amended in some fashion in order that we might
permit reasonable interrogation for rich and poor, for intelligent and
ignorant alike.
The idea behind the privilege against self-incrimination, historically,
was to ban the judiciary's use of the rack and screw, of secret Star
Chamber proceedings. This was early crystallized in John Lilburne's
trial of three centuries ago.14 However, it seems to me that we can explore
methods for avoiding these evils without giving the fifth amendment that
great breadth which it has presently attained. The Bill of Rights was
initially designed to further the ends of the preamble to the Constitution:
"to .. .establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility . . . promote the
general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and
13. E.g., Epstein, Inquest (1966); Fox, The Unanswered Questions About President
Kennedy's Assassination (1966); Lane, Rush to Judgment (1966); Popkin, The Second
Oswald (1966); Sauvage, The Oswald Affair (1966); Weisberg, Whitewash-The Report on
the Warren Report (1965).
14. See 384 U.S. at 459. See generally Gibb, John Lilburne, the Leveller, a Christian
Democrat (1947).
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our posterity .... " These ends might best be fostered today by amendment of the fifth amendment.
Although I have been a prosecutor, I do not think that, when I propose
this for consideration, I am being antediluvian. Was it antediluvian when
Mr. Justice Benjamin Cardozo said of the privilege against self-incrimination:
This too might be lost, and justice still be done. Indeed, today as in the past there are
students of our penal system who look upon the immunity as a mischief rather than a
benefit, and who would limit its scope, or destroy it altogether. No doubt there would
remain the need to give protection against torture, physical or mental..
.. Justice,
however, would not perish if the accused were subject to a duty to respond to orderly
inquiry"? 15

Was it antediluvian when Dean John Henry Wigmore wrote some
twenty-six years ago: "The privilege has ... been so extended in application beyond its previous limits as almost to be incredible, certainly to
defy common sense.... Courts should unite to keep the privilege strictly
within the limits dictated by historic fact, cool reasoning and sound
policy"? 6
Coming to the present, was it antediluvian when Mr. Justice Harlan
wrote that he was "free to express the hope that the Court will eventually
return to constitutional paths which, until recently, it has followed
7
throughout its history" ?1
Are the other nations of the world all antediluvian? No other nation
bars absolutely from evidence a defendant's non-coerced statements.
Some of the nations on the continent have elaborate procedures for eliciting such statements from accused persons.
In light of the fact that our young people are asked to expose their lives
in battle and that all of us work a goodly portion of our time to pay taxes,
it should not seem an unreasonable interference with the liberties of an
individual to create-in today's war on crime-a duty to respond to
reasonable inquiry under controlled conditions that could be made known
clearly to a trial or an appellate court.
Why should a change not be made? It is absurd to label our lawyers
as "officers of the court," and yet countenance, as their proper duty, their
telling defendants-who may be known to be highly dangerous to the
community, but as to whom there may be inadequate other evidencethat they should: "Keep your mouth shut." Must we continue to have our
"officers of the court" serve society in this way? Would constitutional
amendment not substitute reasonable conduct for this absurdity?
In this age of mounting reliance upon psychiatric knowledge, when
we have learned that part of maturing is the acceptance of responsibility
15. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 US. 319, 325-26 (1937). (Footnote omitted.)
16. 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2251, at 319 (3d ed. 1940). (Footnote omitted.)
17. Grifn v. California, 380 US. 609, 617 (1965) (concurring opinion).
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and that one of the first steps toward rehabilitation of the criminal is his
own realization and acceptance of guilt, why should reasonable, noncoercive interrogation be banned? When rehabilitation of drug addicts involves experiments like "Synanon"-where social misfits 'learn, brutally,
to accept personal responsibility for their pariah status-why should our
law not encourage defendants to assume responsibility for their own
guilt, rather than hiding behind words that many of them do not even
understand? Would constitutional amendment not restore reason in place
of this absurdity?
What form should an amendment to the fifth amendment take? I do
not purport to provide a pat formula, an easy answer. Rather, I simply
urge a "Great Dialogue"-a discussion of whether or not there should
be some duty to respond to reasonable inquiry and, if so, the form that
such duty should take in order that the precise conditions of the interrogation might be preserved.
One method would involve the use of a tape recording of everything
asked of the defendant and his responses; indeed, even sound-film might
be used. Or possible amendment and enabling legislation might require
a defendant to answer reasonable questions propounded by a magistrate,
either with a stenographer present or with a tape recorder. By this I
envision, not a judge who would simply inform a defendant that he has a
right not to answer, but rather a judge who would-in the light of constitutional amendment-say: "You have a duty to answer."
If a duty to respond is to be created, a method of enforcing that duty
must be devised. Failure by a defendant to respond would either become a
form of contempt or, if that is too drastic, such failure would be subject
to comment to the jury by the prosecutor and the court at the trial. Enabling action under an amendment could make it a breach of legal ethics
(and possibly a violation of the penal law) for a lawyer to advise a defendant to refuse to answer reasonable inquiry.
Today our society spends much time and money and energy attacking
the traditional breeders of crime-clearing slums, eliminating illiteracy,
attacking segregation and improving job security. This is fine and good.
But it makes no sense at all simultaneously to increase the ineffectualness
of enforcement by knowingly restraining its use of reasonable and fair
methods for collecting evidence.
The question of whether defendants are to be reasonably questioned is
sufficiently important in our democracy to be taken to the public-it is a
problem that should be resolved by the people. I urge the initiation of a
"Great Debate" on amending the fifth amendment. The question should
be presented to the public and we should foster submission to the electorate of the question of whether interrogation of all-the rich, the poor,
the intelligent, the ignorant-is to be allowed to continue.

MICHAEL W. HOGAN*

WHILE attempting to assess the impact of recent United States Supreme

Court decisions upon contemporary society,' one is constrained to reflect upon the words of Conrad: "No, it is impossible; it is impossible to
convey the life sensation of any given epoch of one's existence-that which
makes its truth, its meaning-its subtle and penetrating essence. It is
impossible. We live as we dream-alone ..... 2 But, if we cannot perceive
the full significance of the present trend, we can at least delineate the
immediate problems raised by the Court's decision in Mirandav. Arizona.3
The majority opinion represents an explicit departure from the "circumstantial" test of voluntariness, and extends the fifth amendment protection against self-incrimination into the custodial stages of interrogation.4 In addition, the Court extends the sixth amendment right to counsel
* Assistant Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School. Professor Hogan received
his A.B. from Drury College and his LL.B. from Tulane University where he was editor-inchief of the law review. A member of the Louisiana and Missouri bars, he served as Probate Judge of Howell County, Missouri from 1960 to 1965.
1. The difficulty of such an assessment was specifically recognized by the Court in Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 440-41 & nn.1-3 (1966), where it cited a selection of the numerous
cases, articles and other commentary which followed the Court's decision in Escobedo v.
Illinois, 378 US. 478 (1964). The conclusions arrived at by these authorities were quite
varied.
2. Conrad, Heart of Darkness 82 (1903).
3. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking for the Court in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 US. 479
(1965), suggested "that specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed
by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance.... The Fifth
Amendment in its Self-Incrimination Clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy
which government may not force him to surrender to his detriment." Id. at 484.
The inarticulate premise in Justice Douglas' use of the ninth amendment has been commented upon. See generally Franklin, The Ninth Amendment as Civil Law Method and
Its Implications for Republican Form of Government: Griswold v. Connecticut; South
Carolina V. Katzenbach, 40 Tul. L. Rev. 487 (1966). No doubt Justice Douglas would be
surprised at being cast in the role of an American Lord Mansfield. However, such a liberal
construction of the Constitution is not a new idea. "The same problems of method, the same
contrasts between the letter and the spirit, are living problems in our own land and law.
Above all in the field of constitutional law, the method of free decision has become, I think,
the dominant one today. The great generalities of the constitution have a content and a
significance that vary from age to age." Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 17
(1921).
4. 384 U.S. at 439.
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as a coordinate guarantee5 and couples both guarantees with the exclusionary principle derived from the fourth amendment.0 The Court
has defined the guarantees 7 and also given a more detailed exposition of
"custodial interrogation" and the underlying nature of the fifth amendment privilege.' The perplexing problem of how a waiver is to be substantiated is not explained, but the burden of showing an intelligent and
understanding waiver is squarely placed on the government.9
The expansion of the scope of the Miranda opinion, which will no
doubt occur, should be strongly influenced by the Court's extended discussion of alleged police methods."0 The Court has recognized that
psychological coercion, so fearfully demonstrated in the Korean War, remains a new and menacing threat to human freedom, in police interrogations in the Western world. The majority" and the dissenting opinions, 2
i. Id. at 465-66.
6. Id. at 444. See also Herman, The Supreme Court and Restrictions on Police Interrogation, 25 Ohio St. L.J. 449 (1964).
7. The guarantees set forth by the Court are: (a) the right to silence, 384 U.S. at 467-68;
(b) the right to be warned that his statements may be used against him, Id. at 469; (c) the
right to have counsel present, id. at 469-70; and (d) the right of an indigent to appointed
counsel, id. at 472-73.
8. Ibid. It should be noted that detention is not actually the subject matter of the
Miranda opinion. If the courts generally continue to use the circumstantial test to make a
determination of illegality, based upon the rules laid down in Mallory v. United States,
354 U.S. 449 (1957), and McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943), and applied
under Fed. R. Crim. P. 4, 5, not the fourteenth amendment due process clause, then, no
doubt, the United States Supreme Court will have to examine the results of Miranda to
determine if custody was prolonged despite the requirement of counsel.
Such difficulties will be alleviated to some extent by the Uniform Bail Reform Act and
current practices in most states which allow release of defendants on their own recognizance
or sole signature bail bonds. See generally 112 Cong. Rec. 21247 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 1966).
9. 384 U.S. at 475-76. You will note an absence of objection to the inclusion doctrine
generally raised by Harlan, J., in that each state is allowed the freedom to establish rules
and practices to support the decision. Id. at 490. Compare id. at 526 (White, J., dissenting)
with Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 14 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting). The substance of the
White-Harlan-Stewart dissent in Miranda is an eloquent restatement of the objections to
decisions not based on judicial precedent or empirical investigation of the particular facts
weighed against prior circumstantial standards of duress. The historical meaning of the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination as an evidentiary exclusion of compelled
testimony seems overshadowed by the new test of voluntariness requiring a demonstrable
atmosphere of freedom to the accused.
10. 384 U.S. at 445-58.
11. Id. at 481.
12. Id. at 500-03 (Clark, J., separate opinion); id. at 516-17 (Harlan, J., dissenting);
id. at 541-42 (White, J., dissenting).
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however, point out difficulties which this ruling may create for law enforcement. Limitation of proper interrogation was not the Court's purpose
or scheme, but, in view of the absence of any provision for depositions or
interrogatories in the revision of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
the expansion of the defendant's right of discovery under Rule 16 ,"a and
the threat of reversal or mistrial inherent in Brady v. Maryland," the
government is severely limited.
Unanswered in the majority opinion is the question of wizen the custody
originates. This question strikes at the whole structure of criminal justice
0
in the United States as no common standard of arrest exists.' Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has not yet heeded the suggestion of Justice
Jackson that a variable standard of probable cause, based upon the nature
of the crime, should be established."' In any event, we are left without
13. See also Comment, Discovery in Federal Criminal Cases-Rule 16 and the Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination, 35 Fordham L. Rev. 315 (1966).
14. 373 U.S. 83 (1963); see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 514-24 (1966) (Harlan,

J., dissenting).
15. Wisconsin, for example, has a modified form of common law arrest. Wis. Stat. Ann.
§§ 62.09(10), 954.02 (Supp. 1966); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 954.01, 954.03, 964.30 (1958). See also

Peloquin v. Hibner, 231 Wis. 77, 285 N.W. 380 (1939); Mantei v. State, 210 Wis. 1, 245
N.W. 683 (1932). Wisconsin has also retained the traditional dichotomy of criminal offenses
as the basis for arrest. See generally Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 Va. L. Rev. 315
(1942); Warner, Investigating the Law of Arrest, 26 A.B.A.J. 151 (1940); Note, 43 Denver
L.J. 366 (1966); Comment, 26 La. L. Rev. 789 (1966); Note, 1963 Wis. L. Rev. 153. The
problem is, of course, intensified by the lack of a federal standard of arrest, except for
federally defined felonies. 18 U.S.C. § 3052 (1964). There is a wide variation between those
states which have a "stop and frisk" law and must govern police conduct in a field investigation, see People v. Peters, 18 N.Y.2d 238, 219 N.E.2d 595, 273 N.YS.2d 217 (1966); People
v. Sibron, 18 N.Y.2d 603, 219 N.E.2d 196, 272 N.YS.2d 374 (1966) (memorandum decision),
35 Fordham L. Rev. 355 (1966) ; People v. Rivera, 14 N.Y.2d 441, 201 N.E.2d 32, 252 N.Y.S.2d
458 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 978 (1965), and those which deem an arrest to commence
upon the attempted apprehension of the accused. Terry v. State, 252 Miss. 479, 173 So. 2d
889 (1965). The frustrating problem is that the question of a police privilege to stop, interrogate and frisk remains outside the litigated issue of the motion to suppress and the usual
defensive argument of legality of arrest. See Remington, The Law Relating to "On the Street"
Detention, Questioning, and Frisking of Suspected Persons and Police Arrest Privileges in
General, 51 J. Crim. L., C. &P.S. 386 (1960).
16. Brinegar v. United States, 338 US. 160, 180 (1949) (Jackson, 3., dissenting). Equally
problematic is the confusion of the term "probable cause" which is used interchangeably
by state and federal courts for that quantum of proof necessary to sustain issuance of an
arrest warrant, a search warrant, arrest without a warrant and proof sufficient in preliminary examinations to cause certification to the trial court. See State v. McIlvaine, 245
La. 649, 160 So. 2d 566, vacated and remanded, 379 U.S. 10 (1964) (per curiam), conviction
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definite standards as to time, place, or circumstance when the police must
give a warning.
The second interesting omission is the lack of any specific language
that the Court states will satisfy the requirement of a "warning." Perhaps this is good, as it leaves the states latitude to develop adequate
individual standards." But, the omission of specific language, coupled
with the burden of proof placed upon the government to uphold a claim
of waiver, accentuates the real problem-a record. Some means of a permanent record is necessitated by the nature of the accused's continuing
privilege to withdraw his waiver." Such requirements, however, may not
all redound to the benefit of the accused. An accurate record of the interrogation proceedings may well foreclose post-conviction appeal. But
the requirements may also have an effect upon the nature of post-conviction appeals which will be favorable to an accused. The burden of showing
a denial of federal constitutional rights which heretofore rested with the
accused, now lays heavily upon government. 19 Whether or not the
Miranda approach, which demands an intelligent and understanding
waiver of the right to silence and the right to counsel, obviates the prior
circumstantial tests of incommunicado detention, 21 prolonged questioning,2 1 threats,' status of accused, 3 implied threats and humiliation, 4
second confessions,2 5 special techniques, 26 previous experience, 27 and time
of detention, 21 it seems indisputable that state courts are not going to
reaff'd, 247 La. 747, 761, 174 So. 2d 515, 520 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 921 (1966) ; Note,
31 Mo. L. Rev. 316 (1966).
17. See note 11 supra.
18. See note 10 supra.
19. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1937). See generally Wright and Sofaer, Federal
Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners: The Allocation of Fact-Finding Responsibility, 75
Yale L.J. 895 (1966) ; Note, 40 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 154 (1965).
20. Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737 (1966); Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503
(1963).
21. Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949).
22. Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961).
23. State v. Francisco, 257 Wis. 247, 43 N.W.2d 38 (1950).
24. Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945).
25. Kellaugh v. United States, 315 F.2d 241 (D.C. Cir. 1962) ; Kiefer v. State, 258 Wls.
47, 44 N.W.2d 537 (1950).
26. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 448-58 (1966); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293
(1963) ; Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
27. State ex rel Wenzloff v. Burke, 250 Wis. 525, 27 N.W.2d 475 (1947).
28. Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S.
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be able, on the basis of procedural defects, to overrule objections based
upon violations of the Miranda guidelines.' The fact that the government
must bear the burden of proving in-custody waiver may also change state
habeas corpus proceedings into evidentiary fact-finding hearings. These
proceedings can be used to supplement an inadequate record."
The problems presented by the requirement of counsel will not be
easily solved." The primary determination of indigency, for example,
varies from state to state, and whether the same standard used for social
welfare agencies will suffice in criminal prosecutions has not yet been
resolved. Without adequate guidelines the government is left with a dilemma which may require automatic appointment of counsel for all who
profess indigency regardless of true financial inability. Although the requirements may allow expansion of police investigation into financial
circumstances, this solution is not very practicable unless the police
interrogate the accused and have sufficient facts upon which to base such
inquiry.
Perhaps in the abandon of judicial independence, the United States
Supreme Court remains heedless to the abundant, pertinent criticisms
332 (1943) ; Phillips v. State, 29 Wis. 2d 521, 139 N.W.2d 41 (1966) ; Note, 1960 Wis. L. Rev.
164.

29. Cf. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963);
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1937); Note, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 78 (1964).
30. Townsend v. Sain, 372 US. 293 (1963); Young v. Ragen, 337 US. 235 (1949);
Fairchild, Post Conviction Rights and Remedies in Wisconsin, 1965 Wis. L. Rev. 52; Comment, 26 La. L. Rev. 705 (1966).
31. The full scope of Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 US. 335 (1963), is still to be measured.
Wisconsin, for example, has long recognized the right of indigent defendants in criminal
cases to compensated counsel. Carpenter v. County of Dane, 9 Wis. 274 (1859). However,
Wisconsin has left the outer limits of pre-commitment and post-conviction proceedings and
the right to counsel undefined. Compare Wis. Stat. Ann. § 957.26 (1), (2) (Supp. 1966) and
Wis. Stat. Ann. § 957.265 (Supp. 1966) with Sparkman v. State, 27 Wis. 2d 92, 133 N.W.2d
776 (1965). Missouri, to the contrary, has a narrow application of right to counsel, and
affords no compensation. See Hunvald, The Right to Counsel at The Preliminary Hearing,
31 Mo. L. Rev. 109 (1966). Louisiana seems well buried in the quagmire of state reluctance
to extend United States Supreme Court decisions into local practice. See State v. Graves,
246 La. 460, 165 So. 2d 285 (1964), 26 La. L. Rev. 599 (1966). Even the United States Supreme Court seems in a quandary about right to counsel in areas outside traditional criminal
proceedings. See Kent v. United States, 383 US. 541 (1966) ; Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d
46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd per curiam, 341 US. 918 (1951). Nor are the states uniform in
their application. See People v. Shipman, 62 Cal. 2d 226, 397 P.2d 993, 42 Cal. Rptr. 1
(1966); People v. Wood, 2 Mich. App. 342, 139 N.W.2d 895 (1966); People ex rel. Rogers
v. Stanley, 17 N.Y.2d 256, 217 N.E.2d 636, 270 N.Y.S.2d 573 (1966); Winters, Counsel for
the Indigent Accused in Wisconsin, 49 Marq. L. Rev. 1 (1965).
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that recent decisions have been beyond the scope of judicial authority.
Seizing upon an insignificant fact situation, the Court has re-enforced
the doctrine of judicial decree, serenely glossing over the manifest truth
that legislative action is the more appropriate remedy. 2
32. The writer reflects upon the inarticulate ban on school segregation set forth In Brown
v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1954), and its phrase "all deliberate speed," Id. at 301,
and begins to agree with Mr. Justice Black's dissenting opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 507 (1965), that perhaps the natural law theory is one of solipsis. The twelveyear-old struggle for integration, which resulted from the Court's milestone quasi-legislative
opinion in Brown, has foundered upon the ineffability of the Court's doctrine while managing
successfully to dissolve the present system of public education.

OSMOND K. FRAENKEL*

T HE five-to-four decision in Miranda v. Arizona,' rendered on June

13, 1966, together with the explanation of its application made a week
later in Johnson v. New Jersey,2 constitutes a climax in the judicial function. It is, of course, a commonplace that the courts should decide only
the particular case that comes before them and eschew elaboration not
necessary to that case. But the temptation to go beyond the necessities of
a limited state of facts has lured many of our greatest justices into farreaching pronouncements, some of which, indeed, almost parallel the
legislative function.
The practice, many believe, goes back to Chief Justice Marshall in
Marbury v. Madison.' But, it has been indulged in from time to time
ever since. Mr. Justice Cardozo, in Palko v. Connecticut,4 attempted a
philosophical explanation of the relation between the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment and some of the specific provisions of the

Bill of Rights when he wrote:
The line of division may seem to be wavering and broken if there is a hasty catalogue
of the cases on the one side and the other. Reflection and analysis Will induce a different
view. There emerges the perception of a rationalizing principle which gives to discrete
instances a proper order and coherence. The right to trial by jury and the immunity
from prosecution except as the result of an indictment may have value and importance.
Even so, they are not of the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty. To abolish
them is not to violate a "principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience
of our people as to be ranked as fundamental." Snyder v. Massachusetts, [291 U.S. 97]
... 105; Brown v. Mississippi, [297 U.S. 278] ... 285; Hebert v. Louisiana, [272 U.S.
312] .

.

. 316. Few would be so narrow or provincial as to maintain that a fair and

enlightened system of justice would be impossible without them. 'What is true of jury
trials and indictments is true also, as the cases show, of the immunity from compulsory
self-incrimination. Twining v. New Jersey, [211 U.S. 78] ....

and justice still be done.5

This too might be lost,

More recently Chief Justice Warren tried to formulate guidelines for
legislative committees in Watkins v. United States,' saying:
But, broad as is this power of inquiry, it is not unlimited. There is no general authority to expose the private affairs of individuals without justification in terms of the
* Member of the New York Bar. Mr. Fraenkel received his A.B. and A.M. from Harvard

University and his LL.B. from Columbia Law School. He is associated with the firm of
Hays, St. John, Abramson & Heilbron, and is a Director of the New York Civil Liberties
Union.
1.

384 U.S. 436 (1966).

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

384 U.S. 719 (1966).
5 US. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
302 U.S. 319 (1937).
Id. at325.
354 U.S. 178 (1957).
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functions of the Congress. This was freely conceded by the Solicitor General in his

argument of this case. Nor is the Congress a law enforcement or trial agency. These
are functions of the executive and judicial departments of government. No inquiry is
an end in itself; it must be related to, and in furtherance of, a legitimate task of the
Congress. Investigations conducted solely for the personal aggrandizement of the

7
investigators or to "punish" those investigated are indefensible.

Perhaps the most comprehensive venture of the kind is to be found in
Mr. Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Brown v. Allen.8 There
he laid down explicit rules for the guidance of federal district courts in

habeas corpus proceedings challenging state convictions, guides somewhat
amplified later in Townsend v. Sainf

It is probable, however, that no case can be found in which the Court
has gone so far in laying down rules for the future as it did in Miranda.
The four cases then decided involved the question of the admissibility of
statements made by a suspect while in police custody and in the absence
of counsel. That problem, in one form or another, had troubled the Court
for a long time. In federal cases the Court had, beginning in 1943, ruled
that no statement was admissible which had been taken while a person
was held by federal agents for an unreasonable length of time before
being arraigned,"0 but no particular attention was given to the absence
of a lawyer. And the rule was held based on the Court's supervisory power
over inferior federal tribunals, not on the Constitution."
But, in review of state convictions, the Court's power must rest on
some provision of the federal constitution. For a long time it had
wrestled with confessions obtained after persistent questioning in the
absence of lawyers, but rested its reversals primarily on the ignorance
or youth of the defendant and the seriousness of the crime.'
The question of counsel did come up in three cases decided in June
1958, in all of which the state action was upheld. In one,'8 Justices Black
7. Id. at 187. (Footnote omitted.)
8. 344 U.S. 443, 488-508 (1953).

9. 372 U.S. 293,312-19 (1963).
10. Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957); Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S.
410 (1948) ; McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
11. Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410, 414 n.2 (1948); McNabb v. United States,
318 U.S. 332, 340-41 (1943).
12. Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957); Harris v. South Carolina, 338 U.S. 68 (1949);
Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62 (1949); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949); Lee v.
Mississippi, 332 U.S. 742 (1948) ; Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948) ; Ashcraft v. Tennessee,
322 U.S. 143 (1944) (direct review of conviction), 327 U.S. 274 (1946) (on remand) ; Ward
v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547 (1942). But see Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181 (1952); Wilson v.
Louisiana, 341 U.S. 901 (1951) (per curiam).
13. Ashdown v. Utah, 357 U.S. 426 (1958).
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and Douglas dissented on the ground that relatives of the prisoner had
objected to her being questioned in the absence of counsel; " in another,"5
Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black, Douglas, and Brennan dissented
because the prisoner had expressly said he wanted a lawyer; 0 in the
third, 17 the prisoner had actually retained a lawyer who had been refused admittance-here the dissenters were the same "8 except for Justice
Brennan who had not participated because the case arose in New Jersey,
on whose supreme court he had once sat. In these three cases the majority
took the position that states must be free to use police investigations
unhampered by lawyers so long as the questions are not coercive.
In Spano v. New York 19 the Court did not reach this issue since the
conviction was reversed on the ground that improper pressure had been
used. But Justices Black, Douglas, Brennan, and Stewart wanted to rest
the decision on the additional ground of refusal to let defendant have a
lawyer while being questioned."0
The police, in Haynes v. Washington,2 ' had refused the defendant access to his wife and counsel but indicated that this would be allowed after
confession. On that narrow ground, the conviction was reversed. The
stage was thus set for the next step which was taken in 1964 in Escobedo
v. Illinois: In that case the police denied the accused's request to see a
lawyer who had been retained and had come to the police station. A
majority of the Court set the conviction aside on the ground that a person
in police custody has the right to consult with a lawyer if he wishes to.
Immediately there was a spate of interpretations, judicial, scholarly,
and political. Some took the view that the case barred all confessions
obtained in the absence of counsel; 3 others that the case must be limited
to its exact facts. 24 Naturally, most police and prosecuting officials expressed hostility. 25 This was noted by Chief Justice Warren in the next

case to present the problem, Miranda v. Arizona.:" His opinion there
14. Id. at 431.
15. Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958).
16.

Id. at 441.

17. Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U.S. 504 (1958).
18. Id. at 511.
19. 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
20. Id. at 324-27.
21. 373 U.S. 503 (1963).
22. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
23. E.g., Herman, The Supreme Court and Restrictions on Police Interrogation, 25 Ohio
St. L.J. 449, 499 (1964).
24. E.g., Dowling, Escobedo and Beyond: The Need for a Fourteenth Amendment Code
of Criminal Procedure, 56 J. Crim. L., C. & P.S. 143-44 (1965).
25. See, e.g., authorities cited by the Miranda Court, 384 U.S. 436, 441 n.3 (1966).
26. Id. at 440-41 nn.1-3.
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reviewed earlier decisions dealing not only with the right to counsel, which
had been the basis of Escobedo, but also with the privilege against selfincrimination, which the Chief Justice made the basis of the new decision.17 He dealt at length with current police practices in the interrogation of suspects and noted that many abuses still continued.2 8
The opinion declared that a suspect must be advised that if he is indigent a lawyer will be appointed to represent him29 and that if the state
claims he waived his right to a lawyer it must carry a heavy burden of
proof.30 In closing, the Chief Justice rejected the view that society's need
for interrogation outweights the privilege. 31 Justices Clark, Harlan, Stewart, and White disagreed. Justice Clark insisted that "custodial interrogation" was an essential tool and that a confession should not be barred
unless the "totality of circumstances" evidenced that it had not been
voluntarily obtained 2 Justices Harlan, Stewart, and White dissented on
the ground that there was no constitutional basis for discarding confessions not obtained by improper methods and that such had been the
course of earlier decisions. 33
It is apparent that the Court reached new ground in Miranda. Indeed,
it can be argued that it adopted a code of police conduct which, ordinarily,
it would be the function of a legislature to promulgate. The Court's
action in the later Johnson case rather confirms this diagnosis.
Johnson dealt with the issue of retroactivity, an issue which has assumed increasing importance as the Court has, from time to time, widened
the areas of protection of individual rights. That issue first arose in connection with the right of an indigent to obtain a free transcript for
purposes of appeal. In Griffin v. Illinois34 the Court reversed a conviction
on that ground. Two years later it held that a person who had so lost his
opportunity to appeal was, years later, entitled to raise the issue on
petition for habeas corpus and be released unless given the transcript
and allowed an appeal. 5
0
Similarly, when the Court finally ruled, in Gideon v. Wainwright,"
that a defendant in a state court was, under all circumstances, entitled to
27. Id. at 439.
28. Id. at 445-58.
29. Id. at 473.
30. Id. at 475-76.
31. Id. at 479-81.
32. Id. at 501-03 (clark, J., separate opinion).
33. Id. at 504 (dissenting opinion); id. at 526 (dissenting opinion).
34. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
35. Eskridge v. Washington State Bd. of Prison Terms and Paroles, 357 U.S. 214 (1958).
See also Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961).
36. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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counsel, that ruling was retroactively applied, not in direct review but
on habeas corpus. Collateral attack was allowed in Jackson v. Denno37
which was also retroactively applied. In those cases the Court justified the
result because "the rule affected 'the very integrity of the fact-finding
process' and averted 'the clear danger of convicting the innocent.' ""
But in two other situations the Court had, belore Miranda, refused to
allow retroactive application to a new rule. The rule of Mapp v. Ohio,w9
that state courts might not use evidence obtained through an unreasonable
search and seizure, was denied retroactive application in Linkletter V.
Walker, 0 and that of Griffin v. Califoria,' forbidding comment on the
failure of a defendant to testify, was similarly restricted in Tehan v.
United States ex rel. Shott.'
And now, in Johnson, the Court followed these last decisions. The
Chief Justice noted that to allow retroactivity would seriously disrupt the
administration of criminal laws and require the retrial, or release if retrial proved impracticable, of large numbers of persons.4 3 Justices Black
and Douglas, who had dissented in Linkletter, reaffirmed that dissent. 4
There is, however, a peculiarity about the majority decision in Johnson
which further emphasizes the legislative character of Miranda.Ordinarily,
when a new legal principle is announced by a high court, it becomes
available to all persons whose appeals are still pending regardless of
when the trial had taken place, even if not to be applied to cases in which
the appeal process has been concluded, and that had been widely done in
various state cases involving illegal searches."5 But now the Court suggested that the rules laid down in Escobedo and Miranda should, respectively, apply only to trials begun after those cases had been decided.
The Chief Justice said:
Future defendants will benefit fully from our new standards governing in-custody
interrogation, while past defendants may still avail themselves of the voluntariness
test. Law enforcement officers and trial courts will have fair notice that statements
taken in violation of these standards may not be used against an accused. Prospective
application only to trials begun after the standards were announced is particularly
appropriate here. Authorities attempting to protect the privilege have not been apprised heretofore of the specific safeguards which are now obligatory. Consequently
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

378 U.S. 368 (1964).
Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 US. 719, 727-28 (1966).
367 US. 643 (1961).
381 U.S. 618 (1965).
380 U.S. 609 (1965).
42. 382 U.S. 406 (1966).
43. 384 U.S. at 731-32.
44. Id. at 736.
45. See, e.g., authorities cited by the Court in Tehan v. United States ex rl. Shott, 382
U.S. 406, 409 n.3 (1966), and Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 622 n.4 (1965).
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they have adopted devices which, although below the constitutional minimum, were
not intentional evasions of the requirements of the privilege. In these circumstances, to
upset all of the convictions still pending on direct appeal which were obtained in trials
preceding Escobedo and Miranda would impose an unjustifiable burden on the adminis46
tration of justice.

Why the date of trial should have been chosen rather than the date of
questioning does not appear. Surely the language just quoted seems better
calculated to fit the latter time.4" The Chief Justice noted, however, that
the states were free to impose stricter standards and apply them to a
wider range of cases.4
Regardless of the philosophical character of the pronouncements in
Miranda, there can be little doubt that they have cleared the air. After
learning to live with the new rules, police and prosecutors should be able
to function adequately. And the protection of the individual has been
immeasurably advanced.
46. 384 U.S. at 732-33. (Emphasis added.)
47. In consequence of its refusal to apply the rules announced in Miranda to trials begun
before the date of the Miranda decision, the Court denied certiorari in a large number of
cases which, like Miranda, arose on direct review and were of the same vintage. Turner v.
Texas, 384 U.S. 1021 (1966), and 39 other cases. 384 U.S. at 1021-25. No explanation was
given why the one group should have been favored over the other and only Mr. Justice
Douglas noted dissent. 384 U.S. at 1020-21. See also Russo v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 1012
(1966), and 76 other cases, 384 U.S. at 1012-20, where the Court denied certiorari. Justice
Douglas again noted dissent and would have remanded them for reconsideration in the light
of Miranda on the ground that it was impossible to discover from the records whether the
principles announced in Miranda had been violated. 384 U.S. at 1012. In Mann v. Wainwright, 384 U.S. 996 (1966), and 3 other cases, 384 U.S. at 996-97, the Court treated motions
for leave to file petitions for writs of habeas corpus as petitions for writs of certiorari and
denied them. Mr. Justice Douglas would have remanded these cases for reconsideration In
the light of Miranda upon the same ground, that the records did not disclose whether the
Miranda guidelines had been violated. 384 U.S. at 996.
48. 384 U.S. at 733.

EVELLE J. YOUNGER*
OW that Miranda v. Arizona1 has levied an additional tax on police
practices, there is national concern over the sweep of the judicial pendulum. Some say that it has left the clock entirely. It is appropriate that we
consider the effect of Miranda to determine whether the majority opinion
in that case justifies a belief that law enforcement has lost the confession
as a valuable tool and will be thereby unable to control crime. How much
have recent decisions hampered public prosecutors? Can we live with
these decisions?
In the wake of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Escobedo
v. Illinois,2 the supreme court of California considered the case of Robert
Dorado' who, while serving a life sentence, was convicted of the capital
offense of assault with a deadly weapon on a fellow prisoner which resulted in the death of the fellow prisoner.4 Following its own liberal interpretation of the Escobedo opinion,5 that court concluded that Dorado's
confession
could not properly be introduced into evidence because (1) the investigation was no
longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but had begun to focus on a particular
suspect, (2) the suspect was in custody, (3) the authorities had carried out a process of
interrogations that lent itself to eliciting incriminating statements, (4) the authorities
had not effectively informed defendant of his right to counsel or of his absolute right
to remain silent, and no evidence establishes that he had waived these rights.0

Following the Dorado decision, a survey was taken in order to assess
* District Attorney of the County of Los Angeles, California. Mr. Younger received his
A.B. and LL.B. degrees from the University of Nebraska. He has served as a special agent
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, as Prosecutor of the City of Pasadena and as a
Municipal and Superior Court judge in Los Angeles. He is a Brigadier General in the United
States Air Force Reserve.
1. 384 US. 436 (1966).
2. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
3. People v. Dorado, 62 Cal. 2d 338, 398 P.2d 361, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169 (1965), cert. denied,
381 U.S. 937, 946 (1965).
4. Dorado was convicted under former § 4500 of the California penal code. Conviction
automatically resulted in the death penalty.
S. Other state courts followed quite different interpretations. E.g., People v. Hartgraves,
31 Il. 2d 375, 202 N.E.2d 33 (1964).
6. 62 Cal. 2d at 353-54, 398 P.2d at 371, 42 Cal. Rptr. at 179.
In the case of In re Lopez, 62 Cal. 2d 368, 398 P.2d 380, 42 Cal. Rptr. 188 (1965), cert.
denied, 384 US. 1016 (1966), the supreme court of California held neither Escobedo nor
Dorado would be applied to "cases which have become final prior to the date that the
United States Supreme Court rendered the Escobedo decision (June 22, 1964]." Id. at 372, 398
P.2d at 383, 42 CaL Rptr. at 191. (Footnote omitted.)
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TABLE I
Dono SuRvEY, COMPLANT STAGE

Defendants
(a) confession or admission
(b) no confession or admission

249
367
616

TOTAL
Complaints Issued
(a) confession or admission
(1) sufficient independent evidence for conviction
(2) insufficient independent evidence for conviction

149
53
202
236

(b) no confession or admission

438
Rejections
(a) confession or admission
(1) confession or admission not admissible due
to Dorado and insufficient independent evidence
(2) confession or admission was admissible, rejected on other grounds

2*
45
47
131

(b) no confession or admission

178
TOTAL
*

616

One of these is not certain as the information sheet regarding it was not complete.

the impact of the Dorado requirements upon the work of the District Attorney's Office in Los Angeles.'
Confessions or admissions were present in 40% of the requests for
felony complaints received from police agencies during this Dorado survey
period. Felony complaints were issued in 71% of the requests for such
complaints received from police agencies during this survey period.' In
46% of these cases there were confessions or admissions. Only 1% of the
complaints were rejected solely upon the ground of the Dorado rule. The
7. Firm conclusions cannot be reached on the basis of this survey. The sample, taken the
week of December 13-17, 1965, was comparatively small and many of the replies received
were incomplete or inconsistent. Memorandum From Earl Osadehey to Lynn D. Compton,
Assistant District Attorney, January 4, 1966. In addition, as no figures were available for
the pre-Dorado period, evaluation of the comparative effect of that case was not possible.
Ibid.
8. See table 1.
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TABLE II
DoRmo SURVEY, PRE.UNtARY STAGE
Defendants
198
165

(a) confession or admission
(b) no confession or admission

363

TOTAL
Confessions or Admissions
(a) introduced
(1) received
(2) not received

139
2
141

(b) not introduced
(c) plea of guilty
(d) dismissed for refiling

52t
4
1
198

I One confession was not introduced by reason of delay. Of the remaining S, most were
not introduced at this stage as they were not required in order to hold the defendant to
answer.

admissions or confessions were deemed to have been required for conviction in only 26% of the cases in which complaints were issued, but the
Dorado requirements were said to have been met in all of these cases.
At the preliminary hearing stage,' there were only two confessions or
admissions which were offered and excluded. Neither of these were excluded by reason of the Dorado requirements.
In 51% of the cases at the trial stage10 where pleas of guilty were entered, the defendant had made a confession or admission. Of those defendants who went to trial, 85% were found guilty and, of these, one-third
had made a confession or admission. Admissions were thought to have
been essential in only three of the cases where a guilty verdict was obtained.
Only two admissions were excluded under the Dorado rule in those trials
resulting in not guilty verdicts and the exclusion did not influence the
result in those cases. There were no acquittals in any cases where there
were confessions even though one confession was excluded under Dorado.
There were four acquittals in cases where an admission was excluded, but
there were also seven acquittals wherein admissions were admitted.
Because of the limited sample and the limited nature of the questionnaire in this "Dorado Survey" it was difficult to arrive at any significant
9. See table 2.
10. See table 3.
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TABLE III
DORADO SURVEY, TRIAL STAGE
Guilty

(a) without confession or admission
(1) disposition by court or jury
(2) on plea of guilty

126
47
173

(b) with confession or admission
(1) on plea of guilty
(A) with admission
(B) with confession

18
31
49

(2) court or jury disposition
(A) with admission
(B) with confession

45t
18 *
63
112
285

Total Guilty
Not Guilty
22

(a) no confession or admission
(b) admission
(1) admitted
(2) excluded

7
4T

(c) confession

0*

11
Total Not Guilty
Total Defendents in Sample

33
318

t In 2 cases there was a disposition of guilty where there had been an admission which
was excluded due to the Dorado rule. In 1 case the admission was termed "surplusage," in
36 cases the effect of the admission was to enhance the prosecution's case, in 3 cases It was
essential and in 3 cases the effect was unknown.
* A confession was excluded in 1 case as a result of the rule in Dorado; in another the
confession was excluded because of the lack of an intelligent waiver; and in a third, the
confession was excluded because of the rule laid down in People v. Aranda, 12 Cal, 2d 307,
83 P.2d 928 (1938) (use of confessions against co-defendants).
In the remaining 15 cases, the confessions were said to have enhanced 12 cases and to be
essential to 3.
t Two of these admissions were excluded under the Aranda rule. The reason for the
exclusion in the other two cases is unknown.
There were a total of 74 admissions considered in this survey and, of these, a total of only
6 were excluded. The effect of the exclusion of the 4 admissions set forth above was said to
be the reaching of a different result in those cases. The exclusion of the other two admissions,
on the basis of the rule in the Dorado case, had no effect on the outcome of those cases.
** There were no court or jury acquittals in cases where a confession was admitted or
where a confession was excluded because of the Dorado rule.

1966]

259

MIRANDA
TABLE IV
MIRANDA SURVEY, Co1PLAnZT STAGE

Confession or Admission
(a) complaint issued
(1) Miranda admonition given
(2) Miranda admonition not given
(A) admissible
(B) inadmissible

433
27*
lit
38
471

(b) complaint not issued
(1) Miranda admonition given
(2) Miranda admonition not given

235
15"
250

(3) rejected due to Miranda
(4) rejected for other cause

3
247
250

No Confession or Admission
(a) complaint issued
(b) complaint not issued

357t
359ff

Thirteen of these defendants were not in custody when the statements were made.
Complaints were, nevertheless, issued in all of these cases.
** One of these defendants was not in custody when the statement was made.
T No Miranda admonition was given to 143 of these defendants.
i1 Miranda admonitions were given to 224 of these defendants and in 106 cases the
reason for rejection was insufficient evidence or insufficient connecting evidence.
*

conclusion except to venture the view that Dorado did not present a difficult problem in the prosecution of current cases.
The requirements set forth in Dorado nearly approached those laid
down by the United States Supreme Court, a year later, in Miranda.The
adjustment required for prosecutors in the State of California was, therefore, correspondingly small. The Supreme Court in Mirandarequired that
in the absence of other "fully effective" procedural safeguards "the person
must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he
does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to
the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed."" The Court
further required that any waiver of these rights be made "voluntarily,
knowingly and intelligently"' and placed a heavy burden of proof of
waiver on the prosecution."3
11.
12.
13.

384 U.S. at 444.
Ibid.
Id. at 47S.

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35

TABLE V
hnnARY STAOE
MANDA SURVEY, PRi
Confession or Admission Admitted
(a) defendant held to answer
(b) complaint dismissed

160
6
166

Confession or Admission Excluded
(a) defendant held to answer
(b) complaint dismissed

17
6
23*

No Confession or Admission
(a) defendant held to answer
(b) complaint dismissed

422
54
476

* All but two of these were excluded for failure to comply with the Miranda guidelines.

Another survey was undertaken after the Miranda decision to determine the effect of these requirements on the prosecution of current
felony cases.' 4
Confessions and admissions were present in 50% of the requests for
felony complaints received from police agencies during this survey
period. 5 This compares favorably with the 40% figure arrived at in the
Dorado survey the previous year. Felony complaints were issued in 58%
of the total requests for complaints and, of these, 57% had made confessions, admissions, or other statements as compared to 46% in the prior
survey.
In 11 instances the Miranda admonition was not given and the statements were deemed inadmissible, nevertheless complaints were issued,
evidently because there was sufficient independent evidence. Only 1% of
the rejections of requests for complaints were attributed to Miranda and
a lack of sufficient independent evidence without the inadmissible statement.
The only valid conclusion that could be drawn from these figures is
that police officers are complying with the Miranda requirements, and that
the extra-judicial statements which have been obtained since that de14. The survey covered a period of approximately three weeks ending on July 15, 1966.
Memorandum From Earl Osadchey to Lynn D. Compton, Assistant District Attorney, July
28, 1966.
Since this survey followed closely upon the heels of the Miranda decision, many of the
defendants in the preliminary stage and most of the defendants at the trial stage were
arrested prior to Miranda, when only the Dorado admonition was being given. Ibid.
15. See table 4.
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TABLE VI
MULA-oA SuRvay, T=L STAGE

Pleaded Guilty
(a) with confession or admission
(b) without confession or admission
(c) unknown

3
273

Confession or Admission Admitted
(a) motion to dismiss (Pen. Code § 995) denied
(b) motion to dismiss (Pen. Code § 995) granted
(c) defendant convicted
(d) defendant acquitted

6
6
82t
20t
114

Confession or Admission Excluded
(a) motion to dimiss (Pen. Code § 995) denied
(b) motion to dismiss (Pen. Code § 995) granted
(c) defendant convicted
(d) defendant acquitted

71ff
40Ul
121

No Confession or Admission
(a) motion to dismiss (Pen. Code § 995) denied
(b) motion to dismiss (Pen. Code § 995) granted
(c) defendant convicted
(d) defendant acquitted

4
3
120
43
170

* The confession or admission was thought to be necessary in 34 cases and unnecessary in
112 cases. There was no indication in 27 cases.
t There were 45 admissions and 33 confessions in non-jury cases while there were 2
admissions and 2 confessions in jury cases. Nineteen of the confessions and 14 of the admissions were considered to be necessary, 44 were not necessary and there was no indication
as to 5.
t There was only 1 admission in a jury case while there were 2 confessions and 17 admissions in non-jury cases.
** The exclusion of 6 confessions and 3 admissions was attributed to Miranda. Of these,
2 admissions and 3 confessions were claimed to have been necessary for conviction.
The convictions were obtained in 65 non-jury and 6 jury cases.
It All of these cases were filed prior to the Miranda decision. There were IS admissions
and 16 confessions excluded because of Miranda but only 8 admissions and 14 confessions
were considered necessary. There were 35 non-jury cases and 5 jury cases.
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cision are admissible. There had been no decrease as compared to the
Dorado survey in the percentage of extra-judicial statements which were
admissible."6
No confessions or admissions were offered in 70% of the preliminary
hearings during this survey. 7 There were 16 defendants who were held to
answer where their extra-judicial statements were offered but not admitted
in evidence. All but one were excluded under Miranda, but the effect of
these exclusions upon the trial in the superior court could not be gauged.
Complaints were dismissed in 66 cases and in 9% of these an extrajudicial statement had been excluded under Miranda. However, 4 out of
these 6 dismissals involved complaints filed prior to the Miranda ruling.
In general, then, the Miranda ruling did not appear to affect prosecutions
at the preliminary stage.
The results of the survey of cases at the trial stage1 are quite inconclusive as most of these defendants had been arrested and the complaint
issued before the date of that decision. A comparison of the conviction
rate for the sample of cases in this "Miranda Survey" with the prior year
shows a decrease from 90.6% to 80.4% 9 This decrease can be explained
by the fact that there were necessary confessions or admissions excluded
because of the application of Miranda rules to pre-Miranda arrests at the
trials in 22 of these cases which resulted in acquittal. Since each of these
cases was filed prior to Miranda, it is anticipated that this problem will not
persist when cases filed after that decision reach the superior court.
The significance of confessions or admissions in obtaining convictions
is subject to varying conclusions, but such statements were considered
necessary in only 40% of the cases resulting in conviction after trial.
There were 71 defendants who made extra-judicial statements which were
not admitted in evidence, but who were nevertheless convicted. In only
10% of the cases decided after trial or on pleas of guilty was the confession or admission deemed necessary.
Thus, although it would appear that the Miranda decision is causing
problems in the prosecution of the current cases which were filed prior to
this decision, it does not appear that the Miranda requirements will create any significant difficulties in the prosecution of future cases.
16. As requests for complaints are made only when the police officers are satisfied that
there is sufficient evidence to establish the corpus and sufficient connecting evidence regarding the particular suspect, the figures do not disclose the number of cases which never go
beyond the police agencies.
17. See table S.
18. See table 6.
19. Memorandum From Earl Osadchey to Lynn D. Compton, Assistant District Attorney,
July 28, 1966.

